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JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE: WHAT
THEY WERE, WHAT THEY ARE, AND WHAT
THEY OUGHT TO BE
EUGENE R. MILHIZERt
INTRODUCTION
Few concepts are as basic to the law-or religion,
philosophy, and life, for that matter-as are "justification" and
"excuse." They are fundamental guideposts for how we live our
lives and interact with others. In the context of the criminal law,
justification and excuse are touchstones for prescribing and
proscribing conduct generally, and for assigning guilt or
innocence in the particular case. They are always implicit, and
often explicit, in every crime that a society chooses to recognize.
They are of paramount importance in both establishing the
parameters of criminal offenses and providing for their
principled enforcement. It is not an overstatement to observe
that a moral and coherent understanding and application of
justification and excuse is indispensable to a moral and coherent
system of criminal laws.1
f Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. B.A., 1976, University
of Michigan; J.D., 1979, University of Michigan School of Law; LL.M., 1988, The
Judge Advocate General's School, 1988. The author served as a Judge Advocate in
the United States Army for twenty-one years, and has written numerous articles on
criminal law and procedure, and military topics. The author thanks Tulsi Rogers,
Albert A. Starkus III, and John Dejak for their significant contributions as research
assistants. The author also thanks three colleagues at Ave Maria School of Law-
Dean Joseph L. Falvey, Professor Charles E. Rice, and especially Professor Howard
Bromberg-for their invaluable insight and guidance. Finally, the author is grateful
to Professor Joshua Dressler and Professor Paul H. Robinson for their scholarship
and encouragement.
1 As Cicero writes in his Laws:
[I]n fact there has never been a villain so brazen as not to deny that he had
committed a crime, or else invent some story of just anger to excuse its
commission, and seek justification for his crime in some natural principle
of right. Now if even the wicked dare to appeal to such principles, how
jealously should they be guarded by the good!
THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 47 (Clarence Morris ed., 1959) (emphasis added).
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Perhaps the clearest expression of justification and excuse
within the criminal law is as general or affirmative defenses.
When operating in this fashion, justification and excuse provide
an exculpatory rationale for finding an actor not guilty, even if
he has engaged in all the conduct, possessed the state of mind,
and caused the harm otherwise necessary to constitute a crime.
These defensive theories, as traditionally understood, exonerate
based on principles that are broader than the facts of a
particular case, because of the manner in which they
appropriately apply to the facts of a particular case.
Justification and excuse defenses thus involve applying the
general to the specific, in order to make a principled judgment as
to whether a given defendant ought to be stigmatized as a
criminal and punished accordingly.
Although justification and excuse thus operate similarly in a
procedural sense, they are, as discussed in greater detail later in
this article, rudimentarily different in terms of their substance.
Justification defenses focus on the act and not the actor-they
exculpate otherwise criminal conduct because it benefits society,
or because the conduct is in some other way judged to be socially
useful. 2 Excuse defenses focus on the actor and not the act-
they exculpate even though an actor's conduct may have harmed
society because the actor, for whatever reason, is not judged to
be blameworthy. 3 Accordingly, a mother would be justified-and
thus be in no need of an excuse-for trespassing into a hardware
store to appropriate tools to rescue her son trapped in a house
fire; she would be excused-but not justified-for robbing the
store at the behest of her son's kidnapper in exchange for her
son's safe return.4 Society has determined through its criminal
2 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 17.02[B], at 207 (3d
ed. 2001).
3 The axiom-justification concerns the act and excuse concerns the actor-and
its variants have been critiqued as being "perhaps too simplistic." Joshua Dressier,
New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of
Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 67 (1984). As will be
urged later in the article, however, this doctrinal description of justification and
excuse remains a principled and effective foundation for defining and applying
defenses based on these theories.
4 In the latter situation, the robbery also benefits society, as the violation of
property rights caused by the trespassing is clearly less harmful than the death of
child. But, as will be discussed later, excuse is not dependent on a lesser evils
rationale. Thus, the mother might be excused for cutting off the hand of an innocent
person-or even two hands and an arm-in response to a threat to cut off the hand
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justice system that a mother does not deserve to be stigmatized
or punished in either circumstance.
Although the distinction between justification and excuse
was formally "a matter of profound practical significance," 5 over
time the defenses came to be viewed as two almost
interchangeable means to the same end-the acquittal of a
defendant notwithstanding that the prosecution had established
all the elements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.6 The
differences between justification and excuse have often been
misunderstood or ignored by courts,7 commentators," legislators,9
and even headnote writers. 10 The United States Supreme Court,
commenting on this repeated conflation, observed that "[m]odern
cases have tended to blur the distinction between duress [an
excuse defense] and necessity [a justification defense]."11 Some
commentators, perhaps as much out of frustration as principle,
have even advocated that the "criminal law should not attempt
to distinguish between justification and excuse in a fully
systematic way."'12  This widespread indifference and
of her child.
5 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.01, at 205.
6 In more recent times, however, there has been some renewed scholarly
interest in justification and excuse defenses. See id. at n.1 (collecting several
comparatively recent law review articles addressing justification and excuse).
7 E.g., United States v. Fleming, 19 C.M.R. 438, 450 (A.B.R. 1955) (confusing
duress and necessity); State v. Cozzens, 490 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Neb. 1992)
("Therefore, the justification... defense operates to legally excuse conduct that
would otherwise subject a person to criminal sanctions.") (emphasis added); Regina
v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 286-87 (1884) ("Now it is admitted that the
deliberate killing of this unoffending and unresisting boy was clearly murder, unless
the killing can be justified by some well-recognised excuse admitted by the law.")
(emphasis added).
s E.g., Erica Luckstead, Choice of Evils Defense in Texas: Necessity, Duress and
Public Duty, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 179, 180-81 (1982) (identifying necessity as a
failure of proof defense).
9 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1011 (1936), amended by § 26-901 (1972) ("There
being no rational distinction between excusable and justifiable homicide, it shall no
longer exist."); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2008 (West 2003) (providing that an obligor
is "relieved of liability" if "failure to perform the principal obligation is justified by a
valid excuse") (emphasis added).
10 E.g., United States v. Hullum, 15 M.J. 261 (C.M.A. 1983) (citing
inappropriately "necessity" in headnote 2, although the court's opinion does not
discuss this). For a collection of misuses of the terms "justification" and "excuse," see
Dressier, supra note 3, at 65-66, and Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification:
Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 269,
276 (1975).
11 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980).
12 Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Boarders of Justification and Excuse, 84
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misunderstanding about these distinct rationales helps explain
why justification or excuse defenses are sometimes disallowed
for reasons that are completely unrelated to whether the conduct
at issue should be exculpated.' 3  It also helps explain the
willingness of some to accept nonsensical theories for exculpation
that are irreconcilable with a principled conception of
justification or excuse. 14
The thesis of this article is that modern criminal law
systems must preserve-and, to the extent necessary,
rediscover-a clear distinction between justification and excuse
defenses, based upon intuitively understood and transcendent
conceptions of these principles, which are applied in a systematic
and coherent fashion. This is not urged for mere housekeeping
reasons or organizational elegance, although these purposes do
have some utility. Rather, a clear and broadly recognized
distinction between justification and excuse, founded upon
COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1898 (1984); see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES art. 3 at 2-4 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
[hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE] (expressing skepticism at being able to draw
meaningful distinctions between justification and excuse, and reasoning that the
benefits of drawing such lines are outweighed by the difficulty of doing so in the
case of modern and complex criminal codes).
13 For example, a traditionally recognized requirement for the justification
defense of necessity is that the conditions that trigger the availability of the defense
must emanate from natural forces rather than from human beings. JEROME HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 426 (2d ed. 1961); WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 10 (1972); GLANVILLE
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 757 (2d ed. 1961) ("Duress is a
species of necessity, in that it is necessity created by the illegal conduct of another,
and not by natural forces."). Conversely, duress traditionally required that the
triggering conditions be of human origin. 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
DEFENSES § 177(e), at 355-56 (1984); WILLIAMS, supra. Leaving aside the practical
difficulties sometimes encountered in drawing such distinctions (i.e., whether the
threat posed by a forest fire started by an inattentive smoker is of a natural or
human origin), such limitations would inflexibly and irrationally exclude the
possibility of a necessity or duress defense for reasons that are completely unrelated
to whether an actor's conduct ought to be justified or excused. For example, such a
rigid distinction would categorically disallow the necessity defense for an actor who
trespasses upon a chemical plant to save someone who is about to be killed by a
synthetic solvent that was released by a worker, because the threat emanated from
a human rather than a natural source.
14 See generally Stephen J. Morse, The "New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome,"
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1995, at 3 (discussing how syndrome evidence
might be used to modify traditional criminal defenses). This matter is addressed in
greater detail in Section IV of this article, where several proposed new defenses are
examined critically, particularly Social Background Defenses and Battered Woman
Syndrome.
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objectively true and immutable norms for exculpation, is
necessary if a criminal law system is to be moral, just, and
tethered to principles that are greater than itself. That the body
of American criminal law, and indeed American society itself,
has become more complex and fractured over time supports
rather than undermines this thesis, as the recognition of
principled and distinct defenses based on justification and excuse
would infuse the criminal law with greater coherence and help
correct society's drifting moral compass. In an age where what is
right and what is legal have become increasingly synonymous, it
is imperative that the law, wherever possible, unequivocally
express sound and consistent moral judgments.
Beyond all of this, a clear distinction between justification
and excuse ought to be drawn because, pragmatically, it can be
drawn. Even as the criminal law has become increasingly
sophisticated, specialized, and even counter-intuitive, 15
affirmative defenses remain amenable to expressing naturally
understood content that can be broadly applied to a wide range
of offenses and across all jurisdictions. The principled
formulation of justification and excuse urged here can fully
achieve the legitimate ends of lawmakers with respect to
criminal offenses and punishment, including retribution,
deterrence, rehabilitation and denunciation. Likewise, it can
generally obtain the results desired by society in particular cases
and circumstances, but do so in a manner that enhances respect
for the law and without undue reliance on jury nullification or
resort to ad hoc distortions of jurisprudential first principles.
The specific application of justification and excuse proposed
in the article is discussed in greater detail in Section V. Before
addressing this, it is useful to survey briefly the development of
justification and excuse as criminal defenses in the Western
legal tradition (Section II), to consider the conventional approach
15 The incoherence of the criminal law is traceable, in part, to the proliferation
of malum prohibitum offenses. These crimes punish conduct or results that are not
innately wrong, as opposed to murder or rape, but rather are unlawful only because
the law says they are unlawful-such as black-marketing or jaywalking. See ROLLIN
M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 884-85 (3d ed. 1982). It is also
traceable to the increasing complexity of the law and punitive regulations. See, e.g.,
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (discussing the complexity of the
federal income tax code in the context of a mistake of law defense). The impact of
malum prohibitum offenses and complex criminal statutes are addressed in Section
V, infra.
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toward criminal defenses generally, and justification and excuse
in particular, taken by modern American jurisdictions (Section
III), and to review some of the novel and problematic approaches
to justification and excuse that have been more recently
proposed (Section IV).
I. HISTORICAL SURVEY OF JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE AS
CRIMINAL DEFENSES
In order to more fully understand and appreciate how
justification and excuse are recognized as criminal defenses in
contemporary American jurisprudence, it is instructive to
consider how these concepts developed and evolved in the
Western legal tradition. This will be accomplished by selectively
and briefly surveying several important early legal systems,
focusing principally on their approaches to justification and
excuse.
This review will be limited in several ways. First, it will
examine only a handful of the multitudinous and varied legal
systems that have existed throughout history. 16 The systems to
be reviewed were not necessarily selected because of their
intrinsic merit or practical significance-the Chinese legal
tradition helps govern the day-to-day life of over a billion people,
but it will not be reviewed here.17 Rather, certain systems have
been chosen primarily because of their collective, profound
influence upon contemporary American jurisprudence in general,
and modern attitudes about justification and excuse in
particular. Moreover, the varying ways in which certain legal
systems have treated these defensive theories can inform our
16 For example, the Continental system of Europe has long recognized
justification and excuse as defensive theories, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 657-74 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1978), but this has
not been surveyed here because it has not significantly influenced American legal
thought.
17 Chinese legal history does, in fact, appear to reflect some acceptance of
defensive theories based on justification and excuse. For example, the Zhou Dynasty
(1122-256 B.C.) officially attributed the fall of the previous Shang-Yin Dynasty to
the widespread use of alcohol. As a result, all drinking was banned and a death
sentence was imposed on those who violated this law. During the Western Zhou Era
of the Dynasty a specific exemption was made for members of the Yin (Shang)
people who drank. Their lives were spared because Yin (Shang) law had allowed
drinking and many of its citizens had become alcoholics. Instead, the order was to
rehabilitate them. See YONGPING LIu, ORIGINS OF CHINESE LAW: PENAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN ITS EARLY DEVELOPMENT 124 (1998).
730 [Vol.78:725
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consideration of some of the radical conceptions of justification
and excuse now urged by commentators and critics. Finally,
particular legal systems have been selected because they can
provide insight into and support for the principled
understanding and application of justification and excuse urged
in Section V of this article.
Second, the historical review is selective insofar as it will
examine certain legal systems primarily with respect to how
they conceptualized and applied justification and excuse as
criminal defenses. In order to accomplish this limited purpose, it
will often prove necessary to describe some of the basic
substantive and procedural attributes of a legal system, as well
as commenting briefly on the surrounding culture, including its
social, political, religious, and economic aspects. But this
broader examination, when and to the extent that it is
undertaken, is performed solely as a means for better
understanding how a particular legal system treated
justification and excuse, and not for the end of providing a
comprehensive historical study of that system.
The historical survey is constrained by a third type of
selectivity that is externally imposed, and which might be
referred to as the limitations of the historical record. Of course,
many ancient materials pertaining to justification and excuse
have been lost or destroyed during the passage of time. Beyond
this, earlier societies did not always memorialize a thorough or
perhaps even representative record of how they approached
justification and excuse as criminal defenses. The reasons for
this are many and varied, and include different approaches to
criminal justice,18 unique cultural and political realities and
priorities, lower rates of literacy, technological limitations, and a
variety of other explanations. Oftentimes, only the most
celebrated or politically significant cases involving justification
or excuse have been recorded. Accordingly, extrapolation and
conjecture are sometimes necessary. Although this presents a
danger-one would certainly draw the wrong conclusions about
twentieth century weddings based on the marriage ceremony of
Princess Diana and Prince Charles, or criminal trials based on
18 For example, one would expect that a society's treatment of justification and
excuse defenses would be accessible through the recorded decisional authority in a
common-law system, and through the statutes and criminal codes of a positive-law
system.
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the O.J. Simpson case-the risks can be minimized by
recognizing that these distorting influences exist and accounting
for them as best as possible.
Among the other problems and challenges to be confronted is
an issue of word usage. What contemporary jurisprudence refers
to as "justification" or "excuse" is sometimes known by different
terms in other systems. Likewise, what these other systems call
"justification" and "excuse" may involve very different concepts
than our understanding of these words. 19 One way of addressing
this semantic imprecision, and an approach used throughout this
section, is to focus on the paradigmatic circumstances that raise
issues of justification and excuse-such as self-defense, duress,
necessity, insanity, intoxication, etc.-to evaluate how selected
legal systems addressed these situations, rather than to be
bound by the words themselves. This circumstantially-based
approach is especially useful given that many older legal
systems never developed a coherent or comprehensive systems of
defenses, in which particular and distinct defenses were
organized into categories based on justification and excuse.
Finally, even assuming a legal system's de jure treatment of
justification and excuse can be correctly understood, this official
usage does not necessarily correspond to that society's actual
understanding of these concepts. This dissonance might be
traceable to a variety of influences, acting distinctly or in
combination. The society could be elitist or insular, and its rule-
making process may be undemocratic. Certain aspects of the
substantive law may be vestigial appendages of a by-gone legal
system. 20 Indeed, gaining a proper understanding of a culture's
19 Terminology can be further confused with the introduction of philosophical or
theological references to "justification" and "excuse." For example, one of the
questions in St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica was, "Did the moral precepts
of the Old Law work justification?" St. Thomas replied:
Now justice, like the other virtues, may be acquired or infused. The
acquired virtue is caused by man's acts, the infused comes from God
Himself through grace. The latter is true justice, of which we here speak,
and on its account one is said to be just before God, according to Romans
[4: 2] "If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but
not before God."
29 ST. THOMAS ACQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 109 (Ia2ae. 100,12) (David Bourke
& Arthur Littledale trans., McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1969) [hereinafter SUMMA
THEOLOGICA]. Although a full understanding of the quoted passage is beyond the
scope of this article (and this author), it clearly reflects a far different meaning of
the term "justification" than is accorded to it in the criminal law.
20 For example, California is a community property state, which in the
[Vol.78:725
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social and moral conventions and norms, which are necessarily
complex and multi-faceted, can prove to be a far more daunting
task than knowing its formal laws and legal processes.
Despite all of the difficulties and vagaries noted here,
surveying past conceptions and usages of justification and excuse
remains well worth the effort. Accordingly, and with these
purposes and limitations in mind, this Section will examine the
cultures and systems that most strongly influenced our Western
legal tradition-those in the ancient world, as well as the
Jewish, Greek, Roman, and Common Law legal systems-
focusing on their understanding and usage of justification and
excuse as defensive criminal theories.
A. Justification and Excuse in the Ancient World
The civilizations that dotted the ancient world generally
lacked both the sophistication and the desire to establish and
implement complex and abstract theories of justification or
excuse. They were far more concerned with issuing and
enforcing practical, ad hoc commandments to govern the daily
interactions of their subjects. Nonetheless, their sometimes-
rudimentary understanding of justification and excuse, such as
it existed, was reflected in their culture generally, and in their
legal systems in particular. This was especially true in cases
where different punishments were mandated for the same crime
committed under slightly different conditions. As time
progressed, some societies introduced the refinement of
exculpatory circumstances, which had not been recognized by the
earlier cultures that they had conquered or subsumed. Some of
the more important early developments in the law with respect
to exculpatory defensive theories, and the ancient societies that
originated them, are discussed below.
nineteenth century afforded women greater rights to own and manage property
than was recognized by the common law. California, first settled by the Spanish,
inherited its community property law from Mexico, which got it from Spain, which
got it from the Visigoths, who derived it from the Romans. New York, like most of
the eastern states during this period, followed the common-law tradition. It would
be a mistake, however, to assume based on this difference that nineteenth-century
Californians were less "patriarchic" in their attitude toward women than were
nineteenth century New Yorkers. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E.
KRIER, PROPERTY 383-84 (5th ed. 2002); THE VISIGOTHIC CODE (S. P. Scott trans. &
ed.), available at http://libro.uca.edulvcode/visigoths.htm (last visited Aug. 18,
2004).
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1. Mesopotamia and Early Polytheistic Cultures
Among all of the venerable laws still existing today, the
earliest developed in the Tigris and Euphrates river valley, an
area that has been given several epithets, including
Mesopotamia. 21 One early legal assemblage is the Laws of Ur-
Namma (2100 B.C.), who ruled the Sumerian city of Ur during
its Third Dynasty.22 These laws were simple and basic by
today's standards, consisting of little more than a cataloging of
the conduct that was prohibited and allowed with corresponding
punishments, but without offering any reasons or explanation in
support of either. For example, the Laws of Ur-Namma
declaratively provided that if a man committed a homicide then
he was to be executed. 23 Further, these laws seemed to punish
strictly, without regard to justifying or excusing circumstances.
This harsh, unsparing approach continued in Ur and the rest of
the river valley area for centuries. 24
The immediate successor to the Sumerian culture of
Mesopotamia was the Babylonian culture that conquered it.
With the rise of this new civilization emerged a somewhat
different approach to the law. Although its basic form remained
the same-a strict listing of what is required and the associated
punishment for failing to meet that requirement-the criminal
law now began to draw distinctions based on nascent concepts of
intent, justification and excuse, sometimes specifying different
21 This region is also sometimes referred to as the Fertile Crescent. Some
historians go so far as to call this area the birthplace of civilization, because it is
thought that its small urban centers were the first to develop writing and other
accoutrements of civilization around 3500 B.C., several centuries before anywhere
else. SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER, CRADLE OF CIVILIZATION 7 (1967). Especially in light
of the last of these titles, it is quite fitting that the search for the earliest traces of
justification and excuse should begin with the laws of this area. For more
information on the historical concerns of this civilization, see id.; ERICA REINER,
ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA: PORTRAIT OF A DEAD CIVILIZATION (A. Leo Oppenheim, ed.,
University of Chicago Press, Rev. ed., 1977); and, in particular, PAMELA F. SERVICE,
MESOPOTAMIA (1998).
22 MARTHA T. ROTH, LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR
15 (1995).
23 See id. at 17 ("If a man commits a homicide, they shall kill that man.").
24 After the collapse of Ur, the fifth ruler of the First Dynasty, Lipit-Ishtar
(1930 B.C.), developed a system of laws that has partially survived to present day.
Id. at 23. His laws addressed everything from domestic relations to the borrowing of
animals. See id. at 26-33. In all things, there seems to have been a sort of strict
liability without allowing for exceptions.
[Vol.78:725
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punishments based on these concepts. 25 An example of this
increasing sophistication is found in the famous Code of
Hammurabi (1795-1750 B.C.). 26 The usual punishment under
the code followed lex talionis, i.e., an eye for an eye or a death for
a death. But the code also recognized several circumstances in
which such strictly proportional punishments could be mitigated
based on an excuse rationale. For example, a man who struck
and injured another man in a quarrel faced only a fine if he could
prove, usually by swearing, that he did not intend to cause
harm, 27 even if the victim died as a result of the injury.28 The
earlier Code of Ur-Namma did not include any exceptions to the
rule of strictly proportional punishment.29
In other circumstances, the Code of Hammurabi called for
the total exculpation of the offender consistent with an excuse
rationale. For example, a father was obliged to forgive his son
who was guilty of a grave fault if it was the son's first such
offense, even though the crime otherwise would have rightfully
deprived the son of the filial relationship. 30 Similarly, a barber
who was deceived into marking a slave for sale without the
knowledge of the slave's master was given a total pardon, even
though the barber's punishment for committing such an offense,
when not deceived, was the cutting off of his hand. Likewise, a
broker was required to repay in full any money entrusted to him;
if the same broker was forced to surrender the money to an
enemy robber, however, he was under no obligation to repay.
31
25 See, e.g., id. at 71-72 (describing the increased complexity of a homicide
provision as compared to an earlier, simpler provision); see also id. at 57 (noting the
expansion of the Babylonian empire).
26 See id. at 71-142 (translating the Laws of Hammurabi).
27 Id. at 122 (providing Law 206 of the Hammurabi Code).
28 Id. (providing Law 207 of the Hammurabi Code).
29 See id. at 15-21 (translating the Laws of Ur-Namma).
30 Id. at 113 (translating Law 169 of the Hammurabi Code).
31 The references concerning a barber and the marking of a slave are found at
Laws 226 and 227 of the Hammurabi Code. Id. at 124. Those concerning the agent
entrusted with money are found at Laws 102 and 103. Id. at 100. Both situations
focus on the excusing condition. The barber would not be excused simply because his
mistake was reasonable; in order to be excused, his mistake must be caused by the
deception of another. Thus, even if the barber could claim some other extenuating
circumstance, such as being partially blind and consequently misidentifying the
slave, it appears that the code would reject this as an excuse. The case of the broker
is similar-he must be robbed by an enemy to be excused from repayment. The code
apparently would not excuse the same broker if he lost the money through a cause
of nature or other circumstance beyond his control. In both situations, a human
agent can prompt a valid excuse while other causes, which in modern-day situations
2004]
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These examples reflect the greater willingness to exculpate
under the Code of Hammurabi, as compared to the earlier
Sumerian law texts. 32
Defensive theories based on justification and excuse
continued to evolve and expand in later societies, such as the
Egyptians. Although Egyptian culture stretched back to 2700
B.C., its written laws did not appear until eighth century B.C. 33
This is not to say, however, that the criminal laws extant in the
incipient stages of the Nile civilization are completely unknown.
For example, it appears that the Egyptian legal system long
recognized a distinction between premeditated and
unpremeditated murder. 34  There is also some indication that
from the earliest times, killings were divided into those that
were exculpated-i.e., which were not punished-and those that
were punished.35 Literary texts suggest that a man might
approvingly kill his adulterous wife or her partner, 36 and that
such an act could be justified to at least some extent under the
law.3 7  Besides homicide, a commoner was excused from
punishment if he did not deliver the king's goods due to theft or
loss beyond his control, while an official who similarly failed at
this task would apparently suffer dismissal and mutilation.38
The Hittite legal system likewise recognized a rudimentary
expression of justification and excuse. The Hittites were the first
of the ancient societies to discover the art of working iron, and,
in part as a consequence of this, they established a powerful
might support an excuse defense, are disallowed.
32 For example, a surviving portion of a Sumerian scribe's training tablet
instructs that the son who denies his adopted parents is not to be tolerated, and he
should lose all his inheritance and be sold into slavery. There is no mention of a
second chance. See id. at 44.
33 RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN ANCIENT EGYPT 17 (2002).
34 Id. at 169-70.
35 Id. at 169; see also James Hoch & Sara E. Orel, Murder in Ancient Egypt, in
DEATH AND TAXES IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 87, 89 (E. Mellen Press 1992) ("In
ancient Egypt a revenge homicide committed by a cuckolded husband was
apparently considered justifiable.").
36 In the Middle Kingdom story of King Cheops and the Magicians, the king
does not reprove a husband for summoning a magic crocodile to devour a man who
committed adultery with his wife. In fact, the king orders the crocodile to take the
adulterous miscreant away and to have the wife burned. VERSTEEG, supra note 33,
at 174.
37 Hoch & Orel, supra note 35, at 97. It is not clear, however, whether the usual
outcome was the justification of such a killing. Id.
38 VERSTEEG, supra note 33, at 176.
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empire in the Middle East and Asia Minor.39 Of particular
interest is the period identified as their Old Kingdom (1650-1500
B.C.), 40 during which the Hittites explicitly began to introduce
the notion of ignorance as a criminal excuse. For example, a
man who had relations with two sisters, not his sisters, which
was otherwise unlawful, would be excused if the sisters lived in
different countries presumably because he could not have known
of their consanguinity. 4 1 If the sisters had instead lived in the
same country, the man would be excused only if he did not know
of the relationship. 42 These ancient cultures were followed in
time by a succession of kingdoms and empires that, although
historically significant for many purposes, add little to the
development of justification and excuse. 43
2. The Jewish Old Testament
Another important source of ancient law are the Jewish
texts, which are collectively known as the Old Testament.
Although the Old Testament is not a legal code or document as
such,44 it does contain an abundance of references to and
teachings about the civil law and legal principles, especially in
39 See ROTH, supra note 22, at 213.
40 Id. at 213-14. For more information on Hittite law and culture in general,
see EPHRAIM NEUFELD, THE HITTITE LAWS (Luzac 1951).
41 See ROTH, supra note 22, at 236.
42 Id. Hittite law also provided that although crimes involving sexual impurity
generally brought a punishment of death, many of the laws involving bestiality
contained-for whatever reason-the express provision that the offender may be
forgiven by "the king." See id. at 236-37. It is doubtful that forgiveness, in these
circumstances, was based on mistake.
43 One notable example was Assyria, a kingdom known throughout the ancient
world for the exceedingly brutal governance of its subjects (1115-609 B.C.). The
Assyrians established a short-lived empire that preceded a revival of the
Babylonian state. Some Assyrian laws have survived to the present, but they add
little to the discussion of justification and excuse. Roth provides translations of
some such laws in her Law Collections. Id. at 153-209. In addition, see GODFREY
ROLLES DRIVER, THE ASSYRIAN LAWS (Clarendon Press 1935), for a somewhat more
comprehensive treatment of the subject.
44 See generally CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (Libreria Editrice
Vaticana, 2d ed. 2000), particularly §§ 121 & 702, which explain that the
significance of the Old Testament extends beyond its being a mere dispenser of law.
For other authorities that either divide or recognize a division of the Old Testament
into types of books (historical, legal, poetical, prophetic, etc.), see the following: FR.
OSCAR LUKEFAHR, C.M., A CATHOLIC GUIDE TO THE BIBLE 39-113 (Liguori
Publications 1998); J.W. EHRLICH, THE HOLY BIBLE AND THE LAW 7-15 (THE
LAWBOOK EXCHANGE 2002); HENRI DANIEL-ROPS, WHAT IS THE BIBLE? 31-33 (J.R.
Foster trans., 1958).
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the Pentateuch,4 which under Jewish tradition are attributed to
Moses as author. 46 The book of Exodus, for example, draws a
distinction between a man who kills another after he
"maliciously schem[es] to do so" and one who kills without lying
in wait.47 In the latter's case, the pertinent verse reads, "[He]
may flee to a place which [God] will set apart for this purpose."48
The implication seems to be that those who kill with
premeditation deserve to be punished with death, while those
who kill more impulsively or opportunistically may be punished
less severely and granted the right of asylum elsewhere. 49
45 Five books comprise the Pentateuch-Genesis, Exodus, Deuteronomy,
Leviticus, and Numbers. DANIEL-ROPS, supra note 44, at 31.
46 There is considerable disagreement as to who actually wrote the Pentateuch,
but the purpose of this article does not include attempting to sort through the
different positions. See, e.g., J.M. POWIS SMITH, THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF
HEBREW LAW 173-75 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1960) (1931). The texts themselves
attribute authorship to Moses. Deuteronomy 1:1; Exodus 24:4.
47 Exodus 21:13-14. Specifically, the Jewish law provides that a man who lies
in wait and kills is to be executed, while a man who kills but does not lie in wait is
merely given an appointed place to which he may flee and escape punishment. See
id. at 21:12-15. It is difficult to know for sure whether this mitigation of
punishment for killing also represents the recognition of a partial defense based on
excuse. In other words, was an impulsive killer allowed to escape the death penalty
because his actions were, at least in part, the product of fate or providence, and as
such did not represent an unencumbered exercise of his free will? In light of this
uncertainty, it is not always evident how this law would apply to certain, albeit
convoluted, circumstances. For example, suppose a man mistakenly believed that a
person he impulsively killed was a stranger who fell into his hands, when his victim
was in fact a rival who he planned to kill the next day. What if the converse
occurred: a man lied in wait to dispatch a rival but mistakenly killed an unknown
passer-by? In either case would the killer be put to death? At least one commentator
has opined that the above referenced scripture passages introduced clear
distinctions in the law of homicide, which he described as a precursor of the modern
division of murder and manslaughter. See EDW. J. WHITE, THE LAW IN THE
SCRIPTURES § 104 (1935). Other commentators, however, believe that this exception
was limited to instances involving accidental death. See 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 3-4 (photo. reprint 1971) (1736). If the first
approach is correct and the Exodus exclusion was an early version of modern
manslaughter, then perhaps the impulsive killer was allowed to escape the death
penalty because his actions were, at least in part, the product of an excusing
incapacitation, i.e., a sudden, emotional impulse. If the second interpretation is
correct, then excuse may still apply because the killing would have resulted from
fate or providence, and as such was not completely the consequence of an
unencumbered exercise of the killer's free will.
48 Exodus 21:13-14.
49 Id. at 21:12-15. Of course, one can kill with premeditation and not lie in
wait, just as one may lie in wait for some other reason-such as to rape or rob-and
then kill without premeditation. Perhaps this early society sought to single out for
capital punishment for especially aggravated types of premeditated murder.
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE
Many of the Old Testament teachings, rather than involving
the law per se, address the morality of conduct having a legal
dimension, which encompass the concepts of justification and
excuse. Relevant to justification are the actions of Gideon, as
recounted in the Book of Judges. Gideon tore down his father's
temple to Baal on the command of God, which, although in
seeming violation of the Fourth Commandment, 50 was held not
only to be morally blameless but was indeed praiseworthy. 51
Judges also gives the example of the men of the Tribe of
Benjamin who, because other tribes had sworn oaths not to give
them wives, were allowed to lie in wait and abduct their women,
who they later married.52  This acquiescence toward the
kidnapping of female family members in Judges contrasts
sharply with the brutal slaughter of Shechem and his family by
the vengeful brothers of Dinah, as told in the Book of Genesis. 53
Shechem had captured Dinah by force and wished to marry her;
however, Shechem's abduction of Dinah was neither justified nor
excused, and his death was judged to be a proportionate
punishment for his serious misconduct. 54
Illustrations of justification and excuse are also found in
other portions of the Old Testament. The book of Samuel
describes how David and his men ate the holy bread, 55 an act
that was normally prohibited by the law.56 They did this while
in flight from Saul, who was jealous of David's popularity and
unjustly sought his death. 57 The priest allowed David and his
men to eat the holy bread without consequence because they
suffered from great hunger. 58 Similarly, the book of Jonah
50 "Honor your father and your mother." Exodus 20:12.
51 Judges 6:25-32.
52 Judges 21:6-23.
53 Genesis 34:1-31.
54 Id. The Pentateuch gives several other examples that suggest recognition of
justification and excuse. For instance, one who kills a thief in the act of breaking
into one's home is excused, but one who hunts down a thief who had fled the scene
faces "bloodguilt." Exodus 22:1-3. Likewise, the owner of an ox that had gored
before can avoid being stoned with the beast, provided he did not know beforehand
that it was dangerous. If the owner were aware his ox was dangerous, then he
would be killed with the beast. Exodus 21:28-29.
55 The "showbread" is mentioned as being an offering to God and reserved for
the priestly class. 1 Samuel 21:2-7.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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recounts how the property of another may be legitimately
destroyed in an emergency to save human life. 59
3. The New Testament
The authors of the New Testament likewise recount several
examples of justification and excuse. Perhaps the best of these
involve the activities of Christ and his apostles on the Sabbath.
Luke's Gospel tells how Christ healed the sick on the Sabbath, 60
and Matthew's Gospel describes how the apostles gathered and
ate grain on the Sabbath as they walked in the fields.61 The
Third Commandment requires the Sabbath to be kept holy, and
Exodus contains laws against working the fields on the seventh
day. 62 When the Pharisees admonished Christ and his followers
for engaging in such behavior in seeming contravention of the
Decalogue and other venerable prohibitions, Christ rebuked
them and instructed that the law admits of exceptions. 63
B. Ancient Greek Legal System
Athens and Sparta were the two great societies of ancient
Greece. Although they shared a common language, gods, myths,
legends and heroes, they were stunningly dissimilar in many
important ways. Among the most striking of these differences is
the manner in which they addressed crime and punishment.
The Spartans dealt with crime by closely regulating every
aspect of the lives of their citizens and subjects. Life in Sparta
was centered on a constant preparation for war,64 and the
59 E.g., Jonah 1:5 ("Then the mariners became frightened and each one cried to
his god. To lighten the ship for themselves, they threw its cargo into the sea."). The
law of jettison is found in an ancient maritime code developed on the Greek island of
Rhodes. The Rhodian Maritime Code, one of the first examples of international law,
allows the captain of a ship to throw overboard the ship's cargo and the passengers'
goods to save the ship. Although the code itself is no longer extant, parts of it have
been preserved in other sources. See, e.g., 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN bk. 14, tit. 2
(Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., Univ. of Penn. Press 1985) (n.d.).
60 Here, the Pharisees seem to have made an exception for the son who, or ox
that, falls in the well, thus seeming to indicate that exceptions to the Sabbath rule
existed even under Old Testament teachings. Luke 14:1-5.
61 In Matthew, Christ makes reference to David's eating of the showbread,
notes the temple priests violated the Sabbath, and instructs that the Christ's
actions are even more justified than theirs. Matthew 12:1-8.
62 Exodus 20:8-12, 34:21.
63 Luke 6:1-11, 14:1-6; Matthew 12:1-8.
64 "When [the Spartans] were in the field, their exercises were generally more
moderate, their fare not so hard, nor so strict a hand held over them by their
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temptation and opportunity to commit most criminal acts were
greatly minimized by pervasive regulations that enhanced their
society's collective war-making capacity. Lycurgus, the semi-
mythic founder of the Spartan polity, is attributed with
establishing a variety of institutions and a mechanism that
allowed the state to accrue and exercise a dominating control
over the day-to-day activities of its citizens and subjects.6 5 Not
surprisingly, some of these "reforms" implicated notions of
justification and excuse. 66
officers, so they were the only people in the world to whom war gave repose."
PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 44 (John Dryden
trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952).
65 Plutarch tells us that Lycurgus (circa 800 B.C.) was born some three
generations after the Spartans conquered the neighboring Helots, who were later
enslaved by Spartan masters to provide agricultural labor. See id. at 32. Lycurgus
was the son of one of the Kings of Sparta by a second wife. Id. Upon the King's
death, Lycurgus assumed the throne until it was discovered that his sister-in-law
was with child. Id. at 33. Lycurgus then renounced his kingship and served as
guardian of his nephew, the rightful king. Id. In response to the queen mother's
jealousy, Lycurgus went into voluntary exile where he studied the constitutions of
other states and visited Crete, Ionia and possibly Egypt. Id. at 33-34. Upon his
return to Sparta, Lycurgus resolved to transform "the whole face of the
commonwealth" with the help of the principle men of Sparta and an oracle from
Delphi. Id. at 34. Once Lycurgus had accomplished his task of reforming the
Spartan Constitution, he made the entire populace swear an oath not to modify it
until he returned from Delphi. Id. at 47. While there the oracle confirmed to
Lycurgus that the new constitution should not be altered in any way. Lycurgus
responded by starving himself to death, thus perpetually binding the Spartans by
their oath to leave unchanged the laws he had instituted. Id. Lycurgus was not
deceived in his expectations, as Sparta retained his laws, in their original form, for
some 500 years. Id. Later, during the reign of King Agis (338-331 B.C.), gold and
silver spoils from war began to flow back into the state, bringing "with them all
those mischiefs which attend the immoderate desire of riches" and changes in the
law, as Lycurgus had feared. Id.
66 Among the most important of Lycurgus' reforms was the Spartan
constitution he helped establish, which incorporated democratic, aristocratic and
monarchical elements. Under the constitution, all male citizens over thirty years of
age comprised the Assembly and by popular acclaim elected the Senate, a group of
28 men over the age of 60-one can assume that between war, sickness, and natural
death, few men lived to the age of 60. Id. at 35, 45. The Senate and the two kings,
who were ex-officio members, held the supreme authority of the state. Id. at 34-35.
The kings' office was hereditary, having various political, religious and military
responsibilities. HERODOTUS, THE HISTORY bk. VI, at 52-60 (David Grene trans.,
1987). The Assembly could only vote yes or no viva voce on matters submitted to it.
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 79, 81 (Carnes Lord trans., University of Chicago Press
1984). It could not meet except upon summons, and its votes were subject to veto by
the Senate. Id.; PLUTARCH, supra note 64, at 35. It is unclear what, if any, matters
were required to be brought before the Assembly, which seems to have functioned
more as a rubber-stamping than a law-making body, and its primary purpose was
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In particular, Lycurgus sought to eliminate "extreme
inequality" by dividing the country into equal lots, 67 by banning
gold, silver and luxuries from the state,68 and, perhaps most
importantly, by requiring all the citizens to eat their meals in
common.69 Additionally, Spartan boys were raised by the state
from the age of seven in a communal setting, and it was not until
the age of 30 that they were allowed to establish a household. 70
As a consequence of these and other regulations, young men had
little incentive to accumulate (or steal) wealth, either for their
own enjoyment or as an estate to pass to others. 71 In contrast,
certain "desirable" theft was indirectly encouraged by the state;
because boys were only given bare and even inadequate
sustenance, they found themselves compelled to steal food from
the gardens and eating-houses of the men, 72 which in turn
helped them to develop skills useful to a warrior culture.7 3
apparently to elect senators.
67 PLUTARCH, supra note 64, at 36. It appears that land was owned by the state
and entailed to individuals. Spartan citizens gradually gained a greater ability to
alienate the land, which eventually led to disparities in wealth. ARISTOTLE, supra
note 66, at 75 & n.68.
68 PLUTARCH, supra note 64, at 36. ("[Lycurgus] commanded that all gold and
silver coin should be called in, and that only a sort of money made of iron should be
current.") Lycurgus had these iron bars heated and then quenched in vinegar to
make them worthless. Id.
69 By making the citizens eat in common, Lycurgus removed from wealth not
just "the property of being coveted, but its very nature of being wealth. For the rich,
being obliged to go to the same table with the poor, could not make use of or enjoy
their abundance." Id. at 37. And, without gold and silver, the foreign trade in
luxuries dried up so that their wealth "had no road to come abroad by but [was]
shut up at home doing nothing." Id. at 36.
70 See id. at 41-45. "Those who were under thirty years of age ... had the
necessaries of their family supplied by the care of their relations and lovers." Id. at
45.
71 Id. at 41.
72 Id. "[I]f they were taken in the act, they were whipped without mercy for
thieving so ill and awkwardly." Id.
73 The entire organization of the laws is with a view to a part of virtue,
warlike virtue; for this is useful with a view to domination .... [T]hey
came to ruin when they were ruling [an empire] through not knowing how
to be at leisure and because there is no training among them that has more
authority than the training for war.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 66, at 78. Besides wealth and property, women were the
most likely cause of strife among the citizens of Sparta. Here, too, Lycurges
transformed what was once private into the semi-public domain. Plutarch writes
that it was even deemed honorable for husbands to give the "use" of their wives to
other men whom they should think fit, "ridiculing those in whose opinion such
favours are so unfit for participation as to fight and shed blood and go to war about
it." PLUTARCH, supra note 64, at 40. On one occasion a Spartan citizen, upon being
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Athens, unlike Sparta, was a bustling city-state where
trade, commerce and the arts flourished. For a society of only
about thirty thousand citizens, Athens has given to posterity a
remarkable list of lasting accomplishments, 74 and "[n]owhere has
popular sovereignty been so completely realized in practice as in
ancient Athens."75 The Athenian citizens themselves, chosen by
lot from among the different "tribes," exercised the full
legislative, executive and judicial authority of the state. 76 In
particular, "the absolute freedom with which the people vote as
jurors [made] them absolute masters of the state ... and the
draughtsmanship of the laws, far from simple or lucid ... gave
the final arbitration of all questions, whether political or civil to
the jurors."77
Lawsuits could be either public or private in character,
depending on who had standing to bring the case, with their
accessibility contingent upon the juries' right to determine the
penalty. 78 Juries were large, commonly numbering 500 but in
important cases totaling as many as 6,000.79 Verdicts were
asked what punishment was given for adulterers, replied, perhaps sardonically,
that "[t]here are no adulterers in our country." Id.
74 The legacy of Athenian artists, philosophers, playwrights and historians,
flowering in such a small city during such a short time span, is unparalleled.
Western civilization has been called a footnote to Plato's work, The Republic.
Aristophanes' comedies, Euripides' tragedies and Thucydides' History of the
Peloponnesian War are all unsurpassed works of art by Athenians of the same
generation. Sparta's legacy, on the other hand, is largely limited to the battle of
Thermopylae, where a small band of Spartans held a narrow pass to the very end,
defying overwhelming forces. See ANDREW ROBERT BURN, PERSIA AND THE GREEKS
407, 412 (1962) (describing the battle and its place in Spartan heritage).
75 ROBERT J. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS v (Barnes
and Noble Inc. 1969) (1927).
76 See ARISTOTLE, ON THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS (E. Poste trans., Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1993).
77 Id. at 15.
78 Id. at 142-43. These procedures did not fully correspond to our civil and
criminal law. Murder, theft and deliberate wounding were all private wrongs and
thus only certain parties could prosecute them; any citizen could prosecute public
wrongs, such as the embezzlement of public funds. BONNER, supra note 75, at 44,
46. The use of citizen prosecutors gave rise to the "Sycophants," a group of litigators
who made their living prosecuting cases for rewards. DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL,
THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 62-63 (1978).
79 MACDOWELL, supra note 78, at 35-36. Trials for homicide seemed to have
somewhat smaller juries than the norm, although scholars differ on the precise size.
DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, ATHENIAN HOMICIDE LAW 51-55 (1963) [hereinafter
MACDOWELL, HOMICIDE LAW]. Intentional homicide could be tried only before
jurors who had previously held the position of one of the nine Arkonships, which
nonetheless could have provided a fairly large pool of potential jurors. Id. at 52.
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obtained in the court of public opinion and there was no appeal
from the judgments of the juries, whether based on asserted
errors in law or fact.80
More is known about the crime of homicide than of other
offenses under Athenian law. Homicide was punished for three
related but distinct purposes, the foremost being to provide
vengeance for the victim and his family.81 Beyond this, the act of
killing rendered the killer "unclean," thereby putting the state at
risk of being "infected" by him.8 2 In other words, the victim and
his family deserved vengeance, while the killer and his
associates needed purification, and society protection, and both
of these ends provided a distinct and sufficient basis for
punishment.8 3 Lastly, punishment could be imposed for the
broader purpose of deterring others from killing, but general
deterrence seemed to be the least important of the three
recognized bases for punishment under Athenian homicide law.8 4
Although the state proscribed the homicide, its successful
prosecution depended upon a person with standing seeking
vindication in the courts. Thus, deterrence was only sporadically
and in some sense derivatively achieved, and homicide itself was
not a "public crime" as we understand the concept today.8 5
80 One accused of providing false witness could be prosecuted in a different trial
for perjury. Although not technically an appeal, the conviction of a key witness for
perjury, if in time, might save a wrongfully convicted man. MACDOWELL, supra note
78, at 244. The Assembly could also pardon a convicted citizen. For example,
Alcibiades was pardoned after being convicted of sacrilege. PLUTARCH, supra note
64, at 168.
81 This reason for punishing seems to be more properly classified as vengeance
rather than retribution, as its purpose was to provide satisfaction to the victim and
his family in their terms without regard to what society might consider just deserts.
Accordingly, if the slain man forgave his killer before dying, the killer was deemed
to be no longer polluting society, and thus vengeance against him was no longer
required. In such circumstances, the killer could not be prosecuted. MACDOWELL,
HOMICIDE LAW, supra note 79, at 1, 8.
82 See id. at 3; see also SOPHOCLES, Oedipus the King, in THREE GREEK
TRAGEDIES 87-88 (David Grene trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1951). The city was
polluted by Oedipus's presence after he unknowingly killed his father in self-
defense, the visible manifestation of this spiritual pollution being the presence of
the plague in the city. Id.
si One who kills unintentionally must be exiled until forgiven by the family of
the victim, as forgiveness satisfies the need for vengeance. Society's interests
nonetheless required that the killer be purified by religious ceremony. MACDOWELL,
HOMICIDE LAW, supra note 79, at 120-21.
84 Id. at 5.
85 Although the family was expected to prosecute the killer, there was no time
limit for prosecution. Further, while a family might be bribed to not prosecute, the
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The different forms of homicide were tried in different
courts.
Homicide with malice aforethought [was] tried in the
Areopagus, including homicide by wounding [86], by
administering poison, [and] by fire; ... [i]nvoluntary homicide,
attempts to commit homicide and homicide of a slave or a
foreigner, domiciled or undomiciled [were] tried in the
Palladion. Homicide avowed and alleged to be lawful... [was]
tried in the Delphinion.s7
A fourth type of court, the Phreatto, was employed to try
those already in exile for an unintentional homicide. These
trials were held aboard ship to avoid having the convicted killer
pollute the society with his presence.88 As discussed in some
detail below, this multi-tiered system of courts was established
and used to address and distinguish between killings reflecting
different levels of gravity and culpability.
The distinction between intentional and unintentional
killings under Athenian law did not correspond to the
contemporary understanding of murder and manslaughter. For
example, an Athenian who killed by poisoning would be tried at
the Areopagus if he was accused of administering the fatal dose
himself, but not if he allegedly planned the killing but took no
active part in it. s9 On the other hand, some perpetrators who
killer was nonetheless required to stay away from certain places, such as temples
and law courts, of course, other than the court in which his trial was conducted,
under penalty of being publicly prosecuted. Id. at 25-26. Also, it was a public crime
for a family member of a homicide victim to associate with the unpurified killer. Id.
at 9-10.
86 Death by deliberate wounding seems roughly equivalent to common-law
murder based on malice aforethought constituted by intending to inflict grave bodily
harm, although the Athenian crime may have been wider in scope. A person on trial
at the Areopagus for intentional killing, if found to have instead killed
unintentionally, could not be convicted by that court of unintentional homicide and
had to be acquitted. Id. at 46-47. It is unclear whether the killer could be
prosecuted subsequently at the Palladion for an unintentional homicide, although
there is nothing in the recorded proceedings of these courts that suggests that such
a prosecution would be barred.
87 ARISTOTLE, supra note 76, at 113.
88 Id. at 113-14. Although it can be assumed such trials were infrequently held,
some defendants accused of an unintentional killing presumably submitted
voluntarily to the Phreatto in the hope of receiving a pardon for the earlier killing if
acquitted of the present charge. MACDOWELL, HOMICIDE LAW, supra note 79, at 83-
84.
89 MACDOWELL, HOMICIDE LAW, supra note 79, at 44. The same word,
"bouleusi," Greek for "planning," was used both for ordering a poisoning, i.e.,
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killed without a specific intent to kill-such as persons who
caused death of another by deliberately wounding-were tried
for committing a form of intentional homicide. 90 A person
convicted of intentional homicide was subjected to the death
penalty and confiscation of his property, although such a
defendant could instead choose exile if he departed before he was
convicted. 91
As previously noted, involuntary homicide, attempts to
commit homicide, and homicide of slaves or foreigners were all
tried in the Palladion. The penalties for attempted homicide and
the homicide of slaves and foreigners are unclear, and in some
cases the jury may have determined them.92 The punishment for
unintentional killing was exile unless the victim's family forgave
the killer.93  Execution was permitted for anyone found in
Attica-i.e., Athens and its vicinity-who was convicted of an
unintentional killing and had not been pardoned. 94
The range of homicides punished as "unintentional killings"
was quite broad. It included both those situations in which the
defendant was at some fault in causing the victim's death, as
well as those in which there was merely an actual causal
relationship between the victim's death and the defendant's
act. 95 Even animals and inanimate objects were "liable" for
planning an intentional killing, and for being a participant in an unintentional
killing. For example, MacDowell describes the case of a choir director who
prescribed a potion for a boy choir member who had a sore throat, and the boy later
died. The director was prosecuted for "planning" an unintentional killing. Id. at 63-
64. All planned killings, of both kinds mentioned above, were tried at the Palladion,
and there is some evidence that death was always the required punishment for
"intentionally planning a killing." Id. at 64-66.
90 Id. at 44. As noted earlier, it is unclear whether all deliberate wounding, no
matter how trivial, could expose an accused to prosecution for killing at the
Areopagus. In any event, Athenian law recognized a separate crime of battery for
less serious attacks. MACDOWELL, supra note 78, at 123-24. Presumably, such
questions about the magnitude of guilt were left to the discretion of the jury.
91 MACDOWELL, HOMICIDE LAW, supra note 79, at 114-15. One who is exiled
can no longer "pollute" the state with his presence. Also, exile was considered a
horrific penalty, which was in many ways equivalent to dying. See id. at 113 ("[I]f I
go into exile, I shall be an old man without a city, a beggar in a foreign land.").
92 Id. at 126.
93 Id. at 119-23. All of the victim's close male relatives had to agree to pardon,
but if only distant relatives were alive, a majority agreement was seemingly
sufficient. Id. at 119. It is unclear whether close relatives of the victim could pardon
intentional killers. Id. at 124-25.
94 Id. at 121-22.
95 Id. at 63-64. In one case, a spectator died after accidentally running into a
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committing unintentional homicides. 96  The only allowable
punishment for all unintentional homicides-exile, for both
negligent and non-negligent killers-suggests that the state was
primarily concerned with addressing the pollution caused by
these offenders, rather than in seeking proportionate retribution
or revenge, or achieving deterrence. 97
Plato, in The Laws,98 explained why all unintentional killers
were punished with exile, regardless of their culpability. 99
According to Plato, the victim's rage against his killer would be
exacerbated if the killer continued to frequent the same spots
and enjoy the same life as had the victim prior to his death. 100
Conversely, the victim would be less angered by his passing if
the killer avoided the victim's usual haunts.10' Because the dead
were able to affect vengeance on the living and thereby disturb
the state, the killer's exile was mandated so as to mitigate the
victim's rage and thereby protect society.' 02 Plato would limit an
unintentional killer's exile to one year, however, recognizing the
injustice of allowing the victim's relatives unlimited discretion in
determining the length of an exile that was sufficient to placate
the dead. 103
Plato also drew several important distinctions between
voluntary and involuntary homicides. Although he did not
javelin at an athletic event. The jury apparently focused its deliberations solely on
whether the thrower committed an unintentional killing or the spectator committed
unintentional suicide. The jury seemed unconcerned about what would today be
described as the perpetrator's mens rea, culpability or fault. Id. at 74.
96 Id. at 85-86 (noting that a stone that killed a man could be cast out of attica).
97 Id. at 141-42.
98 THE LAWS OF PLATO (Thomas L. Pangle trans., Basic Books, Inc. 1980)
[hereinafter THE LAWS OF PLATO].
99 Plato's works are written in dialogue form, often making it difficult to discern
his actual views. For example, although The Republic of Plato is sometimes
interpreted as representing his design for a perfect state, others contend that it
instead reflects his search for a definition of justice. See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO
Book 1 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books, Inc. 2d ed. 1991). In any event, it would be
a mistake to conclude that Plato's conception of a perfect state is presented fully in
Socrates' comments in The Republic, or in the "Athenian stranger's" comments in
The Laws.
100 THE LAWS OF PLATO, supra note 98, at 259.
i0i Id. at 259-60.
102 Id.
103 Id. Although a negligent killer would less likely be pardoned than would a
purely accidental killer, Plato implies that here too it would be unfair to allow the
victim's family to exercise unfettered discretion in determining the length of exile.
Id. at 262.
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discriminate between negligent and purely accidental killings,
Plato did further divide those committed intentionally based
upon their volition, or what we might today refer to as mens
rea. 10 4  First, were the killings perpetrated "not out of
spiritedness" but with forethought, which should be punished by
death.105 Next, were the killings resulting from "spirited anger
by those who act on a sudden impulse, who all at once without
intending to kill beforehand destroy someone .. .."106 These
most closely resembled unintentional or involuntary killings and
should be punished by only two years of exile. 10 7 Last were the
intermediate situations, such as those involving one "who guards
his spiritedness and doesn't immediately get retribution ... but
does so at a later time after deliberating." 108 For these, Plato
prescribed a moderate punishment of three-years exile. 10 9
It is not completely clear how Athenian law dealt with
potential excuses such as youth, senility, drunkenness and
insanity. 110 It, could be that the actions of those with such
104 Id. at 261.
105 Id. 265-66.
106 Id. 260-61.
107 Id. Presumably the killer learns to restrain his "spiritedness" while in exile.
108 Id. at 261.
109 Id. In Protagoras, Plato argues that vice corresponds to ignorance and virtue
to knowledge. See 1 FREDERICK COPLESTON, S.J., A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 216-
20 (1946). In The Laws of Plato, virtue is reached not by knowledge but by
habituating the passions to be rightly ordered. Because high spiritedness can be
rightly ordered, those who commit for this reason are to be lightly punished. On the
other hand, those whose crimes show they are incurable, repeat offenders are to be
executed. THE LAWS OF PLATO, supra note 98, at 256-58. This reasoning does not
explain the punishment of the purely accidental killer who has done no injustice
and, according to Plato, is thus in no need of a cure.
110 Perhaps some light can be shed on this by several passages from Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics. "Indeed, we punish a man for his very ignorance, if he is
thought responsible for the ignorance, as when penalties are doubled in the case of
drunkenness." Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk. III, ch. 5, line 1113b 30-32,
reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 972 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941)
(emphasis added). And again in the same book, a distinction is made between
excusable and inexcusable ignorance. "Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to
be different from acting in ignorance; for the man who is drunk or in a rage is
thought to act as a result not of ignorance but of one of the causes mentioned, yet
not knowingly but in ignorance." Id. at bk. III, ch. 1, line lll0b 24-27, reprinted in
THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 966 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941) (emphasis in
original). It is difficult to say to what extent these principles resulted in clemency in
Athens at large, and to what extent particular excuses were allowed-youth and
madness are also mentioned as possible sources of ignorance-but it can certainly
be said that the basic structure of excuses is present. Aristotle even goes so far as to
define varying levels of exculpatory ignorance in the following structure:
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debilitations were always deemed to be unintentional and they
were treated accordingly. We know that Plato would excuse the
insane, the extremely old and children who are "no different
from such men," at least insofar as their sentences should be
limited to compensation for the injury done except for murder,
which ought to be punished by one-year exile to address the
resulting "pollution." '111  Many of Plato's laws closely
corresponded to Athenian law, and this could also be the case
with respect to these excuse defenses.1 12 Neither Plato's The
Laws nor Athenian law sources expressly mention duress, but
given the absolute discretion of Athenian juries it may well be
that this excuse was likewise allowed on a case-by-case basis. 11
3
The Delphinion was reserved for trials in which the
defendant claimed that the killing was lawful, a relatively broad
concept under Athenian law. 114 For example, the accidental
killing of an opposing participant in an athletic match was not a
crime.115  Apparently the Athenians believed that these
decedents, like those who were killed unintentionally by their
own doctors, voluntarily assumed the risk of death, and so they
and their relatives would have no legitimate reason to complain.
One who killed another during wartime, mistaking the innocent
Now when (1) the injury takes place contrary to reasonable expectation, it
is a misadventure. When (2) it is not contrary to reasonable expectation,
but does not imply vice, it is a mistake (for a man makes a mistake when
the fault originates in him, but is the victim of accident when the origin
lies outside him). When (3) he acts with knowledge but not after
deliberation, it is an act of injustice-e.g. the acts due to anger or to other
passions necessary or natural to man; for when men do such harmful and
mistaken acts they act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice, but this
does not imply that the doers are unjust or wicked; for the injury is not due
to vice. But when (4) a man acts from choice, he is an unjust man and a
vicious man.
Id. at bk. V, ch. 8, line 1135b 16-25, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
1016 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941) (emphasis in original).
111 THE LAWS OF PLATO, supra note 98, at 258.
112 For example, according to both Plato's Laws and Athenian law, doctors have
no liability for even negligent deaths, and contestants in public games are likewise
judged to be unpolluted and not responsible for unintentional killings. Id. at 259;
MACDOWELL, HOMICIDE LAW, supra note 79, at 73-75.
113 Youth, senility and insanity often relate to cognition, while duress relates
instead to volition. There is nothing in the literature, however, to suggest that
Athenian courts would draw distinctions based on this difference.
114 MACDOWELL, HOMICIDE LAW, supra note 79, at 70.
115 Id. at 73-74 (noting that the words opponent were not in the text, but
"Demosthenes in his discussion... takes for granted that the opposing contestant is
the only kind of victim to whom the law applie[d]").
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decedent for the enemy, was also deemed to have killed
lawfully. 116 Further, it was lawful to kill in defense of one's
property, but only the actual property owner could defend on this
basis, and then only if the thief used force and the killing was
contemporaneous with the robbery." 7 An actor could lawfully
use deadly force to protect himself, but only if he could
demonstrate that he did not cause the confrontation or strike the
first blow, and the amount of force he used was appropriate.118
Anyone caught stealing at night could be lawfully killed. 119 It
was likewise lawful to kill anyone found in Athens who had been
exiled, and a citizen could lawfully kill a transgressor who
attempted to overthrow the democracy.1 20 Finally, a man was
permitted to kill anyone caught in the act of sexual intercourse
with his wife, mother, sister or daughter. 121
Although a necessity defense was not formally recognized
under Athenian law, a justification defense premised on a lesser-
evils theory must have been allowed in some criminal trials. A
defendant who contended that a killing was lawful would
ordinarily defend on the basis that a particular law affirmatively
authorized or permitted his conduct.1 22 In situations involving
116 Id. It is unclear if there were other accidental, non-negligent killings that
were excused.
117 Id. at 75 (indicating in the imaginary case of Antiphon that witnesses were
called to prove that the decedent was the one to start the fight).
118 Id. In Antiphon's case, the issue at trial was "whether one blow was enough
to justify" such a violent reprisal. Id.
119 Id. at 76 (noting that this rule applies to home burglars who would not be
covered by the rule which did not punish a man for killing in defense of himself or
his property).
120 Id. at 77, 78.
121 Id. at 77 (noting that Athenian men considered women to be "analogous to
[their] property"). MacDowell seems to imply that this right to kill applied only to
seduction and not to rape, but it is unclear how this would come about. Would the
victim of the rape testify that she was not seduced, and so her husband would be
convicted of a wrongful killing? This seems unlikely, and thus the determination of
seduction might be based on circumstantial and reputation evidence. Indeed,
Athenians had an unusual attitude toward sex crimes generally. Rape was
considered to be less serious than seduction, being essentially a private crime that
could only be prosecuted by the injured party, i.e., the woman's family. See
MACDOWELL, supra note 78, at 124. The penalty for raping a free woman was
limited to a fine in an amount assessed by the jury, with the fine being paid to the
state as well as the family. Id. at 124. In contrast, seduction appears to have been a
public crime. Besides a monetary punishment, the prosecutor could cause a
convicted male seducer to suffer great humiliations. Id.
122 MACDOWELL, HOMICIDE LAW, supra note 79, at 73. ("Allocation of a case to
a particular court depended not on the verdict reached by the jury .... but on the
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duress or mistake, a defendant would likely have argued that his
actions were "unintentional."'123  But presumably some
"intentional" killings could also be exculpated-these on the
basis that they were justified-and an Athenian claiming
necessity would probably make such an appeal directly to the
jury.124 As noted earlier, an Athenian jury could dispense justice
without being constrained by the letter of the law. 125 Given the
size and composition of juries, they typically were seen as
constituting a representative sample of the lawmaking body.' 26
Thus, juries essentially operated as quasi-lawmakers, defining,
applying, and administering justice on a case-by-case basis
consistent with contemporary notions of justification and excuse.
Juries also exercised sentencing discretion for many crimes, even
being authorized to remit all penalties if this was deemed
appropriate in their judgment.127
nature of the charge and the defense offered.").
123 The idea that crimes are made up of "elements" (each requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt) is a relatively recent development. Before the recognition of
"elements of a crime" and affirmative defenses, many defenses that we would
classify today as failure of proof defenses would operate instead as excuse defenses.
For example, the taking of another's property pursuant to the mistaken belief that
it was one's own would traditionally support an excuse defense, while contemporary
legal systems would acquit based on the rationale that the prosecution failed to
prove an element of the offense, in particular, the specific intent mens rea required
for larceny.
124 It is unclear which court would try a man who admitted to killing another
while claiming this was justified, without citing any existing law to support this
claim. As noted, under Athenian law a "lawful" killer received no punishment, but
all others who kill--even accidental killers-suffer exile. See id. at 110-11 (noting
the word "deliberate"). It is thus unclear whether a killer claiming "justification," in
the absence of a specific law that permitted the killing, could nonetheless claim it
was done "lawfully." One can speculate that an Athenian making such a claim
would try to equate his actions with a type of killing that was explicitly permitted
by law. For example, a man who killed his aunt's seducer might defend on the basis
that this was permitted by the law that allowed him to kill his mother's seducer. In
support of this defense, the man might argue to the jury that his aunt raised him
from childhood and she was in many ways his de facto mother, and thus this law
ought likewise to exculpate him.
125 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
126 The chances seem pretty good that 500 randomly chosen Athenian jurymen
would vote the same way as the Athenian assembly in any given case. See
MACDOWELL, supra note 78, at 34-35 (finding that the system of paying jurors
produced a fair representation of poor citizens, but "did not produce [a] fair
representation of different age-groups" because the pay was low, so mainly old men
who were not fit to work volunteered).
127 Id. at 254 (indicating that some penalties were fixed by law). Under the
Athenian system, a litigant could propose a penalty he felt suitable. Thus, Socrates
once proposed a punishment of free meals for life at the public expense. Although
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C. The Roman Legal System
The breadth and scope of the Roman legal system allows for
only a superficial treatment of the subject matter. This review
will consider broad themes pertaining to criminal intent, while
concentrating on specific examples of justification and excuse
theory. Following is a brief sketch of Roman history and the
corresponding sources of law. It begins at Rome's very
beginnings, because to appreciate the development of Roman
legal thinking, it is necessary to understand its earliest
governmental structures.
1. Historical Overview
a. The Time of the Kings (753-510 B.C.)
The populus of Rome was first divided into patricians and
plebeians.' 28 Rome was ruled by a king, who derived his
authority mainly from the populus. The king also served as
judge, commander-in-chief, and priest of the community. 129 The
king chose from the patricians a senatus or assembly of between
one hundred and three hundred old men, who were his standing
council in all matters of difficulty, but who had no real
administrative or legislative powers.1 30  The law resided in
custom (mos maiorum) and the common sense of the king, who
alone had the power of consulting the gods by means of auspicia
or "bird watching."1 31 The king had only a few assistants, such
as the tribunus celerum (the commander of the cavalry) and the
quaestores parricidii (a commission of inquiry into cases of
murder). 132 Knowledge of the legal history of this time period is
sketchy at best. "For the history of the first period, ending
traditionally in 510 B.C. with the expulsion of Tarquinius
Socrates was ultimately put to death, there is no reason to believe that the jury in
his case could not have instead imposed the punishment he suggested. Id.
128 OLGA TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 7 (1993).
129 WOLFGANG KUNKEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 13 (J. M. Kelly trans., 1966); TELLEGEN-COUPERUS,
supra note 128, at 10.
130 TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, supra note 128 at 10, 11.
131 KUNKEL, supra note 129, at 13; see also TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, supra note
128, at 13.
132 JAMES Gow, A COMPANION TO SCHOOL CLASSICS 159 (1951).
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Superbus, the last king, we have little reliable evidence, and for
its law even less."'133
b. The Republic (509-31 B.C.)
After the overthrow of Tarquinius Superbus, the people of
Rome reorganized and founded an aristocratic republic. 134 Two
annually elected magistrates (later called consules) were
invested with power (imperium) in the place of the kings. 135 The
Senate, as founded and organized in the former period,
continued to exercise its influence and advise the consuls.1 36
During the next 250 years, two longstanding struggles would
fundamentally influence Roman history: (1) an internal class
struggle that ultimately produced the republican constitution,
and (2) an external struggle with the surrounding peoples that
led to Roman ascendance over a confederation that stretched
across all of Italy.' 37
The internal struggle had a particularly profound effect on
the Roman legal system. It involved a contest between the
plebians (commoners), who sought more rights and status, and
the patricians (the ruling class), who resisted this. In time, the
patrician class was forced to acknowledge the plebs' grievances,
resulting in their legal recognition.'38 This compromise resulted
in the creation of arguably the most important legal landmark in
Roman history, the codification of the Twelve Tables (450 B.C.).
Indeed, "the law of the Twelve Tables was treated by the
Romans as the starting point of their legal history."' 39  The
Twelve Tables were:
133 BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 3 (1962).
134 See id.
135 PAUL FREDERIC GIRARD, A SHORT HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 41 (Augustus
Henry Frazer Lefroy trans., 1906) (indicating that the only power that was withheld
was the religious power); see also KUNKEL, supra note 129, at 14; TELLEGEN-
COUPERUS, supra note 128, at 12.
136 See GIRARD, supra note 135, at 41-42 (finding that the constitution "had the
same elements as before"). The positions of each were altered. See TELLEGEN-
COUPERUS, supra note 128, at 12 (noting that the modern constitution is similar to
that of the Republic).
137 GERARD, supra note 135, at 60: TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, supra note 128, at 30.
13s Matthew E. Creighton, S.J., A Summary of the History of Greek and Latin
Literature 34-35 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
139 THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 827 (3d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1999)
(describing "Roman Law and Procedure").
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a code of twelve statutes, each consisting of many clauses,
dealing in a confused manner with large legal principles,
special enactments on details and rules of procedure. With all
their defects they were received most gratefully, and remained
for ever afterwards the foundation of Roman notions of right
and wrong. 140
The Twelve Tables were thus a codification of the customary
laws that had governed the Romans for centuries and would
later serve as a foundation for the Roman Empire's legal system.
Although the Twelve Tables were not the sole source of law
for the Roman Republic, it remains difficult to ascertain the
larger organized body of law extant during this period given the
great upheavals and turmoil that occurred in Rome. Widespread
codification of the law would only come much later under the
empire. Other important legal sources can nonetheless be
identified during this time, which contributed to and built up the
vast body of Roman law. These sources include: (1) the Senatus
Consulta, or decisions of the Senate, which became law only if
they were not vetoed by a magistrate; (2) the decisions of the
comitia centuriata, an assemblage of various classes of people of
the republic, which was reformed over time by various laws; (3)
the plebiscita, or the decisions of the comitia tributa or
commoner's assembly; and (4) the Edicts of the magistrates.' 4 '
Criminal jurisdiction under the Republic was divided among
multiple authorities and changed over time. The Senate had no
jurisdiction but could issue the senatus ultimum consultum,
which suspended all laws of the republic during times of
emergency and gave dictatorial powers to the consuls. The
Comitia centuriata and the comitia tributa had jurisdiction in
criminal trials until the last century of the republic, when the
quaestiones perpetuae, or permanent commissions, were
established for criminal matters. The Pontifex Maximus also
exercised criminal jurisdiction over some religious offenses. 142
140 GOW, supra note 132, at 240.
141 TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, supra note 128, at 14-16 (discussing the comitia
centuriata and comitia tributa), 39-40 (discussing the senatus consulta, plebiscita
and edicta).
142 See id. at 88; ORTOLON, THE HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 153 (Cutler et al.
trans., 2d ed. London, 1896).
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c. The Empire (31 B.C. to Sixth Century A.D.)
After the murder of Julius Caesar (43 B.C.), his adopted son
Octavian, through a series of intrigues and struggles, assumed
the ultimate power in Rome and became its first emperor,
Caesar Augustus. 143 Thus the Roman Empire was born, and it
would continue as the most powerful force in the ancient world
until the sixth century A.D. Although it is beyond the scope of
this article to analyze all of the forces that led to the ultimate
disintegration of the empire, it is instructive to trace briefly the
legal ramifications of these historic events.
Under the empire, the emperors abolished the legislative
competence of the comitia.144  Although the senate was now
entrusted with legislation in matters of private law, the chief
source of all law unquestionably resided with the emperor
himself. The emperor could declare his will either by edicta, like
the praetors, i.e., judicial officers, under the republic; by
mandata, i.e., instructions to magistrates; by rescripta, i.e.,
answers to magistrates who consulted him; or by decreta, i.e.,
actual decisions on doubtful points. 145  These orders and
decisions were codified from time to time by lawyers for the use
of the profession, but an authorized digest was not prepared
until the codex Theodosianus of Theodosius II in 438 A.D. 146
At first, criminal jurisdiction under the empire remained
substantially the same as in the late republic, i.e., under the
quaestiones perpetuae. The appellate jurisdiction for these
commissions was exercised by the emperor himself. As the
imperial police became more influential over time, the power of
the quaestiones correspondingly decreased. Eventually, criminal
jurisdiction was exclusively within the control of the imperial
police. 147  "The quaestiones could not sit unless a formal
accusation was made by a citizen; but the police, having
exceptional means of information, used to ferret out offenders
and themselves prefer accusations before their own superiors."' 48
143 See COLIN WELLS, THE ROMAN EMPIRE 11-30, 49-51 (1984).
144 TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, supra note 128, at 83.
145 Id. at 86.
146 GOW, supra note 132, at 255.
147 TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, supra note 128, at 88, 92.
148 GOW, supra note 132, at 257.
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2. Roman Law: Justification and Excuse as Applied
The notion of criminal intent in Roman law has roots as
ancient as the founding of the city itself. Thus, the Romans were
cognizant that punishment for a crime might be mitigated
because of circumstances. The Oxford Classical Dictionary is
instructive on this point:
From the earliest times the intention of the wrongdoer was
taken into consideration; even the legendary law of Numa on
parricide required that the murderer had acted knowingly with
malice (sciens dolo); the analogous expression in republican
laws was sciens dolo malo. More adequate differentiation
between different states of mind was developed in the practice
of the cognitio extra ordinem or extraordinaria, influenced also
by imperial constitutions. In appreciating the atrocity of the
act and depravity of its author the judge considered the
intensity and persistence of the delinquent's will (dolus), the
question of whether the act had been committed with
premeditation or on sudden impulse, whether it had been
provoked by a moral offence (e.g. murder of an adulterous wife
when caught in the act) or was due to drunkenness ('per
vinum). A late classical jurist, Claudius Saturninus, known
only by a treatise on penalties, distinguished seven points to be
taken into consideration in determining the punishment:
reason, person, place, time, quality, quantity, and effect (Dig.
48. 19. 16). Judicial liberty, however, gave occasion for
arbitrariness: the 3rd cent., with the decline of imperial
authority, brought anarchy into criminal jurisdiction. Under
the late empire fixed penalties-now more severe than
formerly-were restored, the discretion of the judge in the
infliction of punishment having been abolished. 149
Roman criminal law never underwent the refinement or
systemization of Roman civil law.150 In the broadest sense this is
attributable to the intrinsic nature of traditional criminal
149 THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 139, at 833 (describing
"Roman Law and Procedure"). It should be noted that Numa Pompilius was the
second king of Rome. He reigned from 715-673 B.C.
150 This is not to say that Roman criminal law did not change or develop as
society matured, but it never received the attention nor obtained the sophistication
of the civil law. Gaius' The Institutes, the first "textbook" on Roman law, concerned
itself almost entirely with what we would call "civil law." See 1 THE INSTITUTES OF
GAIUS 2 (Francis De Zulueta trans., 1946). See generally ANDREW STEPHENSON, A
HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1992) (1912) (tracing the
development of Roman civil law).
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jurisprudence. As Edward Gibbon succinctly observed, "Our
duties to the State are simple and uniform ... [b]ut our relations
to each other are various and infinite."'151  Accordingly, a
functional and shared understanding of Roman criminal law was
ubiquitous within Roman society, not only because the law itself
was basic and finite, but also because its content was largely
intuitive. 152 Roman civil law, on the other hand, was a far more
complicated and indefinite matter. For example, questions such
as how to equitably distribute the rights to water for
downstream users, or how to apportion the loss of cargo
jettisoned to avoid a shipwreck, did not lend themselves as
readily to self-evident answers as did matters of crime and
punishment, and thus they called for greater didactic regulation
and prescription by the state.1 53
There were other reasons, unique to Roman society and
culture, which helped suppress the development of Roman
criminal law. A major impediment was the scope and breadth of
the jurisdiction of the "paterfamilias." By virtue of the paternal
power granted under paterfamilias, wrongs occurring within the
family were beyond the jurisdiction of the state. 54 From this it
can be inferred that many of the crimes committed outside the
bounds of the domestic family were handled informally between
151 4 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE 517 (J.B. Bury ed., Heritage Press 1946) (1776).
152 In this sense, Roman criminal law was essentially a selective expression of
"true" or natural law. "True law is right reason in agreement with nature, it is of
universal application, unchanging and everlasting ... [w]e cannot be freed from its
obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an
expounder or interpreter of it." CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA 211 (Clinton Walker Keyes
trans., 1928). For a comprehensive treatment of the relationship of human reason to
the natural law, see generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
(1999).
153 See EUGENE F. WARE, ROMAN WATER LAW 47-48, 101-10, 147 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1985) (1905) (translated from the Pandects of Justinian).
154 With respect to paterfamilias under Roman law:
[T]he exclusive, absolute, and perpetual dominion of the father over his
children is peculiar to the Roman jurisprudence .... Neither age, nor
rank, nor the consular office, nor the honors of a triumph, could exempt the
most illustrious citizen from the bonds of filial subjection: his own
descendants were included in the family of their common ancestor; and the
claims of adoption were not less sacred ....
GIBBON, supra note 151, at 470-72. Indeed, it was not until the reign of Alexander
Severus (208-235 A.D.) that the "private jurisdiction" of paterfamilias was finally
abolished. Id. at 473.
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the heads of households. 155 Besides this, the civil cause of action
corresponding to a tort, called a "delictum," contained both a
compensatory and punitive element, and, thus, in the early days
of Rome there was no corresponding public wrong. 156 Also,
during most of Rome's history a majority of the population-i.e.,
the non-citizens-was subject to the arbitrary rule of appointed
magistrates, who were not constrained to base their judgments
on the law as such. 157
The law under the Twelve Tables proscribed a variety of
public and private wrongs, including murder, theft, arson, injury
to slaves, and the making of defamatory or insulting songs. 1
58
Like today, a case could be brought as a public criminal
prosecution, a private suit for damages, or both, depending on
the circumstances. 159 Roman criminal law was a mixture of
codified crimes and "common law" offenses. For example, the
Lex Calpurnia (149 B.C.), which punished extortion by the
provincial administrators, and the Lex Cornelia de Incendio (88
B.C.), which punished arson, were statutory crimes. 160 Other
offenses, such as abortion, blackmail, the violation of tombs and
vagabondage, were prosecuted in the absence of a statute.161
It is unfortunate, if not surprising, that the surviving
historical examples of ancient Rome criminal proceedings are
limited to political and other highly publicized trials, and thus
they are probably not representative of Roman criminal law and
procedure as it was generally administered.1 62 Given the paucity
155 WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION
TO MODERN LAW 677 (1938).
156 Id. at 678.
157 GIBBON, supra note 151, at 505 (stating that "on the proof or suspicion of
guilt the slave or the stranger was nailed to a cross").
158 BURDICK, supra note 155, at 678.
159 Id.; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 150, at 233-41 (explaining
classification of actions).
160 BURDICK supra note 155, at 683-85. These laws were extended to related,
and sometimes seemingly unrelated, offenses. For example, Lex Cornelia de Falsis,
originally punishing the forgery of testaments, was extended to cover counterfeiting
and giving false evidence. Punishment for violating these laws was prescribed by
the statute. Id. "A Roman accused of any capital crime might prevent the sentence
of the law by voluntary exile or death." GIBBON, supra note 151, at 515. The accused
were presumed innocent and were free until the vote for conviction by popular
assembly (or jury) was counted. Id.
161 BURDICK, supra note 155, at 685-86.
162 For example, minors under the age of puberty were generally not subject to
criminal liability and certainly not the death penalty. THE INSTITUTES OF GAIuS,
supra note 150, at 223; THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 408 n.18 (Thomas Collett
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of such records and documents, one must be cautious in drawing
firm conclusions about specific aspects of Roman criminal law
from these sources. In fact, the only nearly complete "record" of
a Roman prosecution or defense is contained in a purported
speech by Cicero. This "record" is, of course, not a trial
transcript but was instead created sometime after the trial to
demonstrate the art of rhetoric, and thus there is good reason to
doubt that even this account accurately reflects what actually
transpired in that case. 163
We do know that in the early days of Rome trials were held
before the popular assembly, in which all citizens of age took
part.164 During later periods, because of the growth of the city
and the increased number of crimes and trials, cases were
brought before judges (Praetors) and juries voted on the guilt or
innocence of the accused. 16 5 The popular assembly commissioned
these courts, first to deal with a specific case and later to address
specific crimes. 166 In many respects these bodies more closely
resembled a standing legislative committees than they did courts
of law. The popular assembly retained concurrent jurisdiction
over crimes; it could decide either to exercise its authority and
hear the case itself, or to delegate its authority and allow the
Sandars trans., 7th ed. 1952). Nonetheless, the tender age of the children of
Sejanus, a commander of imperial guard who conspired against Emperor Tiberius,
did not protect them from execution, even though they were clearly under the age of
criminal liability. Tacitus even mentions that one female child was raped because
the execution of virgins was unprecedented. TACITUS, THE ANNALS OF IMPERIAL
ROME 199 (Michael Grant trans., Penguin Books 1989) (1956).
163 See generally CICERO, DEFENCE SPEECHES 170-71 (D.H. Berry trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2000). Asconius was a contemporary of Cicero who probably
attended the trial of Milo. In a commentary on Cicero's speeches, Asconius wrote
that Cicero had argued at Milo's trial that Clodius had set a trap for Milo and he
was killed in self-defense. Cicero, in his written speech, also contended that the
killing of Clodius was justified because he was a public enemy. Asconius claimed
that Cicero added the justification argument sometime after the trial had concluded.
Id. at 210-13.
164 Voting was not by individual citizens but by the "tribes" that comprised the
assembly. The upper class, although less in number, had more voting units than the
lower classes. The two highest classes, the senatorial and equestrian, when
combined, constituted a majority vote. HANS JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW 39-42
(1951).
165 BURDICK, supra note 155, at 682, 688. Juries were large and generally
totaled more that 30 persons, with a conviction garnered by a majority vote and a
tie vote constituting an acquittal. Id. at 695.
166 Id. at 681-82.
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case to be prosecuted in another forum, i.e., before a different
court having its own procedures and penalties. 167
Roman juries were deemed to represent the people fully in
their capacity as lawmaker, and as such they decided both the
facts of the case and how they should be applied to the law. 168
Juries were not restrained in their authority to convict or acquit,
and their decisions were not subject to appeal. Although juries
were expected to follow the law, there was no mechanism that
limited a jury's ability to determine or apply the law as it saw fit
in a particular case. 69 The judge did not instruct the jury on the
law, 170 and there were no formal rules governing the admission
of evidence. 171 As a consequence, a defendant was free to seek an
acquittal on the basis of any theory-such as justification,
excuse, or nullification-that he believed had the best chance of
persuading the people or jury that he should not be convicted. 172
Despite the difficulties in ascertaining the Roman criminal
law, some conclusions can be confidently drawn about the
procedural aspects of their criminal defenses in general, and the
substantive content of defenses based on justification and excuse
in particular. Procedurally, the burden of proving guilt was on
the accuser, and the quantum of proof needed for a conviction
would seem to be as great as our own "reasonable doubt"
167 The trial of Milo was one such instance, in which the popular assembly
commissioned an alternate court to hear the case. CICERO, supra note 163, at 164-
66.
168 BURDICK, supra note 155, at 694.
169 Id.
170 CICERO, supra note 163, at 694. Jurors voted immediately after the
conclusion of the trial without deliberation. The Roman criminal courts, each with
its own particular jurisdiction as defined by statute, existed until the second century
A.D. They were replaced by criminal courts of general jurisdiction without juries,
jury trials being anathema to an absolutist constitution. Id. at 697-98; GIBBON,
supra note 151, at 381.
171 Witnesses did take an oath to tell truth. BURDICK, supra note 155, at 691.
"In Anglo-Saxon courts hearsay evidence, the opinions of witnesses, and facts
irrelevant to the issue are excluded by the presiding judge. These rules of evidence
were not applied in Roman courts." FRANK FROST ABBOTT, ROMAN POLITICS 102
(1963).
172 GIBBON, supra note 151, at 381.
[Tihis union of the judicial and legislative powers [exercised in trials before
the assembly] left it doubtful whether the accused party was pardoned or
acquitted; and, in the defence of [their] client, the orators of
Rome... address[ed] their arguments to the policy and benevolence, as
well as to the justice, of their sovereign."
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requirement-sometime stated in the Roman system as a
"clearer than daylight" standard. 173 The trial process itself was
inquisitorial rather than adversarial. 174 The defendant had no
right against self-incrimination, and although slaves could not
be forced to testify against their masters, 175 it was common
practice to torture slaves to obtain evidence. 176
Crimes under Roman law had both wrongful act and
wrongful intent components. For example, using a borrowed
item for a purpose other than that agreed upon by the owner
constituted larceny. 177 In contrast, a person did not steal if he
was unaware that his use of an item was against the owner's
will, because "theft is not committed without dishonest
intention."'178 Papinian, one of the principle Roman jurists,
advised, "It is not from the event alone, but the intention, that
the law draws an inference of fraud."'179 Similarly, a person who
mistakenly believed that his taking of property was against the
owner's will was not guilty of stealing because he did not commit
an objectively wrongful act. 80 As an example of this, Gaius gives
a case in which "Titus," Roman for "John Doe," attempted to
induce a slave to steal property from his master and bring it to
him. The slave informed his master of this and the master,
wanting to prosecute Titus as a thief, instructed the slave to take
the property and bring it to Titus as he instructed. According to
Gaius, Titus would be judged innocent of a theft in these
circumstances because his receipt of the property was not
accomplished in contravention of the owner's wishes.' 8 ' Using a
173 BURDICK, supra note 155, at 694. In one case, a prosecutor, seeing he was
about to lose, exclaimed to the emperor, "[I]f it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter
will become of the guilty?" The emperor replied, "If it suffices to accuse, what will
become of the innocent?" Id. at 693. Bringing a criminal charge at times could be
dangerous to the accuser, as a failure to prove a case could led to severe punishment
of the citizen-prosecutor. See THE THEODOSIAN CODE 225 (Clyde Pharr trans., 1952)
(n.d.).
174 BURDICK, supra note 155, at 694.
175 Slaves could not be compelled to testify about accusations of adultery.
CICERO, supra note 163, at 231.
176 In fact, evidence received from a slave not taken under torture was deemed
to be unreliable. Id. at 227.
177 THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 150, at 219.
178 Id.
179 JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42
(Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2001) (1856).
180 THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 150, at 219.
181 Id. The Justinian Code, referring to the same example, provides that "Titus"
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similar rationale, the Romans seemed to hold that one could not
be accused of stealing abandoned property, regardless of his
state of mind.
By modern standards, early Roman law pertaining to
unconsummated crimes appears to be both incoherent and
inconsistent. 8 2 For example, one who acts with an intent to kill
but does not actually kill anyone can nonetheless be convicted
and punished as if he committed a homicide, rather than merely
an attempted homicide.18 3 The actus reus requirement for these
unconsummated homicides was not limited to ultimate or
penultimate acts, such as failed attempts to inflict the lethal
blow. A more remote act, such as going about armed with intent
to kill or acquiring poison, was deemed sufficiently proximate to
support a homicide conviction. 84  Moreover, whether an
unconsummated crime would be punished at all varied with the
nature and gravity of the offense. For instance, the attempted
theft of the property would go unpunished, probably because the
direct social harm of theft-i.e., an interference with the owner's
property interests-was comparatively venial and had not yet
occurred. 8 5 Other comparatively minor crimes, such as opening
the will of a living donor, were instead punished as if they had
been completed. 8 6
As in our present-day system, under Roman law, a mens rea
of recklessness could be substituted for a more aggravated evil
should be liable for corrupting a slave because "the intention to corrupt the slave
[was] indisputable." THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 162, at 484; see also
4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59, at bk. 47, tit. 2.43.10 ("[T]here cannot
be a deliberate appropriation of what another deliberately disregards.").
182 In the late empire, all attempts were punished as if the criminal had
committed the crime. THE THEODOSIAN CODE, supra note 173, at 236.
183 "A man who has slain another is sometimes acquitted, while one who has
not slain is convicted as a homicide." REV. M. HYAMSON, MOSAICARUM ET
ROMANARUM LEGUM COLLATIO 61 (William S. Hein & Co. 1997) (1913). The former
result obtains, in part, because one who kills another by mere chance without
intending to do so would be undeserving of punishment by the state, although he
may be required to undergo religious atonement. WOLFF, supra note 164, at 34-35.
184 CICERO, supra note 163, at 186; HYAMSON, supra note 183, at 61, 65 (noting
that going about armed with intent to kill was punished as a homicide); 4 THE
DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59, at bk. 48, tit. 8.1.
185 Contrast theft with homicide, the latter crime being so gravely harmful to
society that the law punished as murder some remote acts that could likely, but not
necessarily, lead to death, provided the actor intended to kill. See HYAMSON, supra
note 183, at 61.
186 This offense was punished as a forgery, rather than as an attempted forgery.
O.F. ROBINSON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ANCIENT ROME 18-19 (1995).
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intent and thus support a conviction for a lesser offense. For
example, although not explicitly calling it a reckless homicide,
the Emperor Hadrian approved the five-year exile as
punishment for a death that resulted from overly boisterous play
at a party. 187
Roman law recognized non-exculpatory defenses for some
crimes, such a general defense of prior adjudication and statutes
of limitations.188 In particular, a defendant who was acquitted
could be re-prosecuted for the same crime only if it could be
established that he and the prosecutor colluded with each
other. 8 9 Apparently it was not uncommon for a defendant to
seek a favorable verdict by procuring a friend to act as the
prosecutor. Such collusion constituted prosecutorial misconduct
and was itself made criminal by statute. 190
Roman law recognized a variety of excuses as complete or
partial defenses to crimes, or as a basis for mitigating
punishment. 19' The very young were excused because they were
judged to be incapable of possessing a "dolus," i.e., a guilty
mind. 92 "In almost every penal action indulgence is shewn to
youth and inexperience."'' 93 This maxim applied to offenses
prohibited by the civil law alone, but it did not apply to
violations of the natural law. 94 The extent to which mental
maturity was evaluated with reference to physical maturity is
187 HYAMSON, supra note 183, at 63; see 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra
note 59, at bk. 9, tit. 2.7 ("[J]f one who is unreasonably overloaded throws down his
burden and kills a slave, the Aquilian action lies; for it was within his own
judgment not to load himself thus"); THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 162,
at 413 ("[the] law punishes fault as well as wilful wrongdoing").
188 THE THEODOSIAN CODE, supra note 173, at 241.
189 BURDICK, supra note 155, at 695.
190 See id. at 699.
191 These excuses may have operated as a failure of proof defense negating
mens rea, or as an affirmative defense, or some blended combination of the two. As
observed earlier, Roman law did not classify or distinguish between defenses in this
manner. See supra text accompanying note 172.
192 "Since theft depends on intention, the child is only liable on such a charge if
he is approaching puberty and so understands that what he is doing is wrong." THE
INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 150, at 233; THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra
note 162, at 408.
193 PHILLIMORE, supra note 179, at 223.
194 Id. at 224. If a youth entered into an incestuous marriage as prohibited by
the civil law only, as when first cousins marry, then he would be excused; if he
married in violation of the natural law, as when a father marries his daughter, then
he would not be excused. Id.
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unclear.195 Although a person under the age of twenty-five was
still considered to be a minor, 196 he was nonetheless deemed
capable of possessing "dolus."1 97  In such cases, an offender's
youthful age might provide a partial defense of diminished
responsibility. 198
Insanity was recognized as a complete criminal defense
under Roman law.1 99 An insane person was treated as an ox or
other beast for the purpose of tort and criminal liability, in that
he could not be held responsible for his conduct in any fashion,200
but his "keeper" could be liable in tort for failing to restrain the
insane man.201 Roman law did not adopt a specific rule or test
for insanity, such as an irresistible impulse test, leaving this
instead to the determination of the judge or jury on a case-by-
case basis. 20 2 The Romans no doubt struggled with many of the
195 THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 150, at 63. Some jurists held that
puberty must be judged simply by age, while others held that it was reached when a
youth was capable of procreation. Justinian believed it was indecent to examine a
boy for this purpose and so, "to conform to the purity of the present times," fixed the
age of puberty at fourteen. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 162, at 71.
The law of the twelve tablets imposed a punishment of flogging for "furtively
pasturing his herds or flocks on the land of another" for a person below the age of
puberty, and "death if an adult." It appears that this flogging was not really a
criminal penalty as such, but rather it served as a kind of public discipline of
children whose parents have let them stray. BURDICK, supra note 155, at 678-79.
Sajnus's daughter, as she was being dragged off for execution by Tiberius, asked
why she was not to be whipped like other children. See TACITUS, supra note 162, at
199.
196 Majority and minority status based on age was treated differently under
Roman law than it is in contemporary American law. Roman youths were subject to
the authority of the paterfamilias, unless freed from it by death or legal action.
Thus, under Roman law, those under twenty-five years of age were entitled to
special protection because of their youth and inexperience, although, strictly
speaking, they had the legal capacity to act under the civil law-e.g., to enter into
contracts). R.W. LEAGE, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 122-23 (C.H. Ziegler ed., 2d ed.
1948).
197 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59, at bk. 4, tit. 4.9.
198 "[It is settled that were a minor has committed a delict, he is not to receive
help .... [b]ut if... he could have confessed so as to avoid liability for double [or
fourfold] damages and yet preferred to deny liability, he is given restitutio... to the
extent of being deemed to have confessed." Id. A minor is not liable for "calumny" if
he falsely accuses his wife of adultery. 4 id. at bk. 48, tit. 5.16.6.
199 See, e.g., 4 id. at bk. 48, tit. 8.12 ("[A] madman who kills a man is not
liable.... [he is] excused by the misfortune of his condition.").
200 See id. at bk. 44, tit. 8.12, bk. 1, tit. 18.14.
201 See id. at bk. 1, tit. 18.14.
202 The available sources of Roman law are unclear as to whether exculpation
required a showing that the mental infirmity caused the crime. In this regard, one
can imagine a case where a man is delusional but his crime is unrelated or only
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same vexing issues as we encounter today with respect to
insanity, such as what to do in situations where the defendant
has intermittent periods of lucidity, and how to determine
whether the defendant is merely feigning madness. Roman law
did, however, distinguish clearly between insanity and the
capacity to stand trial. If a defendant was deemed to be sane at
the time he committed the offense, he would be punished
regardless of his state of mind at the time of his judicial
proceeding. 203
Roman law also appears to have been receptive to excusing
those who committed their acts while in the heat of passion. One
of the Maxims of the jurist Paulus was that "[n]othing said or
done in the heat of passion is irrevocable, until perseverance
shews [sic] that it was the deliberate purpose of the mind. 20 4
Even when the act was irrevocable-as when the husband killed
his wife for committing adultery-the penalty imposed on the
killer could be somewhat remitted because of his excited
emotions. Papinian argued that the killer's penalty should be
reduced from death to exile in such cases, even though he
recognized a husband had no legal right to kill his adulterous
wife and acknowledged such a killing was governed by the Lex
Cornelia concerning assassins. 20 5 Papinian also contended that a
husband had the "right" to kill a male adulterer, provided the
adulterer was of low social status and the husband acted
immediately upon discovering the offender in flagrante delicto in
the husband's house. 20 6 Although Papinian referred to this as a
marginally connected to his mental condition.
203 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59, at bk. 1, tit. 18.14.
204 PHILLIMORE, supra note 179, at 207. Thus, "hasty words did not bring the
speaker under the' penalties of the 'Lex Julia Majestatis" for treasonable
utterances. Id.
205 HYAMSON, supra note 183, at 79. "Antoninus the Great, too, pardoned those
who, in the first outburst of passion, slew the adulterers." Id. at 77. It seems
Papinian meant temporary exile because he distinguishes it from banishment. Id. A
person who is banished loses his citizenship; he is considered dead under the civil
law and his children are no longer in his "potestas." A person who is exiled
temporarily retains his citizenship and his children remain in his potestas. THE
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 162, at 48-49.
206 HYAMSON, supra note 183 at 81. Compare this to Papinian's statement that
a father's right to kill the adulterer and his daughter is limited to fathers whose
daughters are "Sui Juris" and not extended to fathers who are in another's power.
Thus, a father's legal status as paterfamilias and his concern for his family duty
justify, rather than excuse, the killing. 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59,
at bk. 48, tit. 5.22.
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"right," he probably meant that the husband should be excused
rather than justified because the killing remained wrongful even
if the husband was exculpated. 20 7 In all other situations, a
husband seeking redress against a male adulterer was required
to bring a judicial action against the offender. 208 Exile to a
separate island was the only punishment for adultery permitted
by the Lex Julia.20 9
One of the oddities of Roman law is its distinction between
"manifest" and "non-manifest" crimes. A thief would be guilty of
a "manifest" larceny if he was discovered in the act or stealing or
spiriting away the goods. Under the Twelve Tables, he would be
punished by death if he was a slave or, if he was a freeman, by
becoming a slave of the person from whom he stole.210 In other
circumstances, a thief would instead be convicted of a "non-
manifest" larceny, and his punishment would be limited to
double the value of the stolen property.21 1 This distinction, based
on the immediacy of discovering the offense, seems to focus on
how an injured party would react if seeking private redress
without the intervention of the state. Everything else being
equal, the victim of a "manifest" larceny would likely have hotter
blood, and would as a result seek a more severe atonement than
the victim of a more remote larceny. By establishing a two-tier
punishment system based on how the victim was likely to react,
the law seemed to treat as partially justified those actions
caused by excited emotions; thus, it mixes and arguably confuses
the basic premises of justification and excuse. 21 2
207 PHILLIMORE, supra note 179, at 225.
208 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59, at bk. 48, tit. 5.
209 GIBBON, supra note 151, at 509. Constantine made adultery punishable by
death, but "[tihe adulterers were spared by the common sympathy of mankind
[and] ... Justinian relaxed the punishment.., to solitude and penance." Id. at 511.
Augustus' own daughter, a notorious adulterer, was punished in this manner.
TACITUS, supra note 162, at 62-63. Banishment to a separate island was probably
imposed only on the wealthy whom could afford this; it is unclear how those of
lesser means were punished.
210 THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 150, at 215. The punishment for
manifest larceny was later reduced from death or enslavement to a fourfold
payment of damages for both slaves and free people. Id. at 217.
211 Id.
212 Under modern criminal law systems, punishment is rarely imposed with
relation to how the victim is likely to react to the crime. Rather, punishment is
legitimately meted out based on more universal grounds, which are not directly
related to the subjective reaction of the victim. Although a victim's "hot blood" might
be a basis for excusing his violent response toward a criminal upon discovery of a
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The Roman codes dealt with duress both as an action to
recover lost property and as an affirmative defense against
breach of contract or other "civil suit"; however, it is unclear how
this defense would operate in criminal trials. 213 "[T]his clause
comprises both force and duress," where a man has been
"compelled by force" to do something.214 An objective "reasonable
person" standard was used to determine which fears amounted
to legitimate excuses for otherwise criminal acts. "[T]he duress
relevant to this edict is not that experienced by a weak-minded
man but that which reasonably has an effect upon a man of the
most resolute character."21 5 Further, the fear must have been in
response to an imminent threat, rather than "a suspicion that
[force] may be brought to bear."21 6
Roman law is less clear whether duress would be allowed for
any crime regardless of its severity, such as murder. Duress in
combination with the defense of "superior orders," however,
would probably have provided a partial excuse to a son who
murdered in compliance with his father's command.217 That
Roman law would recognize a defense of superior orders is not
surprising, given that slavery and paternal dominance
permeated the culture. Like duress, the defense of superior
crime, it does not provide a principled basis for the state to impose enhanced
punishment upon the criminal. To punish a thief with death because his victim
would have been excused for killing him-if the victim killed him while in a rage
caused by catching the thief in the act-confuses justification and excuse, in that it
signifies that the state endorses the victim's emotional response by adopting it as its
own. This is not to say that a thief who is caught in the act could be seen as causing
greater social harm than a thief whose crime is only later discovered, and the
resulting anger of the victim, and society in general, is itself a social harm deserving
of some additional punishment. Note also that the Roman practice of punishing
manifest crimes based on the victim's likely reaction to them should not be confused
with the Eighth Amendment's allowance for victim impact evidence, i.e., evidence
relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the
crimes on the victim's family. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-31 (1991).
Victim impact evidence is a legitimate consideration when determining punishment
because a "defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness" is related to "the
specific harm" caused by his acts. Id. at 825.
213 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59, at bk. 4, tit. 2.
214 Id. at bk. 4, tit. 2.3.
215 Id. at bk. 4, tit. 2.6.
216 Id. at bk. 4, tit. 2.9.
217 No authority has been found that directly supports this statement. Rather,
it is more in the nature of a surmise, which is based on the fact that under Roman
law, paternal authority was even greater than the authority of a master over his
slave.
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orders turned upon the ability of one person to subordinate so
completely the will of another person that the latter's acts were
not the expression of his essentially unencumbered free will. For
example, "slaves who are proved to have obeyed the madness of
[their] masters [were only] sentenced to the mines" even if their
crimes, in the absence of compulsion, called for harsher
punishment.218
Cicero divided necessity, the most general of the justification
defenses, into three categories. The first and greatest was
necessity premised on what was honorable, the next was
necessity based on safety, and the last was necessity related to
usefulness. 219 According to Cicero, if:
[T]hat slight diminution of honesty [for the sake of safety that
may be] caused by our conduct may be hereafter repaired by
virtue and industry, then it seems proper to have regard for our
safety. But when that does not appear possible then we must
think of nothing but what is honourable. 220
Cicero's first example of necessity involves a general who
surrenders his arms and equipment in exchange for safe passage
of his troops.221 When the general is later prosecuted for treason,
the question is presented whether his otherwise treasonable act
was justified by necessity. The prosecutor could seek to defeat a
claim of necessity in several ways. First, he could try to
demonstrate that the harm feared by the general was unlikely to
occur. 222 Second, he could try to show that the general's claimed
motive-saving his troops from certain defeat and death-was a
pretense for a self-serving act.223 Third, he could try to establish
that it was actually preferable for the general to suffer defeat
and sustain casualties rather than to surrender his weapons and
supplies; in other words, that in the choosing between the two
evils, the general incorrectly selected the greater over the
lesser.224 The above arguments suggest that Roman law took an
218 THE THEODOSIAN CODE, supra note 173, at 234.
219 CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, at bk. 2, ch. LVIII (C.D. Yonge trans., Bell & Sons
1888) (n.d.), available at http://www.classicpersuasion.org (last visited Aug. 18,
2004).
220 Id.
221 Id. at ch. XXIV.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. at ch. XXV. The prosecutor's argument might be that the general should
not have given up, for the sake of sparing his troops, those things that are essential
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objective view of necessity, and thus an honest but unreasonable
belief on the part of a defendant would not justify his actions.225
The other examples of necessity presented by Cicero involve
circumstances in which the forces of nature compel a ship's
captain to commit an otherwise unlawful act. In one case, a ship
with a "beak"-presumably a ram of some sort, thus making it a
warship-was forced by the waves and wind into the harbor of
Rhodes in violation of the law. 226 In urging necessity, the
captain might argue, "[U]nder his name the common
powerlessness of mankind is sought to be convicted."227  He
might also assert he was not responsible for causing the
justifying or excusing conditions, and that "the judges should
consider his intentions, and not the result."228  The prosecutor
could seek to defeat the defendant's claim of necessity by
showing the captain could have avoided the unlawful conduct
had he taken proper precautions. In all of the cases addressed
by Cicero, necessity is treated as an affirmative defense, at least
insofar as the defendant admits to committing the charged act
but asserts that it was justified in doing so under the
circumstances. 229
Under Roman law, self-defense was also allowed as a
justification defense. 230 The Justinian Code broadly recognized
that "natural reason permits a person to defend himself against
danger."231 Roman law also presumed that any home robbery at
night justified the killing of the burglar, and thus "[i]f one kill a
thief who comes at night or comes by day and defends himself
with a weapon, he is not liable under the law."232 The available
sources of Roman law are not explicit, however, as to whether a
for the safety of the city and its inhabitants. Id.
225 Of course, given that this discussion is taken from a rhetoric textbook, it
may be unwise to draw firm conclusions about necessity from this source.
226 Id. at ch. XXXII.
227 Id. at ch. XXXIII.
228 Id.
229 Id. at ch. XLVIII.
230 Again, as the burdens of proof and production are not delineated in Roman
criminal jurisprudence, it is unclear whether the defendant had to show he acted
pursuant to legitimate self-defense, or if instead the prosecutor had the burden of
proving that self-defense did not apply.
231 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59, at bk. 9, tit. 2.4.
232 HYAMSON, supra note 183, at 93. Such a killing would be justified "provided
one gives evidence of the fact [that he has caught a thief] by shouting aloud." 1 THE
DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59, at bk. 9, tit. 2.4.1.
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mistaken exercise of self-defense was justified, excused, or
simply disallowed as a defense.
Roman law did not require an actor to retreat-if this could
be safely done-from deadly force in his own home, and it is hard
to believe that a retreat requirement would be generally imposed
in other circumstances. 233 On the other hand, Roman law did
explicitly provide that one could not justifiably kill in defense of
property alone. "[I]f, perchance, anyone should be killed,
whether on the part of the possessor [of the property] or of the
person who has attempted to violate possession, punishment
shall be inflicted on the one who attempted to employ
violence." 234 Justinian further explained that anyone who used
force to defend his right to property would be deprived of the
property. 235 Although this result may seem to conflict with the
unrestricted right to resist highway robbers, the law of the
Twelve Tables and the Justinian Code presume that highway
robbers are always a threat to the safety of the victim's person
not just to his property. 236
Finally, Roman citizens were justified in killing in defense of
the Republic. 237 This included not only the obvious right to kill
the enemy in battle, but also the "domestic" killing of those who
attempted to subvert the constitutional order. 238  The most
famous example of the latter circumstance was the killing of
Julius Caesar by Brutus. "After the expulsion of the
kings ... each of his fellow-citizens was armed with the sword of
justice; and the act of Brutus ... had been already sanctified by
233 HYAMSON, supra note 183, at 95. For example, Cicero does not address
whether Milo could have retreated in safety from the attack by Claudius. On the
other hand, if one could safely apprehend the offender but instead "preferred" to kill
him, he would be liable for murder. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59, at
bk. 9, tit. 2.5.
234 THE THEODOSIAN CODE, supra note 173, at 234. The quoted language, taken
in context, seems to address violent disputes regarding the ownership of both real
property and chattel. It was designed generally to discourage self-help and promote
resort to the legal process. Given that real property is immobile, it is doubtful that
violent self-help would ever be the socially preferred method to resolve disputes
about this. With respect to chattel, if the thief is unknown and the property is
mobile and valuable, even violent self-help might be sometimes justified. It is
unclear if this edict would ever apply to situations beyond the disputed ownership of
property.
235 See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 162, at 492-93.
236 THE THEODOSIAN CODE, supra note 173, at 236.
237 GIBBON, supra note 151, at 506.
238 Id. at 506, n.181.
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the judgments of his country."2 39 So great was the popular belief
in the lawfulness of Brutus's act-and the belief in the fiction of
the existence of the republic during the early empire-that, more
than two hundred years later, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius
recommended Brutus as the model of the good Roman citizen. 240
D. The English Common Law System
The English Common Law tradition has had a singularly
important influence upon American criminal law. The English
Common Law was expressly adopted as the law of the various
states, in most cases in its entirety,241 and, in some respects, it
was understood to apply generally in the newly independent
United States.242 Although a comprehensive review of English
Common Law from the Germanic invasions in the sixth century
to eighteenth century America is far beyond the scope of this
article, 243 a brief survey of justification and excuse under this
tradition is necessary to fully appreciate the magnitude of the
239 Id. at 506.
240 See Cicero's defense of Milo in CICERO, supra note 152, at 212-18. There,
Cicero argues that the killing of Claudius by Milo was justified because Claudius
was a threat to the republic.
241 "American criminal law is primarily English in its heritage and judicial in
its origin. In large measure, the original thirteen American states and most later
states adopted English law as their own." DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 3.01[A] (citing
Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its Reception in the United States, 4
VAND. L. REV. 791, 798-805 (1951)). This is not to say that the Common Law of
England was imported wholesale from the very beginning; Alexis de Tocqueville
notes that the 1650 Code of Connecticut took its penal laws from Moses, and that in
both Connecticut and Massachusetts, adultery was a capital crime. See ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 37-38 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop, eds. & trans., 2000) (1835).
242 For example, the Seventh Amendment provides: "In Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S.
CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
243 The English Common Law tradition did not exist, as such, prior to the
invasion of William the Conqueror in 1066. The pre-existing Danish and Anglo-
Saxon customs were nonetheless important sources of later English law. Before the
conquest of England by the Normans, the laws varied greatly by Kingdom and
Shire; it is only with the conquest that a "common law of England" first developed.
A.K.R. KIRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 25 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1963)
(1960) ("Many of the 'laws of Henry the First' are thought to be statements of
custom which survived the conquest"). See generally 1 NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND
INSANITY IN ENGLAND 17 (1968).
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confusion and misunderstanding of these concepts in
contemporary American legal thinking.
England was the western frontier of the Roman Empire
prior to the invasion of the island by German tribes. Some
scholars posit that Roman law and civilization, to the extent it
had previously applied to the distant province, was completely
over-written by the Germanic conquerors. 244 These scholars
conjecture that the location of England, and subsequent tribal
invasions, resulted in a near eradication of Roman influence.
The legal system established by the invaders was rigid and
primitive. It offered some alternatives to private revenge in the
case of injury, but it drew no distinctions on the basis of an
244 See, e.g., GIBBON, supra note 151. In contrast, Roman law, culture and
religion largely survived the fall of the Empire in other former western provinces,
such as Gaul and Spain. In these areas, the invasions of the Germanic peoples did
not completely stamp out Roman civilization, but instead merged with it to form a
hybrid culture. This blending is seen in the language that developed in these
countries, now called "Romance" languages because their root is Latin. In contrast,
England retained almost no trace of its Roman past in the Anglo-Saxon culture that
developed. Some have argued that the reason for this difference is that England was
always a cultural backwater of the Roman world, and so the "thin varnish of Italian
manners" soon rubbed off of it when the Romans withdrew. Id. Others have posited
that the Germanic peoples engaged in a sort of "ethnic cleansing" of England, so
that the island was almost entirely repopulated by Germanic tribes. Id. Lastly, it is
clear that the tribes that invaded England were quite different from those that
invaded the other provinces of the Roman world. These other invaders-the
Visigoths, Franks, Ostrogoths, Lombards and Vandals-all had extensive previous
contacts with Roman culture. Many had served the Empire as auxiliaries of the
Roman Legions and were Christians-albeit Arian heretics. They came not as
destroyers of the Roman civilization, but as people wanting to share in the
civilization that was Rome. Even long after the conquest, the Germanic Kings
continued the legal fiction of the existence of the Roman Empire, ruling under the
nominal authority of the "Roman Emperor" at Constantinople. The invaders of
England-the Angles, Saxons and Jutes-were quite a different lot. They previously
had only minimal contact with the Roman civilization and were not Christian. They
came not to share in the advantages of a more advanced society, but to destroy it.
See generally GIBBON, supra note 151, at 1202-18. "The arts and religion, the laws
and language, which the Romans had so carefully planted in Briton were destroyed
by their barbarous successors." Id. at 1213. Roman law nonetheless influenced
English Common Law indirectly through a number of sources. England's later re-
conversion to Christianity brought the Canon Law to the island, and with it the
influence of Roman civil law. See THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 301-06 (Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929). The
Norman conquerors also conveyed some who had knowledge of the Roman law as it
then existed in continental Europe. Finally, important jurists such as Bracton were
greatly influenced by Roman law. Id. at 261, 298-300. Other scholars disagree. See
infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
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actor's intent or motivation, and it did not exculpate in any case
because of justification or excuse.
Early Anglo-Saxon law is epitomized by the phrase "buy off
the spear or bear it."245 A victim could always demand a redress
for an injury he suffered. Notions of culpability or
blameworthiness, however, were inapposite to the determination
of an appropriate punishment. Rather, damages were assessed
against an offender based on the victim's status and the severity
of his injury. 246 If an offender refused to pay damages, he was
subject to "feud" and could be lawfully killed by the injured
party.247 The injured party thus acted on behalf of the state as a
sort of surrogate executioner. Indeed, throughout much of the
common law period, a homicide could be fully justified only if it
was committed in the execution of the King's laws.248 English
law even provided for a kind of post-mortem hearing to
determine if a killing satisfied this purpose and was thus
justified.249 Like the trial proposed by the Queen in Alice in
Wonderland, in effect a sentence was imposed before the trial
was conducted. 250
The payment in compensation for injury was known as
"b6t."251  Gradually certain crimes became "b6tleas," meaning
they were not subject to the quasi-civil system of choosing
between a fine and feud. Even before the Norman invasion of
England, the crime of "foresteal" (premeditated murder) was a
capital offense and not subject to b6t.252 By the eleventh century,
"open murder, open theft, arson, housebreaking, and treachery
to one's lord" were added to the list of b6tleas crimes that were
245 See generally WALKER, supra note 243, at 15.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 See 1 J.W. CECIL TURNER, RUSSELL ON CRIME 19-21 (10th ed. 1950); see
also Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567,
568 (1903).
249 The Laws of Henry I provided, "If anyone kill another in revenge, or self-
defence, ... [liet him go to the nearest vill [a unit of the countryside] and declare it
to the first one he meets .... thus he may have proof and defend himself against the
slain's kin .. " PLUCKNETT, supra note 244, at 425 (quoting Leges Henrici Primi,
83(6)). Presumably, the hearing would decide whether the deceased had indeed
committed an offense and the avenger had demanded payment and been refused.
250 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 131 (Random House
1946) (1865).
251 See TURNER, supra note 248, at 20.
252 See KIRALFY, supra note 243, at 27.
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not subject to redress by compensation. 2 3 All b6tleas crimes
were punished by death, unless the offender was "in the king's
mercy" and he could thereby secure a pardon from him.254
B6tleas crimes retained some of the attributes of strict liability
under the civil law, for "U]ust as a man who did harm by
accident had to pay compensation, so accident did not completely
excuse him if he committed a botless wrong." 255
The early common law did not allow for an acquittal based
on justification or excuse, although these rationales did provide a
basis for the king to pardon a convicted offender. 256 Records
reflect that the early kings would routinely exercise this
jealously guarded authority257 by pardoning convicted criminals
based on justification and excuse rationales. 258 Later in time,
the courts gained the authority to acquit for exculpatory reasons,
the first recorded case occurring in 1505.259
The above notwithstanding, there is also much evidence to
suggest that Roman legal thought played a significant role in
helping to shape English law. This influence is mainly traceable
to the role of the Roman Catholic Church in England, as well as
to the effect of the ius commune then extant in continental
Europe. In particular, the historical record seems to reflect that
253 WALKER, supra note 243, at 16.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 "A royal pardon was needed if he had killed by accident or self-defence, or if
he was an infant." Id. at 24. For over a century, trial by "ordeal" was used in
England, in which divine providence was the judge of guilt. Trial by ordeal took
various forms, such as burning the hand, bandaging it, and inspecting it three days
later for infection; if infected, then the man was guilty, and if clean, he was
innocent. PLUCKNETT, supra note 244, at 114. The Normans introduced trial by
combat as another mode of criminal procedure, prompting some particularly
litigious persons to retain a "champion" as today one might retain a lawyer. Id. at
116-17. In 1215, the Roman Church forbid clergy from participating in trial by
ordeal, and in 1219 Henry III banned it. Id. at 118-19. Although these forms of trial
have always engendered a sort of historical fascination, they have little relevance to
the present discussion of justification and excuse.
257 "A lunatic who had burned a man's house was convicted by the justices but
released on their authority; and in the following year [the justices] were fined for
taking this step without consulting the king." WALKER, supra note 243, at 24.
258 Traditionally, the King exercised plenary authority to pardon. In 1390,
pardons for self-defense and accident were made automatic, and the King's power to
pardon a murderer who killed with malice aforethought was restricted. PLUCKNETT,
supra note 244, at 445-46.
259 In that case, an insane woman who killed her child was acquitted by the
jury, rather than being convicted and turned over to the king for pardon. WALKER,
supra note 243, at 26.
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these influences were present and informed the drafting and
provisions of the Magna Carta in 1215.260
Henricus De Bracton, in his mid-thirteenth century treatise
entitled On the Laws and Customs of England, was the first
commentator to produce a comprehensive study of the English
Common Law. 261 Bracton was clearly influenced by Roman law,
so much so that he even patterned his scholarship after the
Roman Institutes of Gaius and Justinian.262 "The substantive
criminal law [at the time of Bracton] consisted of eleven capital
crimes or felonies and an unspecified number of
misdemeanors." 263  The powerful Roman influence on English
law is reflected in Bracton's description of the role of criminal
intent with respect to these crimes:
[Accidental homicide,] which was touched upon above, may be
committed in many ways, as where one intending to cast a
spear at a wild beast. .. [but] has killed a man, not however
with the intention of killing him; he ought to be absolved,
because a crime is not committed unless the intention to injure
exists, < [i]t is will and purpose which mark maleficia, nor is a
theft committed unless there [was] an intent to steal.> [264] ...
as may be said of a child[265] or a madman, since the absence of
260 See generally R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the ius commune, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 297 (1999). Helmholz writes that the ius commune in 1215 was an amalgam
of the Roman and Canon laws that had developed over the centuries in Europe.
With the publication of Gratian's Decretum in 1140, there was a blossoming of
scholarship throughout Europe in the study of law, and England was no exception.
Helmholz convincingly argues that the ius commune most likely would have been
known by many of the drafters of Magna Carta, and that many of Magna Carta's
provisions coincide if not borrow from the ius commune.
261 See generally 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 298
(George E. Woodbind ed. & Samuel E. Thorne trans. 1968) (n.d.).
262 2 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 199
(London, MacMillan 1883).
263 Id. at 201-02. The eleven felonies were laesa majestas (offense's against the
king's person), falsum (forgery of currency or the king's seal), concealment of
treasure trove, homicide, wounding, mayhem, false imprisonment, robbery, arson,
rape and theft. Id.at 201.
264 Brackets ("<" and ">") are placed around portions of text in some but not all
of Bracton's manuscripts. The relationship of the various manuscripts to each other
is a matter of scholarly dispute. It suffices for our purpose that these works, in their
entirety, reflect an authoritative interpretation of Bracton's work accorded by
English jurists.
265 Under twelfth century common law, the age of criminal responsibility was
twelve. Responsibility was not affixed on the basis of an individual being able to
distinguish right from wrong, but rather depending on whether the youth had the
mental capacity and maturity to understand the nature of his act. These attributes
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intention protects the one and the unkindness of fate excuses
the other.[266] In crimes the intention is regarded, not the
result.267
Although a royal pardon was still necessary during Bracton's
time,268 his conception of criminal intent would later serve as a
basis for the courts to acquit because of accident, madness and
immaturity.
Some 350 years separate Bracton and Lord Edward Coke.
Although significant changes in the law occurred during the
interim,269 no writer in the intervening period approached Lord
Coke in providing as complete and authoritative overview of the
were assessed in practical ways, such as by having the youth count up to twelve
pence. WALKER, supra note 243, at 28. Later in time, moral awareness became the
touchstone for responsibility, i.e., whether the youth could distinguish between
"good" and "evil." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23-24. Accordingly, a
court might conclude that a youth knew his conduct was "wrong," and thus was
criminally responsible, because he hid himself or the victim's body after killing the
victim. Id. In one case a boy of eight was tried and hanged for arson. Id. at 24.
266 This portion of the quoted passage is taken almost verbatim from the Roman
jurist Modestinus. WALKER, supra note 243, at 27. Lord Coke later expressed the
view that insanity is punishment enough for crimes committed. See infra note 276
and accompanying text.
267 BRACTON, supra note 261, at 384.
268 Id. at 378. Homicide per infortunium, which includes accidental homicide
and self-defense, long retained a punitive element. These killings remained subject
to forfeiture of goods to the crown. "And yet such a precious regard the hath of the
life of a man, though the cause was inevitable, that at the common law he should
have suffered death... yet he shall forfeit all his goods and chattels." EDWARD
COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (1644).
269 As already noted, one important development during the intervening period
concerned criminal responsibility and the age of an offender. See supra note 265.
Another significant change concerned the doctrine of the privilege of clergy. In
Bracton's time, clergy were surrendered to the Church for trial and punishment
under Canon Law. PLUCKNETT, supra note 244, at 439. Acquittals were so frequent
in the ecclesiastical courts that they became, in time, little more than a formality.
Id. at 440. At first it mattered whether the defendant was a clergyman, but over
time the doctrine evolved so that it applied to, and thus mitigated punishment for,
anyone who could read. Id. By 1707, even illiterate criminals who neglected to
memorize the "neck verse" received the benefit of clergy, although the doctrine was
later limited so that it did not reach the most serious crimes. Id. at 440-41. In 1490,
the law was changed to provide that a man may only claim benefit of the clergy
once, and those who did so were branded. Id. at 440. In 1576, the "clerk[ ] convict"
was no longer handed over to the Church, but was instead discharged. Id.
Interestingly, the distinction between "clergyable" and "non-clergyable" crimes
remained even after the doctrine itself was abolished. In later times, whether a
felony was "clergyable" became an accepted criterion for distinguishing between the
less serious felonies-i.e., where the benefit of clergy could be sought-and other
felonies, when all felonies were punished by death. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 262, at
26, 35-36.
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common law. 270 No lesser authority than Lord James Stephen
observed, "Coke's Institutes have had a greater influence on the
law of England than any work written between the days of
Bracton and those of Blackstone ... Coke came to be regarded
more and more as a second father of the law behind whose works
it was not necessary to go. 271
By Lord Coke's time about thirty statutory felonies had been
added to Bracton's list. These newly recognized crimes included
abduction with intent to marry-under the common law it was
considered rape-stealing a public record, and stealing falcons-
apparently not covered by common law larceny. 272 Also added
was cutting out the eyes or the tongue of a man, which was
distinct from the crime of mayhem.273
Lord Coke's scholarship reflects a more expansive and
sophisticated understanding of justification and excuse than the
works of earlier periods.274 With respect to excuse, Coke wrote in
his First Institutes, "[T]he act and wrong of a madman shall not
be imputed to him ... [a]nd so it is of an infant, until he be of the
age of 14."275 He explained further that the insane are excused
because they are "without... mind or discretion," and thus they
have already been sufficiently punished by their madness. 276
The notion that an insane person is "without mind," i.e. he is like
an animal, was prevalent in Roman law, as the belief was that
the insanity itself was punishment enough for one's crimes. 277 It
is less clear what Lord Coke meant by the phrase
270 The works of Coke, Hale and Blackstone, although written in English, do
not always use modern spelling. Some of the original spellings have been changed in
this article to conform to contemporary usage, e.g., "fowle" to "fowl," and "phrenzy"
to "frenzy."
271 2 STEPHEN, supra note 262, at 205.
272 Id. at 206-07.
273 Id. at 206. For a more detailed discussion of the origins of maiming, see
Eugene R. Milhizer, Maiming as a Criminal Offense Under Military Law, ARMY
LAW 5-6 (May 1991). Other newly recognized statutory crimes, such as bigamy and
unnatural vice, were taken from the ecclesiastical offenses. 2 STEPHEN, supra note
262, at 207.
274 This being said, Coke does not explicitly address duress or necessity.
275 1 J.H. THOMAS, A SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE'S FIRST
INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 416-17 (William S. Hein & Co. 1986) (1836).
276 Id.
277 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 59, at 60. Lord Coke does not write
that exculpation based on insanity requires a causal connection between the
accused's disability and his misconduct, and it is not entirely clear that this is the
case.
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"without... discretion"; he may have been referring to an actor's
inability to distinguish right from wrong, his inability to
understand the full consequences of his actions, or both or
neither of these.278 Coke also wrote that those who become
insane after conviction were not to be punished. 279 "[F]or the
principal end of punishment is that others by his example may
fear to offend.., but so it is not when a madman is executed, but
should by a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of
extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and can be of no example to
others."280 Unfortunately, Coke did not clarify what he meant by
"others," i.e., did this refer only infants and madmen, or to all
other persons besides the actor himself? This distinction is
important with respect to the deterrent rationale for excuse.
Those who were incapable of self-control would not be dissuaded
by the execution of someone who became insane after
committing his crime; whereas, rational persons might be
deterred by the punishment of such an offender.
The law of homicide had evolved by Coke's time to include
all of the classic common law divisions. Murder was defined as
the killing "with malice-forethought, either expressed by the
party or implied by law, so as the party [would] die of the wound
within a year and a day." 281 Malice was defined as "when one
compaffeth to kill, beat, or wound another and doth it... this
malice is so odious in law, as though it be intended against one,
it shall be extended against others."282 Malice was implied if the
victim was an agent of the king "doing his office," or someone
who was coming to the aid of a king's officer. 28 3 It was likewise
implied if the killing occurred during the commission of a
robbery or other unlawful act,2 4 or if the officer in charge of
executions burned or beheaded a condemned man rather than
hanging him. 28 5
278 See supra note 265.
279 COKE, supra note 268, at 6.
280 Id. Coke also observed that the execution of infants, like madmen, did not
provide a deterrent example to others. Id. at 4.
281 Id. at 47.
282 Id. at 50. It is unclear whether the doctrine of transferred intent applied to
other homicides.
283 Id. at 52.
284 It would constitute murder if an actor accidentally shot and killed someone
while shooting at another's hen; it would constitute homicide by misadventure and
no crime if the actor instead was shooting at a wild fowl. Id. at 56.
285 Id. at 52. At Coke's time, all felonies were punished by hanging unless the
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Manslaughter was defined as a voluntary homicide without
malice aforethought, when "the heat of the blood kindled by ire
was never cooled till the blow was given." 28 6  Coke drew no
distinction between those "hot-blooded" killings that may have in
some way been understandable 2 7 and those that were not.
Manslaughter was a felony, but in Coke's time those committing
the crime were eligible for "privilege of clergy," which in practice
meant they generally escaped punishment for their first
conviction.288
Self-defense applied to voluntary killings, which, "being
done upon an inevitable cause, are no felony." 289  A private
person claiming self-defense, however, was required to retreat
safely when this was possible, unless the man killed was
"offering to rob or murder" him.290 It seems that Coke did not
recognize a justification defense of private self-defense as we now
understand it. Rather, he observed that a private person could
be justified in killing another only in circumstances that
constituted a case-specific expression of the state's law
enforcement authority. As noted previously, homicides
committed in self-defense were still subject to forfeiture of goods
to the crown. 291 Coke reasoned that killings done in defense of
an "offered murder or robbery" did not require forfeiture. 292
However, apparently because it furthered a law enforcement
purpose, crime prevention, and not because it was justified by
private self-defense.293 A law enforcement basis of justification
even extended to the killing of a robber who turned and fled 294 or
refused to surrender peacefully to the victim in his home. 295 Law
enforcement authority likewise justified the killing of an
assaultive prisoner by a "gaoler" (prison warden) even if a safe
felon was eligible for the benefit of clergy. Id.
286 Id. at 55.
287 Such as those homicides that might be committed by a reasonable person in
response to an adequate provocation.
288 See supra note 269.
289 COKE, supra note 268, at 55.
290 Id.
291 See supra notes 230-35, 268 and accompanying text.
292 COKE, supra note 268, at 55.
293 Id.; Beale, supra note 248, at 568.
294 COKE, supra note 268, at 55.
295 Id. at 220. When a private person killed another, it was only in these quasi
law enforcement situations that the jury returned a general verdict of not guilty. Id.
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retreat was available. 296 In fact, only certain law enforcement
authorities, such as sheriffs and magistrates, were entitled to an
excuse defense based on a reasonable mistake, with all others
acting at their own risk when using deadly force. 297
Last were homicides that are performed unintentionally, i.e.,
by "misadventure or chance." These occurred "when a man doth
an act that is not unlawful, which without any evil intent
tendeth to a man's death."298  Absent any law enforcement
justification, in the case of self-defense, such a homicide-even
though not a felony-would nonetheless subject the killer to
forfeiture because "to the intent that men should be wary so to
direct their actions, as they tend not to the effusion of mans
blood." 299
Sir Matthew Hale's History of the Pleas of the Crown,300
although written shortly after Coke's First Institutes, was not
published until after Hale's death in 1676.301 Despite serving as
Judge of Common Pleas under the Commonwealth, Hale
continued to work for the restoration of the Monarchy and was
ultimately made Chief Justice of the King's Bench in 1671.302
Unlike the scholarship of his predecessors, Hale's work is more
akin to a treatise on the substantive criminal law, and, as Lord
Stephen observed, it "shows a depth of thought and a
comprehensiveness of design which puts it in quite a different
296 Id. at 55. Taken together, the underlying theory of justification urged by
Coke is unclear. See generally infra Section V.A. One might view Coke's theory as
arguing in favor of a "public benefit rationale" for justification, i.e., that these
killings were justified only because they benefited society, irrespective of any benefit
to the victim. Coke might be promoting a "moral forfeiture" theory of justification,
i.e., that the thief forfeits his otherwise valid right to life because of his misconduct.
Conversely, one might interpret Coke's theory as urging a "moral rights" theory of
justification, i.e., that the actor has a moral interest that justifies his response.
Professor Dressler believes that Coke is arguing here for a "moral rights" theory of
justification. DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.02[D] (quoting COKE, supra note 268, at
55). It might actually be that Coke is urging a defense that incorporates threads
from several theories of justification.
297 COKE, supra note 268, at 220. Accordingly, a private citizen would be guilty
of murder if he killed another person who resisted arrest, where the citizen
reasonably but mistakenly believed that the other person was a dangerous felon,
e.g., killing an apparent rapist who turns out to be the husband of the "victim".
298 Id. at 56.
299 Id.
300 1 HALE, supra note 47.
301 PLUCKNETT, supra note 244, at 285.
302 Id.
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category from Coke's Institutes. °30 3  In particular, Hale
endeavored to define and explain general principles of the law
and to provide detailed definitions for the various crimes, some
of which had never been defined. 30 4
According to Hale, "[m]an is naturally endowed with these
two great faculties, understanding and liberty of will, and
therefore is a subject ... of a law properly so called, and
consequently obnoxious to guilt and punishment for violations of
that law."30 5  Hale explained that "where there is no will to
commit an offense, there can be no transgression, or just reason
to incur the penalty or sanction of that law."30 6 He continued
that because "liberty or choice of the will presuppose[s] an act of
the understanding ... where there is a total defect of the
understanding, there is no free act of the will."30 7
Although Hale recognized that certain incapacities or
defects of the will could amount to an excuse, he rejected the
recognition of a general excuse defense.
But general notions or rules are too extravagant and
undeterminate, and cannot be safely in their latitude
applied .... [I]t hath been always the wisdom of states and
law-givers to prescribe limits and bounds to these general
notions, and to define what persons and actions are exempt
from the severity of the general punishments of penal laws.30 8
Hale described three types of defective will: natural,
accidental, and civil.30 9 Infancy was the only natural defect
recognized by Hale. It excused persons under twenty-one years
of age from punishment for some misdemeanors and other non-
capital crimes, generally involving omissions.310 In other cases,
offenders under eighteen years of age were excluded by statute
from liability for certain crimes, e.g., young servants could not be
held liable for embezzling their master's goods. 311  Hale
reiterated the well-settled common law presumption that
303 2 STEPHEN, supra note 262, at 211.
304 Id. at 212.
305 1 HALE, supra note 47, at 14.
306 Id. at 15.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 20. Hale mentions rioting and battery as exceptions to the rule. Id.
311 Id. at 22. This statutory defense may have been premised on the theory that
a master was at fault for entrusting valuable goods to a young servant.
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persons under seven years of age could never be charged with a
crime. Persons seven to fourteen were presumptively defective
but might be proved "doli capax," and persons fourteen to
twenty-one were deemed mentally capable of committing
felonies. 312
Hale categorized the "accidental" defects of will as dementia,
chance, and ignorance. 313 He further divided dementia into
idiocy, madness, and lunacy.314  Any person "who knows
not ... his father or mother, nor knows his own age," would
probably, like those under seven years of age, escape all criminal
liability.315 Those who suffered a lesser incapacitation of their
mental faculties would not be excused, however, for "doubtless
most persons that are felons ... are under a degree of partial
insanity, when they commit [their crimes] .. .. "316 In contrast,
"a total alienation of the mind or perfect madness; this excuseth
from the guilt of felony and treason."317
Lunacy was a form of temporary insanity, which derived its
name from the popular belief that it was caused by the phases of
the moon. 318 According to Hale, "the person that is absolutely
mad for a day, killing a man in that distemper, is equally not
guilty, as if he were mad without intermission."319 On the other
hand, a lunatic who commits crimes during lucid intervals is
subject to liability as if he had no such insanity.320  Hale
acknowledged that some civil jurists believed drunken conduct
should be excused for the same reasons as lunacy, with only the
drunkenness itself punished. 321 Hale disagreed with this, at
least insofar as when intoxication was voluntary, stating that
under the "laws of England such a person shall have no privilege
312 Id. at 25-28.
313 Id. at 15.
314 Id. at 29.
315 Id. Idiocy was a question of fact for the jury to decide. Id.
316 Id. at 30.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 31.
319 Id.
320 HALE, supra note 47, at 33-34. Traditionally, only the prosecution called
witnesses because it shouldered the burden of proof. By Hale's time, defendants
were allowed to call witnesses. Thus, it became necessary to distinguish between
capacity to stand trial and excuse by reason of insanity. PLUCKNETT, supra note
244, at 438.
321 HALE, supra note 47, at 32-33.
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by this voluntary contracted madness." 322 Hale would recognize
an excuse defense based on involuntarily intoxication, however,
as might be caused by "the unskillfulness of his physician, or by
the contrivance of his enemies. '323 Moreover, he would treat
addiction like involuntary intoxication, observing that "though
this madness was contracted by the vice and will of the
party.., this habitual and fixed frenzy thereby caused puts the
man into the same condition in relation to crimes as if the same
were contracted involuntarily."324
Hale essentially agreed with Coke's analysis of homicide per
infortunium, i.e., that any illegal act, even a mistaken act, that
ended in a man's death constituted felony homicide. He
recognized a lesser crime of manslaughter where the victim's
death was caused by the defendant's failure to exercise due
diligence, 325 and he acknowledged that some reasonable killings,
such as those done in self-defense, would be punished only by the
forfeiture of property until the King's pardon was granted. 326
Mistake or ignorance of the law was no defense, but mistake or
ignorance of fact might provide an exculpatory excuse. Hale
illustrated the distinction between the two with the example of a
general who, to test the readiness of his troops, dressed as the
enemy combatant and snuck up on them at night. If a sentinel
killed the general, reasonably believing him to be an enemy
soldier, he would be "excused" on the basis of reasonable mistake
of fact.3 27
Hale's analysis of "excuses by way of civil subjugation" is
somewhat muddled. He mixes defenses premised on defects of
will, such as duress, with those unrelated to volition, such as
self-defense. Among the excusing circumstances listed here are
those performed because of compulsion and fear, including those
committed by a wife at the command of her husband.328 The law
322 Id. at 32.
323 Id.
324 Id. It is clear that by this time the jury would find the insane not quilty
under an excuse rationale, rather than convict and later pardon, as was done in
previous times. Id. at 36-37.
325 One example of this is where a man, who is playing with a sword,
unintentionally pokes through a scabbard and kills his servant. Id. at 472-73.
326 Id. at 38-41.
327 Id. at 42. Presumably, Hale would have concluded that an excuse defense
based on mistake would not apply if the sentinel deliberately killed the general
under the mistaken belief that this was lawful.
328 Id. at 43-48.
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disallowed duress for certain crimes, such as treason, murder
and robbery. 329 Likewise, a wife's claim to marital compulsion
was permitted only for a limited number of comparatively minor
crimes, such as larceny.330
Hale also addressed acts that were "necess[ary for] ... the
preservation of the peace of the kingdom ... which in the matter
of them without such necessity were felony," as well as those acts
based on "self preservation. '331 He drew a sharp distinction
between the two, the former providing a "public benefit"
defensive theory based on justification, and the latter a "private
necessity" defensive theory based on excuse. Hale, like Coke,
argued that pursuant to the "public benefit" theory, "the killing
[of] a malefactor, that doth not yield himself to justice upon
pursuit" is not a felony.33 2 The killing of a resisting felon would
likewise be justified under the public benefit theory, as even a
private citizen doing this would be viewed as acting on behalf of
the state.333  In contrast, although "private necessity" also
excused an actor from criminal liability, a person relying on this
defense could nonetheless be required to forfeit goods as a
consequence of a killing, unlike those whose killings were
justified as a public benefit.3 34 Moreover, those claiming private
necessity must generally retreat, if safely possible, from a life-
threatening assault.335 The line between public benefit and
private necessity could be murky and overlapping. For example,
a father who killed a man caught in the act of raping his
daughter could plead private necessity, 336 but he might
alternatively be allowed to assert a public benefit defense based
329 Id. at 51.
330 Id. at 44-45. The mere physical presence of the husband was enough to
imply coercion at law. This practice, in effect, gave to wives some of the same
protection that "privilege of clergy" provided to husbands, which was fully extended
to women in 1692. PLUCKNEWr, supra note 244, at 440. Hale admits that although
some husbands commit crime at instigation of their wives, they are not allowed a
reciprocal excuse. HALE, supra note 47, at 45.
331 HALE, supra note 47, at 52-53.
332 Id. at 489.
333 Id. at 489-92.
334 Id. at 478.
335 Id. at 479-85.
336 Id. at 485. The law allowed killing in defense of another if there was a close
relationship between the actor and the person being defended, such as father/child
or master/servant. Because the law permitted a daughter to plead self-defense if she
killed her rapist while trying to fend him off, her father could plead defense of
another for doing the same on behalf of his daughter.
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on the rationale that his act constituted an attempt to defend
against and apprehend a dangerous felon.
Although Hale approved of the maritime law and custom
that allowed appropriating privately owned food aboard a ship in
an emergency to preserve the life of the crew, he disagreed with
those who contended the defense ought to be applied generally to
exculpate anyone who stole food and clothing based on extreme
necessity. 33 7 Hale reasoned that a broadly recognized defense to
larceny based on extraordinary need would put
"propert[y] ... under a strange insecurity, being laid open to
other mens necessities." 338 He also concluded that "by the laws
of this kingdom sufficient provision is made for the supply of
such necessities by collections for the poor."339  Accordingly,
those who steal in most situations, even under extreme
necessity, would remain criminally liable.340
Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England,341 first published in 1765, is a collection of his lectures
on the common law given over the course of several years.3 42 His
commentaries, although certainly influential in England,
probably had their greatest impact on the development of the
law in the newly independent United States. 343 They often
337 Id. at 55-56. It should be mentioned here that Hale took the position that
the laws of England have no dependence on the civil law, arguing that although "it
must be confessed, the civil laws are very wise ... yet neither I, nor any else may
lay any weight or stress upon them, either for discovery or exposition of the laws of
England, farther than by the customs of England or Acts of Parliament they are
admitted." Id. at 16. In this regard, the struggle between equity and common-law
courts to some degree concerned the authority of the civil law, and so common-law
jurists such as Hale might not be well disposed to their reception. See PLUCKNETT,
supra note 244, at 298-99.
338 1 HALE, supra note 47, at 54.
339 Id. at 54-55.
340 Id. St. Thomas, on the other hand, conceives of the right of property as
having two aspects: first, the "title to care for and distribute the earth's resources;"
and second, the use of those resources. "Now in regard to this, no man is entitled to
manage things merely for himself, he must do so in the interest of all, so that he is
ready to share them with others in case of necessity." 38 SUMMA THEOLOGICA,
supra note 19, at 67-69 (2a2ae. 66,3). Accordingly, an individual ought to manage
his property so that it supplies those in need, and if another person takes this
property in order to satisfy an extreme need, then this is no theft. In other words,
under the natural law the right to the use of the property belongs to one who is in
need regardless of ownership, and "necessity renders what a person takes to support
his life his own." Id. at 81-83 (2a2ae. 66,7).
341 BLACKSTONE, supra note 265.
342 PLUCKNETT, supra note 244, at 285.
343 Justice Scalia has described Blackstone as being "the Framers' accepted
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served as the pre-eminent, and sometimes as the only, legal
resource of its kind available to early American legal
practitioners, and they were almost certainly the dominant
influence on the conception of the common law in America. 344
Blackstone's work, on balance, should be considered more
evolutionary than revolutionary, although on occasion his
commentaries reflect important developments in the common
law in general, and with respect to justification and excuse in
particular. It is also fair to say that Blackstone is the first of the
common law commentators who attempted, albeit sometimes
unsuccessfully, to draw comprehensive and coherent distinctions
between the defensive theories of justification and excuse.3 45
With respect to excuse, Blackstone, like Hale, focused on a
"want or defect of will" as a basis for "protect[ing] the committer
of a forbidden act from the punishment which is otherwise
annexed [to it]. '"346 His discussion of excuse based on infancy,
madness, or intoxication likewise corresponds generally with
Hale's commentary on these subjects.3 47 Blackstone does offer a
clearer statement of the law regarding excuse by mistake or
accident, or as he describes it, circumstances in which the will
"neither concurs with the act, nor disagrees to it."348 As
Blackstone explained, "[If any accidental mischief happens to
follow from the performance of a lawful act, the party stands
excused from all the guilt: but if a man be doing anything
unlawful.., his want or foresight shall be no excuse."349
Further, Blackstone clearly separates mistake of law and
authority on English law and the English Constitution." Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Supreme Court continues to rely upon Blackstone as an authority on the common
law. See Scheidler v. N.O.W., Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003) (defining common-law
extortion with reference to Blackstone's Commentaries).
344 PLUCKNETT, supra note 244, at 287. It has been observed that it was
fortunate Blackstone's commentaries were widely accessible to the laity as well as
legal professionals, considering many of those engaged in the legal profession in
early America had little opportunity of receiving a formal legal education. Id.
345 This is not to say that Blackstone's use of the words "justification," "justify"
and "excuse" was always consistent. He did, however, draw the clear distinction
between those acts that may be justified because they are praiseworthy, and those
that may be excused even though they are not praiseworthy. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 265, at *22.
346 Id. at *20.
347 Id. at *21-25.
348 Id. at *21.
39 Id. at *27 (emphasis in original).
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mistake of fact, reasoning that a man would be excused if he
mistakenly killed his daughter while intending to perform a
legal act-e.g., killing a thief in his own home-but he would not
be excused if he killed a thief based on his mistaken belief that
he had a legal right to kill any outlaw. 350
Blackstone also explicitly articulated an excuse theory for
duress, which he based upon an incapacitation of the actor's free
will. "As punishments are therefore only inflicted for that abuse
of that free will . . . it is highly just ... that [an actor] should be
excused for those acts, which are done through unavoidable force
and compulsion. '351  Blackstone divided duress into "civil
subjection" and threats of death or other great bodily harm. 352
As to the former, the scope of matrimonial subjection doctrine
seemed to have broadened somewhat from earlier times,
although the defense still did not apply to crimes such as murder
and treason. 353
Regarding the second type of duress, Blackstone believed
that it could constitute a defense to many crimes, provided the
actor possessed a well-grounded fear of death or mayhem, and
not simply apprehension of a lesser harm, such as a beating or
the destruction of property. 35 4  Like others before him,
Blackstone seemingly confused justification and excuse when he
instructed that, "[F]or whatever is done by a man, to save either
life or member, is looked upon as [being] done upon the highest
necessity and compulsion."355 On the other hand, the statement
350 Id. Although Blackstone's distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of
law is clear in theory, his application of the theory is at times inconsistent. For
example, Blackstone, like Hale, argues that although an actor is justified in using
deadly force to stop a fleeing felon, only a peace officer has the defense of a
reasonable mistake. See id. at *28.
351 Id. at *27.
352 Id. at *27-30.
353 Id. at *28-29. The defense seemingly had broadened both with respect to the
range of crimes to which it applied, and the strength of the presumption that the
wife acted under compulsion of her husband in committing these crimes. An
interesting exception to the marital compulsion doctrine was its disallowance for the
misdemeanor crime of keeping a house of prostitution. Blackstone explains, "this is
an offence touching the domestic economy ... of the house, in which the wife has a
principal share," and in this case presumes the wife to be the instigator of this
activity. Id. at *29.
354 It is not clear what crimes were excluded from the duress defense, although
murder of the innocent was definitely excluded-"for he ought rather to die himself,
than escape by the murder of an innocent." Id. at *30.
355 Id. at *130. "Necessity" is generally associated with justification, and
"compulsion" is generally associated with excuse. It is possible that this apparent
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may simply reflect his belief that duress could provide defense
based upon either a justification or excuse rationale depending
on the circumstances, i.e., an otherwise criminal act might be
justified when the evil avoided is greater than that inflicted, and
it might be excused even when the evil inflicted is greater than
that avoided if the choice to inflict it is not the product of the
actor's free will. 356
Blackstone most explicitly distinguished between
justification and excuse in his discussion of the law of homicide.
He divided homicide into three kinds: justified, excused, and
felonious, the last category being comprised of those homicides
that were neither justified nor excused. 357  Homicide was
justified if it was perpetrated because of "some unavoidable
necessity, without any will, intention, or desire, and without
[any] inadvertence or negligence in the party killing, and [was]
therefore without any shadow of blame."358 Blackstone further
separated justifiable homicide into those that were affirmatively
authorized by the law, and those that were justified "rather by
the permission, than by the absolute command, of the law. 359
Homicides that were affirmatively authorized included the
public execution of a convicted criminal 360 and the killing by a
law enforcement officer of a person who assaults or resists this
official. 361 In cases of riot, law enforcement officers and private
persons alike were justified if they killed a rioter while
dispersing a mob. 362 Other situations falling within this category
included the killing of an escaping prisoner by a prison official
and the killing of one who trespassed in a game park and then
refused to surrender to the game warden.363 In all of these
confusion is simply a matter of misleading word usage. See supra note 19, and
accompanying text. As discussed later in this section, Blackstone seems to equate
necessity with blamelessness, id. at *178, 182, 187, which is related to but not
synonymous with later conceptions of justification. See infra notes 456-60, and
accompanying text.
356 See id. at *21.
35 Id. at *177.
358 Id. at *178. Here again, Blackstone seems to conflate justification and
excuse.
359 Id. at *179 (emphasis in original).
360 Id. at *178.
361 Id. at *179. Clearly the officer has no duty to retreat, but he likewise has no
right to kill if he can arrest without using lethal force, as "there must be an
apparent necessity on the officers [sic] side." Id. at *180.
362 Id.
363 Id.
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circumstances, the law was seen as imposing a specified duty
upon a public official, which in turn justified a killing
perpetrated by that official provided that it was reasonably
related to the performance of his duty.
In other types of cases, a killing was justified because the
law permitted rather than commanded it. Such killings are
allowed "either for the advancement of public justice, which
without such indemnification would never be carried on with
proper vigour; or, in instances where it is committed for the
prevention of some atrocious crime.' 364 Accordingly, a private
person was permitted to kill a felon who resisted apprehension
or restraint.365 Likewise, a woman was permitted to kill a man
who attempted to rape her. 366 As Blackstone explained, "the one
uniform principle that runs through our own ... laws, seems to
be this; that where a crime, in itself capital, is endeavoured to be
committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force by the death of
the party attempting."367
According to Blackstone, justifiable and excusable homicide
differed inasmuch as the latter reflected some slight degree of
fault "so trivial ... that the law excuses it from the guilt of
felony, though in strictness it judges it deserving of some little
degree of punishment."3 6  Blackstone provided two specific
examples of excusable homicide: misadventure and "self-
preservation." 369  He presumed that in all cases of accidental
death the killer must have been at some fault. Consistent with
this reasoning, excusing self-defense was accorded to a man who
defensively killed another during a brawl or confrontation,
rather than the justification doctrine of private necessity,
because "since in quarrels both parties may be, and usually are,
in some fault ... the law will not hold the survivor entirely
guiltless."370
364 Id. at *179 (emphasis in original).
365 "If any person attempts a robbery or murder of another.., and shall be
killed in such attempt, the slayer shall be acquitted and discharged." Id. at *180.
366 See id. at *181.
367 Id. Blackstone explicitly rejects the statement by John Locke "that all
manner of force without right upon a man's person, puts him in a state of war with
the aggressor; and, of consequence, that being in such a state of war, he may
lawfully kill him .... Id.
368 Id. at *182.
369 Id.
370 Id. at *187.
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Finally, Blackstone characterized self-defense against an
innocent aggressor 371  as a form of excuse rather than
justification. He contended that when an innocent aggressor
unjustly threatens the life of another, "the great universal
principle of self-preservation, which prompts every man to save
his own life preferable to that of another," makes "excusable
through unavoidable necessity" the taking of the aggressor's
life.372  Blackstone illustrated this with the example of two
shipwreck survivors floating on the same piece of wood, which
can support only one of them.3 7 3 Blackstone argued that one
survivor would be excused for thrusting the other off the plank
because his companion's use of it would amount to "attempt upon
and an endangering of, each other's life. 374
371 This involves situations where, in Blackstone's words, "the party slain is
equally innocent as he who occasions his death." Id. at *186.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id. Although the killing of an innocent shipwreck survivor in these
circumstances might be excusable under some other theory, this situation does not
present a classical exercise of self-defense. In an actual case almost identical to
Blackstone's hypothetical, seaman Holmes was charged with manslaughter for
throwing shipwrecked passengers overboard to keep a lifeboat from sinking, which
would have caused all to die. The court refused to recognize an unconditional right
to save oneself at the expense of another, imposing an obligation on the crew-based
on their privileged status as seamen-to sacrifice themselves for the passengers.
United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 363-64 (E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).
To the last extremity, to death itself, must [a sailor] protect the passenger.
It is his duty. It is on account of these risks that he is paid. It is because
the sailor is expected to expose himself to every danger, that, beyond all
mankind, by every law, his wages are secured to him.
Id. Blackstone had previously rejected a social compact theory of justification, 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 265, at *30, *181, but his rationale for why such a killing
of the innocent ought to be excused is more in keeping with a social contract theory
concerning the duties of individuals and the state. Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan,
argues that man in the state of nature has a right to everything, "even to one
another's body." To save his own life from others, a man gives up some of his
natural liberty to the state. But a man can never give up the right to act in a way
that will save his own life, as this is the very purpose of his contract with society.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 103-105, 110-111 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier
Books 1962) (1651).
Immanuel Kant also addresses necessity or what he calls ius necessitatis (the
right of necessity) as an excuse in his Metaphysics of Morals. Despite his use of the
word ius, which might seem to imply right and therefore justification, he believes
that using violence against non-assailants to save one's life constituted an excuse.
As Kant writes:
It is clear that this allegation [of a right based on necessity] is not to be
understood objectively, according to what a law might prescribe, but
merely subjectively, as the sentence might be pronounced in a court of law.
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE
Of course, English common law continued to evolve after the
United States achieved its independence, and, although it was
no longer binding in the new nation, it still exerted a
considerable influence upon American jurisprudence. 375  Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen was the most important nineteenth
century commentator on the common law. 376 In his treatise
Digest of the Criminal Law, Stephen provides a comprehensive
overview of English criminal law during this period.377 His
treatise reflects a more refined and sophisticated understanding
of justification and excuse than is found in any of the earlier
scholarship.
Stephen is the first of the major commentators to
distinguish broadly between affirmative defenses and failure of
proof defenses. For example, he explained that voluntary
There could be no penal law assigning the death penalty to a man who has
been shipwrecked and finds himself struggling with another man-both in
equal danger of losing their lives-and who, in order to save his own life,
pushes the other man off the plank on which he had saved himself.
For... no punishment threatened by the law could be greater than losing
his life [in the first instance] .... [Tihe threat of an evil that is still
uncertain (being condemned to death by a judge) cannot outweigh the fear
of an evil that is certain (being drowned).
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 41 (John Ladd trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797). By strange contrast, however, Kant seems to hold
that there are potentially two sorts of justifiable homicide that arise from a threat,
not to the life of the individual, but to the individual's honor.
There remain... two crimes deserving of death with regard to which it
still remains doubtful whether legislation is authorized to impose the
death penalty. In both cases, the crimes are due to the sense of honor. One
involves the honor of womanhood; the other, military honor. Both kinds of
honor are genuine, and duty requires that they be sought after by every
individual in each of these two classes. The first crime is infanticide at the
hands of the mother ... the other is the murder of a fellow soldier ... in a
duel.
Id. at 106 (emphasis added). Kant goes on to note the conflict apparent here and, in
so doing, he seems to vacillate between treating the actions taken, such as
infanticide and honor dueling, as excused and as justified. Id. at 106-07.
375 For example, even today a majority of American jurisdictions follow the so-
called M'Naghten rule as the test for insanity. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 4.2 (2d ed. 1986). This test originated in a mid-
nineteenth century English case. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
376 Even today, courts consider Stephen to be the most authoritative
commentator on the common law of his time. E.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624,
640 (1991) (citing Stephen with respect to the definition of "malice aforethought"
under the common law).
377 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (Fred B. Rothman &
Co. 1991) (1878). With this work, Stephen intended to begin the process of the
codification of the criminal law in England.
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drunkenness as a defense was no longer evaluated on the basis
of whether it affirmatively excused conduct. Rather, it could
only amount to a defense "[i]f the existence of a specific intention
[was] essential to the commission of a crime" and, if so, the
voluntary intoxication "should be taken into account by the jury
in deciding whether [the defendant] had that intention."37
Stephen was also the first to describe a general defense of
necessity that was unambiguously based on a justification
theory. He wrote that an otherwise criminal act could be
justified by the defense of necessity, provided the act was
performed
to avoid consequences which could not otherwise be avoided,
and which, if they had followed, would have inflicted upon him,
or upon others whom he was bound to protect, inevitable and
irreparable evil, [and provided] that no more was done than
was reasonably necessary ... and that the evil inflicted by it
was not disproportionate to the evil avoided. 379
Elsewhere Stephen observed that the law pertaining to necessity
was "so vague that, if cases raising the question should ever
occur, the judges would practically be able to lay down any rule
which they considered expedient."380
Unlike his predecessors, Stephen drew a clear distinction
between duress and necessity. Duress was based on an excuse
theory, which provided that an otherwise criminal act was not a
crime "if the act [was] done only because, during the whole of the
time in which it is being done, the person who does it is
compelled to do it by threats ... instantly to kill him or to do
grievous bodily harm."3 8 1 Although acknowledging that duress
could in theory provide a complete excuse, Stephen observed that
as applied "it aught rather effect the punishment than the
guilt."8 2
In summary, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, the
common law's conception of justification and excuse, resting
upon a venerable legal tradition, had sufficiently matured so as
to become solidly principled, coherent and discrete. Justification
was seen as providing a basis to exculpate a person who violated
378 Id. at 19.
379 Id. at 21.
380 2 STEPHEN, supra note 262, at 108.
381 STEPHEN, supra note 377, at 20.
382 Id.
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the letter of the law when he acted to vindicate the common good
or his own legitimate interests, provided that his action achieved
a greater objective benefit or avoided a greater objective harm
than inaction, was necessary and proportional, and was not
explicitly prohibited by the state despite its objective good.
Excuse was understood as providing a basis to exculpate, or
extenuate and mitigate, a person who was judged not to be
blameworthy for violating the letter of the law, because his free
will was completely or at least seriously incapacitated by a
cognitive or volitional deficiency. Although substantial
disagreement remained about how these theories ought to be
practically applied in the form of specific defenses and to
particular circumstances, there seemed to have developed a
general consensus as to their normative foundations and
content.
Of course, nineteenth century criminal justice was not
administered beyond the reach of nineteenth century politics,
and its sometimes-distorting influence upon doctrinal integrity
and purity. Perhaps the most celebrated example of this is the
infamous case of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens,3 3 without
which no review of justification and excuse theory under the
common law would be complete. Captain Dudley, two crewmen,
Stephens and Brooks, and a cabin boy were adrift in a thirteen-
foot open lifeboat more than one thousand miles from land
following a shipwreck. After nearly three weeks at sea, nine
days without food, and seven days without water, the sailors
killed the cabin boy, who was then in the weakest condition, and
drank his blood for sustenance.38 4 The survivors were rescued
four days later. It is generally conceded that the cabin boy was
so weak from drinking seawater that he would not have lived
another day. It is likewise not seriously disputed that all of the
others would have perished before help arrived but for their
consumption of the young boy's blood. 38 5
383 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
384 See NEIL HANSON, THE CUSTOM OF THE SEA 90-120 (1999). Apparently,
waiting for the cabin boy to die and then consuming his blood was not an effective
option because the blood would have congealed in his veins and thus would not have
provided a sufficient amount of liquid to save the others.
385 Dudley, 14 Q.D.B. at 275. Of course, any such conclusion is necessarily
speculative. In the first few days of their ordeal, the group caught a turtle and fed
upon it. Also, it might have rained in the interim.
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It was the common understanding, at least among the sea-
faring community, that such acts of desperation were ordinarily
allowed. Survival killings were not prosecuted in the criminal
courts, and they had even attained a sort of status as "custom of
the sea." In fact, "[s]o complete [was] the belief of sailors in their
right to eat their comrades that Captain Dudley [upon his return
to England] ... related the whole story ... [as] a sailor usually
describes any noteworthy incident of a voyage"; in response,
"[t]he common people received [the survivors] with every mark of
sympathy and regard, and treat[ed] them as if they had
performed some meritorious and praiseworthy act."38 6
The Crown sought to make an example of Dudley and the
other survivors. 387 To ensure convictions from a jury that was
likely to acquit, the Crown caused the case to proceed in a most
unorthodox fashion. The judge convinced the jury to limit its
role to making factual findings, which were not in dispute, and
to leave to the court the decision of whether the defendants
should be acquitted based on these facts. 388 Both the arguments
by counsel38 9 and the court's opinion 390 muddle and confuse the
386 The quotations in this paragraph of text are taken from newspaper accounts
reprinted in HANSON, supra note 384, at 172-74.
387 Given the large number of shipwrecks, survival cannibalism had become
commonplace in the nineteenth century. For example, 838 English ships went down
in 1881, and "[t]here was a near endless tally of actual wrecks whose survivors had
practiced the custom of the sea." Id. at 123-25. Cannibalism sometimes even
occurred when there was no shipwreck, but rather it was occasioned by a
combination of poor planning and insufficient supplies. Polite Victorian society was
horrified by the custom, and so the Crown desired for some time to set down a
precedent case outlawing it. About ten years earlier, a similar case was dropped
because the ship owner was a member of Parliament, and a trial of the survivors
would have been embarrassing as the owner failed to provide proper provisions. Id.
at 183-89. That the trial in Dudley was result oriented cannot be seriously doubted.
Indeed, as Arthur Collins candidly explained to his client Dudley, "The full weight
of the establishment, from Her Majesty the Queen. . . to the justices sitting in
judgment upon you [are] united against you. They are determined that this case will
end in your conviction." Id. at 269. Collins was later awarded a knighthood and
elevated to the bench for his part in helping the court "reach the correct verdict." Id.
at 268 (internal quotations omitted).
388 Id. at 240-41.
389 For example, the defendants' counsel argued at trial, "[A] man is under
compulsion when he is reduced to a choice of evils. . . [t]heir extreme necessity
drove them to an act that would otherwise be a crime." Id. at 263.
390 Now it is admitted that the deliberate killing of this unoffending and
unresisting boy was clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by
some well-recognised excuse admitted by the law. It is further admitted
that there was in this case no such excuse, unless the killing was justified
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE
theories of justification and excuse. This is unfortunate but not
unexpected. As will be shown later, the same type of conflation
and imprecision is oftentimes encountered in contemporary
formulations of justification and excuse, especially when, as in
this case, the desired end-a conviction-is paramount and
predetermined, and the jurisprudential means to the end are
primarily concerned with achieving that result. In this sense,
Dudley is but one example of the general reluctance to adopt and
apply principled and transcendent norms of justification and
excuse, especially when doing so is most problematic.
Ultimately, the defendants in Dudley were convicted of what can
only be described as a most serious crime, 391 and yet they were
paroled just six months later.392
Dudley exemplifies the paramount importance of recognizing
and applying principled conceptions of justification and excuse
as bases for criminal exculpation, especially in the most difficult
cases. It also foreshadows some of the ways in which
justification and excuse theory have been corrupted and
misapplied in recent times. The contemporary understanding of,
and misconceptions about, justification and excuse are discussed
next.
III. JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE
The Western legal tradition, and in particular the English
Common Law, were the predominate sources of early American
criminal law jurisprudence.
Inspired by the Enlightenment, there was a movement in
eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and the United
States to shift the locus of law-making from the courts to
legislative bodies. In part, the effort to enhance legislative
authority was based on the belief that crimes should be defined
by what has been called "necessity."
Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. at 286-87.
391 The two defendants were sentenced to death for the willful murder of the
cabin boy, Richard Parker. "[O]n a day appointed, that you be taken to a place of
execution; that you be there hanged by the neck until your bodies be dead."
HANSON, supra note 384, at 280.
392 The Home Secretary, Sir William Harcourt, had wanted the defendants to
serve a term of life imprisonment, but he was warned that such a sentence would
lead to riots. The commuting of the sentence to six months was a shock to the
prisoners, who expected a full pardon and release. Id. at 283-86.
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by an institution more representative of those being governed
than the judiciary. The "romance with reason" also inspired
reformers of different philosophical stripes (both
utilitarians[ 39 3] and believers in natural law[ 394]) to try to codify
393 Utilitarianism is the belief that the "utility" of the act governs the moral
rightness of the act. Although refined by comparatively modern thinkers, such as H.
L. A. Hart and Peter Singer, utilitarianism is most associated with Jeremy
Bentham (1748-1842) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Mill writes
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to
produce the reverse .... By happiness is intended pleasure, and the
absence of pain .... [This] theory of life on which this theory of morality is
grounded, [holds that] pleasure, and the freedom from pain, are the only
things desirable as ends.
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 278 (Alan Ryan ed.,
Penguin 1987) (1861). The writings of Judge Posner and the Law and Economics
School represent more recent, practical applications of the principle of "utility" to
the law. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY (1999). The idea that pleasure is the only good is, of course, not new. In
Plato's Gorgias, for example, Callicles argues that pleasure is the only good, stating,
"[W]hat could be lower and baser than temperance and justice... when [the strong]
might enjoy the good things of life without hindrance?" THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO
300 (W.C. Hembold trans., 1986) (n.d.).
Although Mill states that a moral man should prefer to act in a way that
maximizes the aggregate happiness of the whole society, he gives no clear reason
why one should do this at the expense of his own personal happiness. MILL, supra,
at 278. Accordingly, one would expect a utilitarian always to find justified the
killing of an innocent to save one's own life. Likewise, one would expect a utilitarian
to reject the notion that an individual should at times prefer society's happiness to
his own private good because man is by nature a social creature, and that the
common good, although intrinsically related to individual goods, is a real value that
transcends the good of the individual. The utilitarian rejection of the common good
as a normative imperative leads to the idea that morality is really only an attempt
by the weak masses to restrain strong individuals. Friedrich Nietzsche, for example,
argues that that the Christian ethic of love, humility and self-sacrifice is the
conquest of the slave morality--"the morality of resentment" over the "noble
morality" of power and selfishness-in which the weak make a virtue of suffering
what they must suffer, and through their morality restrain the strong. FRIEDRICK
NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEOLOGY OF MORALS, 35-56 (Walter Kaufman trans.,
Vintage Books 1989) (1887). A variety of philosophical approaches, such as
Marxism, Critical Race Theory, Feminist Legal Theory, and Queer Legal Theory,
although differing as to which group is dominant, all hold the same basic view that
morality is but an expression of the subjective will of the dominant group being
imposed on the powerless. See David Wong, Relativism, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS
442-50 (Peter Singer ed., 1991). If there is no objective good then all morality is
subjective, or as Nietzsche puts it, "Nothing is true, everything is permitted."
NIETZSCHE, supra, at 150; see also Hans Kelsen, Absolutism and Relativism in
Philosophy and Politics, 42 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 906, 906-14 (Oct. 1948) (giving a
relativist criticism of philosophical absolutism).
394 "The natural law is, of course, a norm for the lawmaker. Such a view has
been held by nearly all philosophers of law, including the founders of the modern
[Vol.78:725
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the criminal law in order to produce "a legislated body of
reordered, reformed, and reconceived law" in accordance with
their respective principles.
395
Other philosophical beliefs, such as individualism 396 and
determinism, 397 also competed for influence.
theory of sovereignty. Bodin and for a time even Hobbes." See HEINRICH A.
ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 227 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1998). As Saint
Thomas Aquinas further explained:
But we should note that we can derive things from the natural law in two
ways: in one way as conclusions from its first principles; in a second way as
specifications of certain general principles. Indeed, the first way is like the
way in which we draw conclusions from first principles in theoretical
sciences. And the second way is like the way that craftsmen in the course
of exercising their skill adapt general forms to specific things .... [Firstly
f]or example, one can derive the prohibition against homicide from the
general principle that one should do no evil to anyone .... [Secondly flor
example, the natural law ordains that criminals should be punished, but
that criminals be punished in this or that way is a specification of the
natural law.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW 47 (Richard J. Regan trans., 2000).
395 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 3.01[B] (footnotes omitted) (quoting Sanford H.
Kadish, The Model Penal Code's Historical Antecedents, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 521-22
(1988)).
396 Individualism stresses autonomous individual rights as the preeminent
purpose of government. "[E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others." JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971); see also John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997). For the seminal work of political
philosophy, arguing that the protection of individual rights is the purpose of
government, see JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Mark Goldie ed.,
Guernsey Press Co. 1996) (1690). For a critique of Rawls' individualist theory, and
the utilitarian theory of justice, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981).
Although John Stuart Mill argues on utilitarian grounds that individual liberty
should be protected from government interference-"the sole end for which mankind
are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of
any of their number, is self-protection"--individualism and utilitarianism are often
in conflict. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 14 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1991) (1859). Consider, for example, laws requiring the use of seatbelts, even
for adults. Perhaps a more dramatic example of this conflict is where an individual's
right to life is surrendered to the utilitarian calculus, as occurred in In Re A, 4 All
E.R. 961, 961-63 (C.A. 2000). There, the British court ordered the separation of
conjoined twins who shared a common blood supply, over the objection of their
parents, so that the stronger might have a longer life. Id. The reasoning was starkly
utilitarian-it is better that the one with the lesser prospects for quality of life
should die, so that the other may live. Further, the court rejected Regina v. Dudley
and Stephens as to whether the defense of necessity justified the killing of an
innocent to save the life of another, and in effect adopted the defense's position in
Dudley with respect to the choice of evils analysis.
397 The paradigm argument and profound impact of determinism has been
explained as follows:
1. If human decisions and actions are determined, then for all such
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Ultimately the movement toward codification of the criminal
law prevailed, as state legislatures one-by-one began to
supplement and later replace the common law with criminal
codes. The watershed event in the codification movement was
the publication of the Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal
Code ("Model Penal Code") in 1962.398 Professor Sanford Kadish
calls the Code's impact "stunning,"399 and it has had a
substantial influence on the criminal codes in an overwhelming
majority of states.400
decisions and actions, there are antecedently sufficient causal conditions.
2. If there are (antecedently) sufficient conditions for all decisions and
actions, then decisions and actions are necessitated by these conditions.
3. But if decisions and actions are necessitated, no-one acts freely; that is,
no-one is able to decide or act differently from the way he or she does.
4. Since it is required inter alia of morally responsible decisions and
actions that agents act freely - that is, that they be able to decide or act
differently from the ways they do - if determinism is true no-one ever
decides or acts morally responsibly.
5. If no-one ever acts freely or morally responsibly many moral (and legal)
practices lose their justification, and thus morality itself can have no
objective foundation.
Robert Young, The Implications of Determinism, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS, supra
note 393, at 536. The description of this argument as a paradigm of the determinist
movement is not meant to imply that every determinist denies individual
culpability. This argument or one similar to it must, however, be accepted or at
least addressed by every proponent of determinism. The most influential
determinists are Simon LaPlace, Sigmund Freud, and Gottfried Leibniz. See SIMON
DE LAPLACE, 5 THEORIE ANALYTIUE DE PROBBILITES: INTRODUCTION VII (Oeuvres
1812-1820) (expressing a theory of mechanical determinism); JAMES V. MCGLYNN,
S.J. & JULES J. TONER, S.J., MODERN ETHICAL THEORIES 125 (1962) ("Clearly
Freud's philosophy of man and morals is rooted in and grows out of his materialistic
and deterministic concept of man...."); GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ, MONADADOLGY (1898)
(discussing the theory of "Monads" which included a belief in a predetermined world
where all substances are entirely separate from each other and ordered by God
toward harmony; "[t]he soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise follows its
own laws; and they agree with each other in virtue of the pre-established harmony
between all substances, since they are all representations of one and the same
universe."), available at http://eserver.org/philosophy/leibniz-monadology.txt (Robert
Latta trans.) (last visited June 10, 2004). Perhaps the best-known determinist of the
twentieth century is B.F. Skinner, whose theory of "behaviorism" and literary work
were attempts to do away with notions of human culpability in light of determinist
thinking. See B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1972). These
individuals constitute only a brief listing of what is a very large field of thinkers
past and present.
398 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 1.05. The American Law Institute
began working on the Model Penal Code in 1952. Contributors included judges,
practitioners, and academics.
399 Kadish, supra note 395, at 538.
400 See Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of
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The codification movement in general, and the influence of
the Model Penal Code in particular, has profoundly reshaped the
character and normative underpinnings of American criminal
law. In some respects, these forces confirmed traditional
understandings, helped infuse a degree of specificity and
particularity through the mechanisms of codification, and
indirectly contributed to a measure of consistency across
jurisdictions. In other respects, they have fragmented the
criminal law, as jurisdictions selectively adopted only certain
provisions of the Model Penal Code that are, themselves, the off-
springs of a hodgepodge of competing philosophies. This has
resulted in a body of contemporary American criminal law
jurisprudence that is at once generally similar in the broad
strokes and quite diverse in the details, which rests upon a
variety of often-contradictory philosophical first principles.
These splintering forces make it especially difficult to
organize contemporary American criminal defenses into a
system of defenses that is at once comprehensive, coherent and
fully descriptive. 40 1 Although a certain consensus has developed
about many aspects of criminal defenses, disagreement remains
about many others. These differing approaches extend beyond
the mere margins and sometimes reach the most basic issues
about the nature and scope of a discrete defense and how it
should be classified. Indeed, questions sometimes even arise
about whether a particular theory, doctrine or rule should be
viewed as constituting a criminal defense at all. 40 2
Fact: Recklessness, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 539 (1988).
401 This is not to suggest that this subject has over time received the scholarly
attention that it merits. See Joshua Dressier, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief
Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1157 (1987)
("Until approximately twenty years ago the subject [of criminal defenses] was
largely ignored by scholars; such literature as existed was primarily atheoretical.");
Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systemic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
199, 200 (1982) ("The general nature and scope of most defenses have been
perpetuated for centuries with little or no question."). As Professor Robinson
correctly notes, much of the discussion and debate about criminal defenses has
concerned questions about the application of a particular defense in specific
circumstances, rather than broader issues of how defenses generally ought to be
catalogued generally. Id.
402 E.g., DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 26.02[B] (discussing diminished capacity,
which can operate as a general defense, a defense to only a limited group of crimes,
or no defense at all). Compare 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 69 ("even more clearly
than other failure of proof defenses, [alibi] is not a true defense at all, but simply a
denial of the prosecution's accusation"), with MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
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The difficulty associated with systematizing contemporary
defenses is as much a consequence of their intrinsic nature and
purpose as it is of their pedigree. Criminal defenses have always
embodied complex, subtle, and sometimes-competing notions of
morality, fairness, and justice. They inevitably have been
shaped and even distorted by the practical forces of the law-
making process. Despite these difficulties-or perhaps because
of them-it is useful initially to sketch a broad and generally
accepted framework or system for characterizing and organizing
criminal defenses, as recognized by contemporary American
jurisprudence. 40 3 This template can serve as both a common
reference and a point of departure for the more detailed and
critical examination of justification and excuse that follows.
A. Common Attributes of Criminal Defenses
A criminal defense is an accepted basis or rationale for
finding a defendant not guilty of an alleged criminal offense.
These defenses have been broadly defined as being "any set of
identifiable conditions or circumstances that may prevent
conviction for an offense."40 4 They simply recognize reasons for
precluding or declining to attach the stigma of a criminal
conviction to alleged misconduct, although these reasons need
not rest on the premise that the defendant is morally blameless.
Criminal defenses are, therefore, necessarily related to
criminal offenses. Although some defenses-the so-called
general or affirmative defenses-are more autonomous from the
charged crimes than other types of defenses, all criminal
defenses must be evaluated and applied with at least some
reference to the crime or crimes at issue. The particular offense
that is alleged can be important in determining the potential
UNITED STATES (1998) [hereinafter MCM], at R.C.M. 701(b)(2), (recognizing an alibi
as a distinct defense). This difference might just be a matter of semantics, as
Professor Dressler defines a "true" defense as being "one that, if proved, results in
acquittal of a defendant, although the prosecutor has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt every element in the definition of the crime." JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 182 (2d ed. 1995). Alibi always negates proof, and
thus it could never be a "true" defense consistent with this definition. Of course,
from the perspective of a defendant who is acquitted on the basis of alibi, his
defense would seem no less "true" than if his acquittal rested on a general defense of
self-defense or duress.
403 The framework used here is based largely on the influential work of
Professor Paul Robinson. See generally 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13.
404 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 21, at 70.
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availability of a given defense and how the defense might
operate to negate the defendant's guilt. In order to appreciate
how criminal defenses relate to crimes, it is first necessary to
understand the essential common components of crimes
generally.
With few exceptions, all crimes have four required
components:40 5  (1) a voluntary act by the defendant, 40 6 (2)
performed while the defendant had a particular state of mind,40 7
(3) causing or tending to cause the social harm specified by the
offense,408 (4) where there is an actual and sufficiently proximate
causal relationship between the defendant's voluntary act and
the specified social harm.40 9 The prosecution has the burden of
proving the existence and concurrence 410 of the four above-listed
components beyond a reasonable doubt.41' In modern American
legal systems, the voluntary act and state of mind components of
an offense are expressed as elements of the crime. 412 The other
aspects of an offense-social harm and causation-may either be
explicitly enumerated as elements or necessarily implied by the
statute.4
1 3
405 Although the components of a criminal offense have been variously
described and analyzed by a considerable number of commentators and scholars, a
succinct and especially accessible description is found in DRESSLER, supra note 2, §
16.01.
406 This is referred to as the actus reus-the physical or external part of the
crime. In limited circumstances, the actus reus requirement for a criminal offense
can be satisfied by an omission. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 9.06;
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 375, § 6.1.
407 This is referred to as the mens rea-the internal or mental part of the crime.
In the narrow case of strict liability offenses, no mens rea is required. See, e.g.,
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 600-01 (1994).
408 See generally Albin Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A
Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV.
345 (1965).
409 See generally the collection of sources cited in DRESSLER, supra note 2, §
14.01 n.1. In the broader sense, the social harm and causation components of a
crime are aspects of the actus reus, in that the defendant's voluntary act or omission
must proximately cause the social harm.
410 See generally id. at ch. 15. A discussion of the temporal and motivational
concurrence is beyond the scope of this article.
411 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
412 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 1.05; DRESSLER, supra
note 2, at ch. 3; Paul H. Robinson & Jane A Grall, Elemental Analysis in Defining
Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983).
413 Causation is an implicit element in all crimes. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT
AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW
218-20 (1983). Whether social harm is an essential element of a crime, as such, is in
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In contrast to criminal offenses, which generally share the
same constituent characteristics, criminal defenses vary
considerably in nature and scope. This has led to sometimes-
spirited disagreement about how defenses should be classified
and organized, both discretely and systematically.4 14 Despite
these differences of opinion, a proposed comprehensive system of
defenses has gained considerable support within the legal
community. 415 This system organizes criminal defenses into
three distinct groups. First are the failure of proof defenses.
These can negate the voluntary act and mens rea elements of a
criminal offense, at least insofar as they can render the
prosecution unable to prove their existence or concurrence
beyond a reasonable doubt. Second are the offense modification
defenses. These can negate that the actor has caused the social
harm specified by the criminal statute, even when an actor has
satisfied all of the voluntary act and mens rea requirements of
the charged offense. Third are the general or affirmative
defenses. These can negate guilt notwithstanding the
prosecution's ability to prove the existence and concurrence of all
of the elements and social harm of an alleged crime, based either
on some justifying or excusing reason relating to the actor or his
act, or some countervailing policy interest that outweighs the
conviction and punishment of the guilty. The scope and nature
of the three types of criminal defenses, as they are commonly
understood, will be briefly considered.
part a question of how the term is defined. See Eser, supra note 408, at 346.
414 For example, involuntary intoxication has been alternatively classified as a
failure of proof defense that negates mens rea and as a general excuse defense, even
in the same case. In City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851 (Minn. 1976),
the court's characterization of the involuntary intoxication defense suggests both
that it is a failure of proof defense and an excuse defense akin to temporary
insanity. Similarly, the necessity or lesser evils defense has alternatively been
classified as a justification defense, e.g., 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 124, a failure
of pxoof defense, e.g., Erica Luckstead, Choice of Evils Defenses in Texas: Necessity,
Duress and Public Duty, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 179 n.1 (1982), and a hybrid
justification/excuse defense, e.g., Michelle R. Conde, Comment, Necessity Defined: A
New Role in the Criminal Defense System, 29 UCLA L. REV. 409 (1981), among
other descriptions.
415 This system of defenses, as noted, is largely the product of the influential
scholarship of Professor Robinson. See 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, §§ 22-28;
Robinson, supra note 401, at 200-43.
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B. Failure of Proof Defenses
Failure of proof defenses are the most commonly asserted
type of defense. When a defendant advances a failure of proof
defense, he simply contends that, for whatever reason, the
prosecution has not satisfied its burden of proving the actual
existence of a required mens rea or actus reus element of a
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In the broadest
sense of the term, a failure of proof defense is no more than an
asserted negation of guilt, which, at least implicitly, is
interposed anytime a defendant pleads not guilty and requires
the government to establish his guilt with the necessary
certainty. As a matter of convention and practice, however, the
term "failure of proof defense" is usually reserved for any one of
several more formalized bases or theories for contesting the
adequacy of the prosecution's proof.416
The manner in which a failure of proof defense can operate
with respect to mens rea can be illustrated by a simple example.
Assume that a defendant is alleged to have stolen an umbrella
one dark and stormy night. Under the common law, a resulting
larceny charge would require the prosecution to prove that the
defendant specifically intended to deprive the umbrella's owner
of its use or benefit. 417 In such a case, if the defendant took the
umbrella based on his honest but mistaken belief that it had
been abandoned or actually belonged to him, the generally
accepted modern view is that this mistake would negate the
prosecution's proof that the defendant possessed the state of
mind required for a larceny. 418 The same would be true if the
416 The more formalized and reoccurring failure of proof defenses may carry
with them special procedural requirements, such as prescribed form instructions
that expand upon the standard reasonable doubt instruction, strict discovery and
notice requirements for witnesses connected with the defense, and so forth. E.g.,
MCM, supra note 402, at R.C.M. 701(b)(2) (requiring the defense to provide the
prosecutor with prior notice of witnesses in support of the failure of proof defenses of
alibi and innocent ingestion). With failure of proof defenses, however, the burden of
proof never shifts to the defense nor can it be relaxed below proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 214-15 (1977).
417 FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 7. Under the Model Penal Code, the
traditionally recognized mens rea of specific intent has been replaced by the
culpability requirements of "purposely" and "knowingly." MODEL PENAL CODE,
supra note 12, § 2.02(2)(a), (b), cmt., at 233-36. The present example remains
germane regardless of whether one follows the common law or Model Penal Code
approach to mens rea.
418 See generally 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 22 (discussing failure of proof
defenses). Note that some scholars, such as Professor Kadish, would classify a
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defendant voluntarily became so intoxicated that he was unable
to form the intent required for larceny when he later took the
umbrella. 419 In either case, a failure of proof defense would be
interposed to negate the mens rea element of the charged
offense.
Failure of proof defenses similarly can negate the voluntary
act requirement of an offense. In our same hypothetical, assume
that the defendant presented a convincing alibi defense showing
that he was miles away from the umbrella when it was allegedly
stolen. If the prosecution's theory of guilt requires the
defendant's presence at the scene of the crime, 420 then the
defendant's "alibi defense" would negate his guilt for larceny.421
Thus, regardless of whether the defendant's failure of proof
defense focused on the mens rea or actus reus required for the
charged offense, he would be acquitted if he succeeds in raising
at least a reasonable doubt as to one or more of the elements of
proof.
As these examples illustrate, failure of proof defenses apply
to specific offenses in specific ways, and thus they are not
general in character. Unlike other types of defenses, a defendant
who asserts a failure of proof defense does not challenge whether
the alleged misconduct, if true, would constitute a crime or result
in social harm. Rather, he contests the fact that he actually
committed the alleged conduct, caused the alleged result, or
possessed the alleged state of mind necessary for a conviction.
mistake of fact as constituting a type of excuse, consistent with the views of
Aristotle and the early common law commentators. SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME
AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 84-85 (1987). This is similar to
the way in which mistake of fact was treated under the English common law. See
supra notes 327 and notes 348-50 and accompanying text, at least prior to the
distinction between affirmative defenses and failure of proof defenses.
419 See generally 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 65(a)-(e).
420 That is, when the defendant is charged as a perpetrator and not as an aider
and abettor, an accomplice, or under some other theory of principles that does not
require his presence at the crime scene.
421 But see id. § 69 (discussing whether alibi ought to be considered a "true"
defense).
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C. Offense Modification Defenses422
Offense modification defenses function like failure of proof
defenses, at least insofar as they negate guilt by undermining
the prosecution's showing that the defendant's conduct satisfies
all four prerequisites for a criminal offense. In this regard, both
failure of proof and offense modification defenses "are
expressions of criminalization decisions."423  But an offense
modification defense, rather than negating proof of the
defendant's guilty act, or omission, or state of mind, instead
negates the requirement that the defendant's conduct caused or
tended to cause the social harm that the criminal statute seeks
to prevent. 424
In discussing offense modification defenses, it is thus useful
first to define and explain what is meant by "social harm."425 By
proscribing that certain acts accompanied certain states of mind,
a statute seeks to prevent either the occurrence of a harmful
result or conduct that can predictably and unreasonably led to a
harmful result. When a criminal statute's purpose is to prevent
a harmful result, the crime is said to be a result crime; when its
intent is to prevent potentially harmful conduct, the crime is
said to be a conduct crime. In either case, the harm is referred to
as "social harm" because the prohibited conduct is a public wrong
that offends the common good.426
The ways in which lawmakers address the fundamental
responsibility of a society to protect innocent life illustrates the
different statutory approaches to minimizing social harm. In a
positive law system, this imperative inevitably leads to the
422 Professor Robinson apparently coined the term "offense modification
defense." See Robinson, supra note 401, at 208-13. Professor Dressler refers to these
defenses as "specialized" defenses. DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 16.05. Others address
each particular defense in this group separately, without assigning a collective
name to them. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 23(a) ("In many cases the defenses of
this group [offense modification defenses] are given no formal name, but exist only
as accepted rules.").
423 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 23(a). Professor Robinson describes
"criminalization defenses" as being those that "represent judgments about what has
and has not been prohibited and criminalized by the criminal law." Id. § 23(b), at 82.
424 Id. § 23(a), at 77-78.
425 See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 9.10, at 108-112.
426 Of course, the common good can be harmed directly or derivatively by an
injury to private or group interest. Thus, one commentator has defined social harm
as the "negation, endangering, or destruction of an individual, group, or state
interest, which [is] deemed socially valuable." Eser, supra note 408, at 413.
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enactment of criminal laws that proscribe specific conjunctions of
actus reus and mens rea for the purpose of furthering this
interest. Thus, the law will denounce as criminal various forms
of homicide, such as murder and manslaughter, in order to
directly minimize and punish the occurrence of an unwanted
outcome, i.e., the death of an innocent person. These are result
crimes, at least as they are defined under the common law. 427
Lawmakers will likewise criminalize certain conduct that can
indirectly, but predictably and unreasonably, lead to the death of
innocents, such as solicitation to commit murder and driving
while intoxicated. 428 The latter offenses are conduct crimes,
because their immediate purpose is to proscribe unwanted
conduct rather than an unwanted result. Of course, a crime may
directly prohibit both conduct that can cause harm and the harm
itself, such as an offense that punishes homicide, a result, by
certain specified means, the conduct. 429
Although all offense modification defenses negate social
harm, they can accomplish this end in a variety of ways. The
rules, doctrines and defenses that have been identified as offense
modification defenses are diverse and eclectic. 430  Some are
merely the application of an accepted rule of statutory
interpretation to the text of a particular criminal statute.431 As
with failure of proof defenses, these offense modification
427 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 265, at *191-96; MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note
12, § 210.2 cmt., at 13-15.
428 The rationale for punishing conduct crimes is more complex than merely
seeking to avoid proximate and unwanted results. The prohibited conduct itself can
constitute a social harm that injures the common good. Eser, supra note 408, at
345-46; Robinson, supra note 10, at 269 (noting that "inchoate offenses do not
punish bad intent evidenced by overt acts, but rather punish conduct which is
harmful to society in a way apart from the harm which might have resulted had the
actor's intent been fulfilled").
429 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316(1)(a) (Lexis 2003) (providing that
first-degree murder includes murder perpetrated by means of poison and lying in
wait).
430 See generally the authorities collected in 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, §
23(a).
431 For example, "Wharton's rule" as applied to the crime of conspiracy. 2
FRANCIS WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1064, at 1862 (J.C. Ruppenthal ed., 12th ed.
1932) (stating that an agreement by two persons to commit a crime that necessarily
requires the voluntary and concerted criminal participation of two persons cannot
be prosecuted as a conspiracy). Contra MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 5.04
cmt., at 482-83. Another example is the common-law rule that the victim of crime is
not liable as an accomplice, even if the he aided and abetted the commission of the
crime. See id.
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defenses relate to a specific crime in a specific way. Other
offense modification defenses operate like a "true" defense, in the
sense that they modify the definition of the offense itself.432 But
even this latter group of offense modification defenses is
predicated on a variety of differing rationales. For example,
some offense modification defenses exculpate, 433 while others are
premised on non-exculpatory rationales. 43 4
Given the wide range of offense modification defenses, it is
difficult to choose an emblematic example that fully illustrates
their nature and scope. Perhaps the best candidate is the de
minimus infraction defense. 43 5  Suppose our hydrophobic
defendant pilfered another person's umbrella with the intent of
depriving the owner of its use and benefit, but then he
immediately returned it because of a sincere change of heart or
because it stopped raining. Although the defendant would
satisfy all of the voluntary act and mens rea elements of proof
required for a larceny conviction, 43 6 it might be argued that his
infraction was so de minimus that it "did not actually cause or
threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to
warrant the condemnation of conviction." 437  The de minimus
infraction defense conceivably could be applied to any offense,
provided that the legislature intended to allow for the defense
when it defined the specified conduct as criminal. 438
432 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 23(a), at 78-79 (citing as examples
renunciation and impossibility as they relate to certain inchoate offenses).
433 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 2.11(l) ("The consent of the
victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a
defense is such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the
infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.")
(emphasis added).
434 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 23(a), at 80 (noting defenses such as the
defense of dissemination of obscene matter by faculty are permitted to further the
extraneous policy interest of advancing liberal arts education).
435 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 2.12.
436 This assumes, of course, that the asportation (carrying away) requirement
for larceny of the umbrella had been satisfied. See JEROME HALL, THEFr, LAW AND
SOCIETY 259 (2d ed. 1952) (stating that almost any movement of the property, be it
even a "hair's breadth," constitutes asportation for purposes of larceny).
437 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 2.12(2). Subdivisions (1) and (3) of this
section recognize other types of de minimus infraction defenses.
438 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 23(a). For example, the Commentary to the
Model Penal Code recognizes that "[w]ithout such a provision [for a de minimus
infraction defense],... unconsented-to contacts might constitute a technical assault
in some jurisdictions, even though the harm that was threatened and that in fact
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Offense modification defenses and failure of proof defenses
can be two sides of the same coin. Suppose the legislature wants
to criminalize generally the possession and use of a certain drug,
while at the same time allowing its limited use for medicinal
purposes if authorized by a valid prescription. The legislature
could draft a criminal statute so that the medicinal use
exemption is recognized as an offense modification. 439
Alternatively, the statute could be drafted so that a failure of
proof defense is available under identical circumstances. 440 Or,
the statute could be drafted to allow for both theories. 441 Finally,
for whatever reason, the legislature may decline to address the
matter explicitly in the text of the criminal statute. In the
absence of a clear statutory basis permitting medicinal drug use,
a defendant might seek to interpose a general or affirmative
defense based on justification or excuse. These defenses are
described next.
occurred was too trivial for the law to take into account." MODEL PENAL CODE,
supra note 12, § 2.12 cmt., at 403-04 (footnotes omitted). Of course, whether a
legislative intent can be discerned with sufficient confidence to recognize the
existence of this defense in a given circumstance can be a contentious matter having
considerable significance. Without addressing the question of legislative intent in
great detail here, it intuitively seems reasonable to suppose that, everything else
being equal, the de minimus infraction defense is most likely to be available in the
case of broadly drawn conduct and result crimes that address wide-ranging social
harms, such as assault and battery.
439 For example, the statute could read, in part, "The possession and use of the
named drug is a defense, provided that the use is based on a valid medical
prescription."
440 For example, the statute could be drafted so as to prohibit "the possession
and use of the named drug without a valid prescription for its use." Criminal
statutes can also use general words of criminality, such as "wrongfully," to limit the
reach of a criminal statute in non-specific terms. A general expression of criminality
might similarly provide a basis for a failure of proof defense in this situation, based
on the reasoning that the legislature did not intend that the possession and use of
the named drug for medicinal purposes be considered "wrongful." Of course, the
legislative history of the statute might fail to provide a legitimate basis for
according such an expansive interpretation to the word "wrongful."
441 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 2.11(1) ("The consent of the
victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a
defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense [a failure of proof
defense] or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the
law defining the offense [an offense modification defense].").
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D. General or Affirmative Defenses
1. In Relation to the Crime That Is Charged
General or affirmative defenses operate quite differently
than do offense modification or failure of proof defenses. In the
case of a general defense, the defendant accepts-or at least he
does not have to contest-that all of the elements and implicit
requirements of the charged offense may have been proven by
the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant
nonetheless contends that he is entitled to an acquittal because
of some other reason. Justification and excuse are the
traditionally recognized bases for exculpatory general defenses.
Other general defenses are based on rationales that are
unconcerned with the defendant's culpability, but are instead
intended to protect and foster important public policy
considerations.
These defenses are described as being general because they
theoretically can apply to any offense. General defenses are thus
said to "operate independently of the criminalization decision
reflected in the particular offense." 442 Unlike failure of proof and
some offense modification defenses, the potential availability of a
general defense is not limited to specific crimes in specific ways.
The asserted ubiquity of general defenses, however, should
not be misunderstood as implying that the offense charged and
its surrounding circumstances are irrelevant to the potential
availability of these defenses. Sometimes the connection
between the crime charged and a potential general defense is
explicitly expressed in the statute. For example, every
jurisdiction has statute of limitation defenses that apply
differently depending upon the specific offense or type of offense
charged.443 In other instances, certain categorical exceptions to
or limitations upon a general defense may be imposed by
language in the statute or case law. For example, although
duress is a general defense premised on excuse, the common law
rule, which continues to the present day in most American
jurisdictions, is that duress is categorically disallowed as a
defense to an intentional killing.444
442 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 21, at 70.
443 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 1.06.
444 See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.04.
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2. Nonexculpatory Defenses 445
The most easily compartmentalized of the general defenses
are the nonexculpatory defenses. These defenses are unrelated
to the blameworthiness or dangerousness of the defendant, or to
the wrongfulness of his conduct. They instead reflect the
proposition that society sometimes finds competing policy
considerations to be weightier than its basic interest in
convicting and punishing blameworthy defendants. For
example, statutes of limitation operate as a complete defense to
a crime, even if the prosecution can prove all of the components
of the offense, including the express elements of proof, beyond a
reasonable doubt. Lawmakers nonetheless provide statute of
limitation defenses because they have concluded that, in some
cases, finality and repose are more important to the complex goal
of "justice" than is accurate fact-finding or achieving the
legitimate purposes of criminal punishment.446 Nonexculpatory
defenses, besides being statutorily based,447 can be premised
upon a constitutional imperative, such as the Fifth Amendment's
Double Jeopardy prohibition 448 or due process guarantees of
competency to stand trial.449
All nonexculpatory defenses are the product of interest
balancing that has been calibrated generally by a legitimate
public authority rather than by a particular defendant.
Individually performed harm or benefit balancing, if objectively
justified, might be allowed as the basis for a justification
defense. Individually performed balancing that is flawed but
reasonable-or perhaps even flawed but understandable-might
445 Professor Robinson uses the term "nonexculpatory defenses." 1 ROBINSON,
supra note 13, § 26. Professor Dressler refers to these defenses as "extrinsic
defenses." DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 16.06.
446 It is, however, sometimes argued that statutes of limitation enhance the
accuracy of the truth-finding process. See Order of R.R. Tel. v. Ry. Express Agency,
321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) ("Statutes of limitations ... in their conclusive effects
are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.").
447 Another nonexculpatory defense based upon a statute is diplomatic
immunity. 22 U.S.C. § 254a-d (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
448 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2; see United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,
127-31 (1980); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (noting that
besides avoiding the costs of redundant litigation, the Double Jeopardy bar protects
the defendant from oppressive prosecution).
449 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,
378, 386-87 (1966).
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serve as the basis for an excuse defense. However, when an
actor engages in the ad hoc balancing of competing interests, his
personal calculation, regardless of how sensible it may be in the
abstract, cannot serve as the basis for a nonexculpatory defense.
This is because an individual person does not have the moral
authority or practical capacity to perform this public policy
making function. This authority resides with the public officials
who are legitimately empowered to make and execute public
policy consistent with their office. When these authorities act
responsibly, they weigh all of the competing policy interests
during the decision-making process and ultimately reach an
accommodation that makes practical sense consistent with
normative imperatives and aspirations. Laws born of this
process are morally binding. However, even when a legitimate
authority acts irresponsibly, the laws thereby created bind
persons legally, although not necessarily morally.
In enacting a nonexculpatory defense, the legitimate
authority has thereby fashioned a bright-line rule that permits
an acquittal even when the defendant is demonstrably
blameworthy and dangerous. This is tolerated because the
authority has determined that, within certain parameters, the
failure to convict an offender is less harmful to society than the
damage that would be done to other legitimate interests valued
by society as a result of the offender's otherwise merited
conviction. Provided that all the requirements of a
nonexculpatory defense are satisfied, the defense will be allowed
even if society suffers a net harm from the acquittal of a
defendant in a particular case.450 That such a result sometimes
occurs is not surprising, given that bright-line rules seek the
practical benefit of simplified dispositions that are usually
correct, even at the cost of occasionally undesirable results at the
margin. 451  Conversely, when individualized balancing is
performed and acted upon, the defendant may be entitled to a
justification defense, but not a nonexculpatory defense, only if he
can establish that his ad hoc balancing actually benefited society
450 For example, the situation where a defendant, who is a likely recidivist, is
acquitted of a serious crime for which overwhelming evidence of his guilt exists
because he falls barely outside the statute of limitations.
451 See generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect
World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Pirr. L. REV. 307, 321
(1982).
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in that given case. The realization, or at least the reasonable
pursuit of a comparative benefit or the avoidance of greater
harm, is a predicate for a justification defense. Nonetheless,
even when society is benefited by a crime perpetrated on the
basis of private calculation, such an outcome will not inevitably
afford an actor a defense based on justification.
3. Justification Defenses
Justification defenses focus on the act and not the actor.
These defenses exculpate conduct that is "otherwise criminal,
which under the circumstances is socially acceptable and which
deserves neither criminal liability nor even censure. 452
Accordingly, an actor is justified if his conduct, taken in context,
is judged to be proper, or at least to be warranted.
Every American jurisdiction recognizes several enumerated
justification defenses, which can be subdivided into three broad
categories. 453 Probably the most commonly asserted justification
defenses involve the defensive use of force. These include self-
defense, defense of another, and the defense of property and
habitation. Other justification defenses are premised on the
legitimate exercise of authority that is broadly recognized by
society, such as the authority exercised by parents, law
enforcement officials, and medical personnel. A third type of
justification defense serves as a kind of residual defense, which
applies generally to conduct that comports with the basic
requirements of criminal justification but is not expressly
provided for by a defense fitting into one of the first two
categories. This is commonly known as either the necessity or
the lesser evils defense, although it has been referred to by other
names.
454
All of the different kinds of justification defenses. share the
same basic internal structure and have the same integral
452 Peter D.W. Heberling, Note, Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal
Code on Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914, 916 (1975).
453 For a more complete listing of justification defenses, see 2 ROBINSON, supra
note 13, §§ 121-149. But see FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 769 (listing several
justification defenses, and suggesting different ways in which they might be
classified).
454 The residual justification defense has also been called the "choice of evils"
defense and the "conduct-which-avoids-greater evil" defense, among other names.
Eugene R. Milhizer, Necessity and the Military Justice System: A Proposed Special
Defense, 121 MIL. L. REV. 95, 95 n.1 (1988).
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components. 455 In all situations allowing a justification defense,
there is some adequate triggering condition that prompts the
actor to violate the letter of the law. In order for the actor's
responsive conduct to be justified, it must be both necessary and
proportional, considering all of the circumstances.
A response is necessary if it is needed to protect or advance
a legitimate interest that has been unjustifiably threatened or
otherwise implicated by the triggering condition. For conduct to
be necessary, it must satisfy both temporal and substantive
criteria. Conduct fails under the temporal prong if the need to
engage in it is not yet ripe. This is why the law has historically
rejected asserted justifications based on preemptive self-
defense.456  Although all justification defenses require some
degree of temporal immediacy, the parameters of sufficient
proximity sometimes significantly vary among the many
recognized justification defenses and, as to any particular
justification defense, between different jurisdictions. 457
Conduct fails under a substantive prong of being "necessary"
if the interest at stake can be protected with the use of less force
or the infliction of less harm. Thus, an actor responding to an
immediate threat of comparatively minor harm, such as being
slapped in the face, has a legitimate interest in protecting
himself against such an affront. He would thus be justified in
resisting, by the use of non-deadly defensive force of an equal
magnitude, if this amount of force was necessary to avoid
suffering a battery. The actor would not be justified in using
deadly force to resist the slap, however, because he could achieve
legitimate self-protection by using force of lesser magnitude.
458
455 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 24(b), at 86. The discussion of the internal
structure of justification defenses in the text is based on Section 24 of Professor
Robinson's treatise. Id.
456 See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill
Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 380-88 (1993).
457 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 131(c)(1)-(3).
458 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 3.04(2)(b) (stating deadly
force is justified to protect "against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, or
sexual intercourse compelled by threat"). Even when an actor cannot protect himself
from being slapped except by using deadly force, he must forego using deadly force
because this response would be disproportional to the threatened harm. See infra
notes 463-66 and accompanying text. Evaluating whether deadly force is a
proportional response based on the crime alone can sometimes be problematic, such
as in the case of kidnapping, because jurisdictions vary with respect to whether the
crime requires the use or threat of death or serious bodily harm.
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The requirement that conduct must be "necessary" to be
justified should not be misconstrued as implying that the law
typically obliges the justified actor to act upon the justifying
circumstances. Persons generally are not required to violate the
letter of the law, even when prompted by a moral duty to do so,
at least in the absence of some pre-existing legal duty that
requires them to act. 459 For example, the law will rarely punish
an actor who declines to rescue another in distress, even when a
rescue attempt would not place the actor in peril or nominally
violate the law. This result is not in conflict with the criminal
law's legitimate role of encouraging moral behavior, nor is it
inconsistent with the notion that penal sanctions ought to be
normatively grounded. Rather, the distinction between legal
duty and moral obligation simply acknowledges that the criminal
law formally condemns and punishes every failure to live up to a
moral ideal.460
Even if an act is temporally and substantively "necessary," it
must also be proportional to be justified. A necessary act is
proportional if the harm it causes is not too severe, as measured
either by an absolute standard or in relation to the
countervailing benefit thereby obtained. 461 The recognition of
absolutes as part of a proportionality analysis reflects a
deontological approach to criminal justification, which holds that
certain conduct can never be justified regardless of its beneficial
consequences. Consistent with this approach, some states
categorically disallow the justification defense of necessity in the
case of murder, intentional homicide, and a limited number of
serious felonies.462 Venerable case authority463 and the natural
459 See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 9.06 (discussing the law of
omissions).
460 See generally id. § 1.01[A][1] (discussing the minimalist role of criminal law);
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 405 (1958).
461 The requirement for proportionality may involve utilitarian balancing of
costs versus benefits, but it does not compel this. The role of utility in justification
defenses will be discussed infra, notes 562-64 and accompanying text.
462 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030(1) (Michie 1999) (providing that
necessity is not available for an intentional homicide); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.026(1)
(West 1999) (providing that necessity is not available for intentional murder or
Class A felonies); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.47, 940.05(3) (West 1996) (providing that
necessity does not exculpate first degree intentional murder, but only provides a
partial defense that mitigates the crime to second-degree intentional homicide).
463 E.g., Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (holding that
necessity did not justify the killing of an innocent by others stranded on a lifeboat,
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law46 4 both support the recognition of certain absolutes when
making proportionality calculations.
Other jurisdictions take a strictly consequentialist view.
They assess the proportionality of an act for purposes of
justification by measuring benefits gained against harms
inflicted, without recognizing any absolutes based upon moral
prohibitions or normative values. This teleological approach to
justification is reflected in the Model Penal Code's choice of evils
defense. 465 Justification defenses based on utility nonetheless
require qualitative comparison. For example, a consequentialist
must necessarily make moral judgments when calibrating
whether the benefit of avoiding a trifling physical injury justifies
the cost of substantial property damage, or whether the
impending loss of one person's hand justifies causing the loss of
another person's foot. But when the denominators on both sides
of the equation are equal, the consequentialist approach directs
the use of a mathematical comparison of costs and benefits
without normative considerations. As the Commentary to the
Model Penal Code explains:
If [an actor] is charged with homicide... he can rightly point
out that the object of the law of homicide is to save life, and
that by his conduct he has effected a net saving of innocent
lives. The life of every individual must be taken in such a case
to be of equal value and the numerical preponderance in the
lives saved compared to those sacrificed surely should establish
legal justification for the act.46 6
In light of these variables, jurisdictions differ significantly
with respect to both the enumerated justification defenses they
recognize and the particular "elements" or requirements of
"proof' they specify for each of the defenses. 46 7 This divergence
even if doing so reasonably appeared to be necessary in order to prevent the others
from starving to death).
464 See Joseph M. Boyle et al., Incoherence and Consequentialism (or
Proportionalism)-A Rejoinder, 64 AM. CATH. PHIL. Q. 271 (1990).
465 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 3.02. The defense provides, in
part, that conduct is justified if "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged." Id.
466 Id. § 3.02 cmt., at 15 (footnotes omitted); accord WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at
740 ("[W]here the killing results in a net saving of life .... [it] should be regarded
as not merely excusing from punishment but as legally justifying.").
467 For example, jurisdictions are sharply divided with respect to whether and
when a person under attack must retreat before he can legitimately exercise self-
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is often traceable to fundamentally different conceptions of
"justification," which manifests itself in different requirements
for objectivity and subjectivity, and disagreement about whether
an actor may claim justification if he is culpable in causing the
justifying circumstances. This can also be reflected in whether a
jurisdiction expressly recognizes a residual justification defense.
These issues will be addressed in greater detail in Section V.
4. Excuse Defenses
Excuse defenses focus on the actor and not the act. A
defendant is excused when he is judged to be not blameworthy
for his conduct, even though the conduct itself is improper and
harmful. An excuse defense, in other words, "is in the nature of
a claim that although the actor has harmed society, she should
not be blamed or punished for causing that harm."46 8
As is the case with justification defenses, jurisdictions
typically recognize a variety of criminal defenses premised on
excuse. 469 Also similar to justification defenses, each excuse
defense has its own requirements of "proof,"470 which can vary,
sometimes significantly, between jurisdictions. 471 Jurisdictions
defense. DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 18.02[C]. A defendant generally has a burden of
production with respect to a defense, i.e., being able to point to some evidence on
every element of a defense that, if believed, could cause a reasonable fact-finder to
doubt the defendant's guilt. Sometimes the law may allocate to the defense the
burden of persuasion, at least with respect to general or affirmative defenses.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977). The burden of persuasion can
never shift to the defendant for failure of proof defenses, however, as this would be
inconsistent with the prosecution's burden of proving all the elements of an offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. A detailed discussion of the burdens of production and
persuasion for criminal defenses is beyond the scope of this article. See generally 1
ROBINSON, supra note 13, §§ 3-4.
468 Dressier, supra note 401, at 1162-63.
469 Typically recognized excuse defenses include duress, insanity, and
immaturity.
470 For a discussion of what is meant by "proof' in this context see supra note
467.
471 For example, although nearly all jurisdictions recognize an insanity defense,
they are sharply divided about many of its substantive and procedural aspects. See
generally 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 173(a). In particular, jurisdictions disagree
on whether some variation of "irresistible impulse" ought to be recognized as a basis
for this defense. Id. Likewise, jurisdictions disagree, both generally and with respect
to specific excuse defenses, on whether a defendant can claim an excuse defense if
he is culpable in causing the excusing conditions. See the authorities collected in id.
§ 162.
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sometimes even disagree on whether a particular excuse defense
ought to be recognized. 472
The diversity among excuse defenses-procedurally,
substantively, and philosophically-is in many respects far
greater than that found among justification defenses.
Notwithstanding this, several general observations can be made
about the structure and content of excuse defenses.473 All excuse
defenses are predicated upon the presence of some disability or
disabling condition affecting the actor claiming the defense. The
disability can arise from a number of sources, both internal and
external to the actor, and may be temporary or permanent in
nature. In any case, the disability can provide the basis for an
excuse defense only if it is causally related to the excusing
condition. Thus, duress can excuse misconduct only when the
actor engaged in the prohibited behavior because he was
threatened. Likewise, intoxication can excuse misconduct only
when the actor engaged in prohibited behavior because he was
intoxicated. Where the nexus between the disability and
excusing condition is too remote, an actor will not be excused,
regardless of the severity or magnitude of his disability.47 4
Excuse defenses can be organized into three categories:
involuntary actions, actions related to cognitive deficiencies, and
actions related to volitional deficiencies. 475 Involuntary actions
are those acts, i.e., bodily movements, that are not willed by the
actor. When used in this narrow sense, the term "involuntary"
does not include behavior that is a consequence of exerted will
that has been overborne. Rather, it refers only to those acts that
are caused by the actor's brain but are not the product of the
actor's mind.476 Reflex actions and convulsions are examples of
472 For example, only a small minority of jurisdictions recognize the excuse
defense of hypnotism, and jurisdictions are divided in recognizing an excuse defense
based on an official misstatement of the law. Id. §§ 183, 191.
473 Professor Robinson has described the internal structure common to all
excuse defenses as: "[d]isabilit[ies] causing [e]xcusing [c]ondition[s]." Id. § 161(a), at
222.
474 For example, an actor who suffers from a severe mental disease or defect
would not be entitled to an insanity defense unless that disease or defect caused the
actor to lack the requisite capacity or volition.
475 Here we depart significantly from Professor Robinson's approach, wherein
he recognizes four categories of excuse and uses different labeling of the categories.
See id. § 161.
476 Holmes would describe involuntary acts, in this narrow sense, as muscular
contractions that are not willed by the actor. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
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involuntary actions, while actions performed in response to a
threat are not. Thus, when a hostage is prompted to speak at
gunpoint, his utterances are voluntary even though they are not
the product of his unencumbered will. In contrast, when this
same hostage reflexively coughs because his throat is dry, this
verbalization is involuntary.
The second group of excusing conditions involves conduct
relating to a cognitive impairment or deficiency. "Cognition"
concerns an actor's ability to know certain things, which, in a
broad sense, includes both facts and law. When used in
connection with a criminal defense based on excuse, cognitive
impairment is concerned with an actor's knowledge of the nature
of his conduct and whether it is right or wrong, and legal or
illegal.
The third group of excusing conditions involves impairments
or deficiencies in volition, which concern an actor's ability to
make unencumbered or choices or to meaningfully control his
behavior. A volitionally deficient actor is a voluntary actor, at
least insofar as his behavior is a product of his effort or
determination. Since a volitionally deficient actor's cognition
need not be impaired, he also may be fully aware of the nature of
his conduct and whether it is right or wrong, and legal or
illegal. 477 Put differently, because most defenses based on a
volitional deficiency require only some impairment of an actor's
will, the actor's conduct remains voluntary in a strict sense and
is usually informed by some degree of awareness.478
Sometimes the cause of the volitional impairment will be
external to the actor. For example, when an actor contends that
he ought to be excused because of duress, he asserts that his free
will was overborne by the illegitimate threats of another person,
and because of this he was thereby coerced to violate the literal
COMMON LAW 54 (1881).
477 Of course, an actor may be both cognitively and volitionally impaired, such
as the insane person who can neither appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct nor
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. See generally 2 ROBINSON,
supra note 13, § 161(0 (discussing 'Multiple Excuses").
478 Thus, a volitionally impaired actor can exercise free will and choose to
violate the law. Alan Brudner, A Theory of Necessity, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 339,
349 (1987). This actor might be excused, however, because he was not given a
reasonable opportunity to exercise his free will because of excusing conditions. See
DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.02 [A].
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terms of the law.47 9 In order for this actor to be excused by
duress, he must show that a person of common fortitude-or as
the Model Penal Code refers to it, "a person of reasonable
firmness" 480-would have likewise chosen to violate the law. A
purely subjective standard of fortitude has been universally
rejected, not only because such a standard would be difficult to
verify, but also because of a general "unwillingness to vary legal
norms with the individual's capacityto meet the standards they
prescribe."481
But even if the actor can satisfy objective standards of
reasonable fortitude, he is not necessarily entitled to an excuse
defense. Under the common law, duress is disallowed as a
defense to the intentional killing of an innocent person.48 2
Although some have argued that a person of reasonable fortitude
would never be compelled to kill an innocent person,48 3 human
experience tells us otherwise. If the concept of a "reasonable
person" is defined with at least a passing reference to practical
reality,48 4 then one can imagine all sorts of compelling situations
where many, if not most, reasonable people might kill an
innocent person, such as where a parent is threatened with the
torturous death of his child unless he kills an "innocent"
stranger, who the parent knows to be a serial child abuser or
drug dealer, or even an unremarkable neighbor. 485 A utilitarian
479 See LAFAVE, supra note 375, § 9.7(a).
480 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 2.09(1).
481 Id. § 209 cmt., at 374. The Model Penal Code does permit the consideration
of some subjective characteristics, as it recognizes that:
The standard is not, however, wholly external in its reference; account is
taken of the actor's "situation," a term that should here be given the same
scope it is accorded in appraising recklessness and negligence. Stark,
tangible factors that differentiate the actor from another, like his size,
strength, age, or health, would be considered in making the exculpatory
judgment. Matters of temperament would not.
Id. at 375.
482 LAFAVE, supra note 375, § 9.7(b); 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 177(g).
Several states have expressly adopted this rule by statute. See DRESSLER, supra
note 2, § 23.04[A] (collecting authority); 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 177(g), at 368
n.58 (same).
483 E.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 265, at *30; 1 HALE, supra note 47, at *51
(stating "[a man] ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent").
484 See generally supra notes 480-82 (discussing the reasonable person
standard as it applies to duress).
485 Notions of a "moral forfeiture" theory can confuse the case of the child
abuser or drug dealer. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.02[C] (discussing
the "moral forfeiture" theory). The theory holds that a person may forfeit certain
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might argue that such a killer should be excused because his
punishment, and threat of punishment, would serve no deterrent
purpose. 48 6 A retributivist might likewise argue that the killing
ought to be excused, reasoning that the actor was not
blameworthy because he did not have a meaningful or "fair
opportunity to exercise free will."48 7  Yet, the general rule
remains that an actor faced with this type of situation cannot, as
a matter of law, be excused by duress, even if his behavior was
consistent with that expected of a reasonable person in
unreasonable circumstances.
IV. NOVEL AND NEW APPROACHES TO JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE
The preceding Section should not be misunderstood as
suggesting that justification and excuse have become well settled
criminal defense theories, with disagreement and dissent pushed
to the margins or relegated to abstractions. Rather, largely
because of unprecedented cultural changes 488 and advances in
rights, such as a right to life, when he engages in certain misconduct. See generally
Huge Bedau, The Right to Life, 52 MONIST 550, 570 (1968). But even assuming the
validity of "moral forfeiture," this theory misses the mark here for several reasons.
First, "moral forfeiture" is an asserted basis for justification, not excuse. Second, to
apply the theory here would require that the moral forfeiture be transferred; i.e.,
although the person to be killed did not abuse the actor's child, this person's
unrelated child abuse constitutes a general forfeiture that this actor can act upon,
at least when the cost of the abuser's life is measured against the "innocence" of the
actor's child. In any event, the "moral forfeiture" theory is irrelevant when the
person to be killed is an unremarkable neighbor, rather than a child abuser or drug
dealer.
48 See HOBBES, supra note 374, at 233. Hobbes discusses a threatened actor
faced with the choice of killing an innocent or being killed by his coercer. The actor
can decide to either resist the threat and die immediately, or kill the innocent and
risk execution for murder in the future. In this type of situation, Hobbes concludes
that punishing the actor will serve no deterrent purpose, as the fear of possibly
being killed at some later date would not dissuade an actor faced with imminent
death. Others disagree. E.g., HALL, supra note 13, at 445-46; Regina v. Howe, 2
W.L.R. 568, 579 (H.L. 1987). See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.04
(discussing duress as a defense to homicide).
487 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.02 (emphasis omitted). Again, others disagree.
E.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 265, at *30; 1 HALE, supra note 47, at *51, cited in
DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.04[B].
488 Cultures always change, but the degree and pace of change can vary
substantially. In the last century, American society has experienced unprecedented
cultural change. A few examples are offered to make the point: the Civil Rights
Movement in the 1960's; the United States Supreme Court's decisions on birth
control (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)), abortion (Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)), and homosexuality (Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003));
the development and use of nuclear weapons and energy; the entry of manned and
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science, 48 9 non-traditional exculpatory defenses have been urged
with increasing frequency and vigor. Many of these have
captured the public's attention, such as the so-called "Twinkie
defense," 490 the Black Rage Defense, 491 the Distant Father
unmanned vehicles into space and onto extraterrestrial bodies; and the exponential
expansion of communication mediums and information transfer through radios,
televisions, and computers. The transformation of technology, culture and morality
has necessarily brought about adjustments-and proposed adjustments-in the
body of criminal law. In particular, any shift in cultural values can potentially bring
about a modification of justification, both in theory and as applied, as this is
tethered to society's recognition of an act as beneficial. Likewise, a change in the
understanding of human choice and morality affects the concept of excuse, which is
based on the expectations that a society has of certain actors under certain
conditions. While some have applauded the advent of new mores and principles of
culture and even urged greater change, others have echoed the sentiments of the
Roman statesman Cicero's celebrated phrase, "0 tempora, o mores!' in regard to at
least some changes. For varying viewpoints on the above-mentioned social changes
see generally the following works: STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, THE
POSTMODERN ADVENTURE: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND CULTURAL STUDIES AT THE
THIRD MILLENIUM (2001); LAW AND CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (Joel B.
Grossman & Mary H. Grossman eds., 1971); JOHN P. HEWITT, LEVERAGING THE
LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE (David A. Schultz ed., 1998);
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR (David B. Grusky ed., 2001);
ALVIN TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT: KNOWLEDGE, WEALTH, AND VIOLENCE AT THE EDGE
OF THE 21- CENTURY (1991).
489 The social sciences such as economics and politics, and particularly sociology
and psychology, have added to the discussion of justification and excuse. Sociology
has offered a direct critique of human social life and institutions through its
statistical approach to theories; by the introduction of new social models based on
race, gender, or other identity theories; and the scholarship of thinkers such as
H.L.A. Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin. Meanwhile, psychology has enriched the
understanding of the dynamics that involve human choice, offering insights to the
law in the form of expert testimony and its classifications of mental illness, as in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and in other ways
that have influenced lawmakers and judges. Beyond the social sciences, there have
also been advances in measuring the physiological changes that occur in the human
body-particularly the brain-and their relation both as causes and byproducts of
individual choices and actions. Some examples of this include Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (MRI), Computerized Axial Tomography Scan (CAT Scan), and the
mapping of nucleotide sequences of the human genome-all developments of the
last 100 years that profoundly shaped our understanding of nature and human
choice, which, respectively, underlie the notions of justification and excuse.
490 This moniker is actually a misnomer that was dubbed by the press and
adopted by the public at large. It originates from People v. White, 117 Cal. App. 3d
270, 277 (1981), in which a defense based on depression, a defense recognized at the
time by California law, not junk food, was proffered. The defendant's consumption of
Twinkies and other junk food was used as evidence of the depression, but they were
not themselves purported to be the cause of the murder. Nonetheless, the "Twinkie
defense" attained the dubious status of an urban legend, which is repeatedly trotted
to demonstrate the imagined bankruptcy of the criminal justice system. See, e.g.,
William Li, Unbaking the Adolescent Cake: The Constitutional Implications of
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Syndrome, 492 and Coercive Persuasion, i.e., "Brainwashing.'' 493 A
few, such as Battered Women Syndrome, have even achieved
modest acceptance by lawmakers, judges, and commentators. 494
Although some of the proposed defenses are simply variants
of traditional justification or excuse rationales, others are clearly
distinct and novel, even radical. Regrettably, many of these non-
traditional defenses reflect inattention or even indifference to
the theoretical bases for justification and excuse, and the
distinction between the two. The proponents of these defenses
sometimes selectively borrow from both rationales to cobble
together a hybrid defense that is untethered to any accepted
normative underpinnings. On occasion their purpose seems
Imposing Tort Liability on Publishers of Violent Video Games, 45 ARIZ. L. REV 467,
497 (2003) ("White's murder convictions were reduced to manslaughter when he
relied on the so-called 'Twinkie defense' arguing that his consumption of junk food
had diminished his mental capacity.") (emphasis added); Suzanne Mounts,
Premeditation and Deliberation in California: Returning to a Distinction Without a
Difference, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 307 n.204 ("This testimony was seized upon by the
press and blown entirely out of proportion, so that when the jury convicted White of
voluntary manslaughter, the case became infamous as having established the
'Twinkie Defense."') (emphasis added). The California Legislature responded to the
outcry by severely limiting the Diminished Capacity Defense. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 28(b) (Deering 1998).
491 See generally the work by WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK
RAGE (1968), in which the authors explicate the anger of African-Americans as a
minority in a racist society. Although this work does not seem to propose a defense
based on race, it does provide the basis for later defense arguments that African-
Americans who commit crimes ought to be exculpated because of racism. A similar
theory having the same name was originally offered as a defense in the notorious
Colin Ferguson, New York subway case. People v. Ferguson, 248 A.D.2d 725, 725,
670 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (2d Dep't 1998). For a discussion on the Black Rage Defense,
and other "abuse" or "victim" defenses in general, see Kimberly M. Copp, Black
Rage: The Illegitimacy of a Criminal Defense, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205 (1995);
see also PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 9-10 (1997) (tracing the
variants of Black Rage back to 1846).
492 See, e.g., ROBERT BLY, IRON JOHN, A BOOK ABOUT MEN (1990).
493 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind: Toward a
Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed') Defendant, 63 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1978). Professor Delgado argues:
When a group or individual bent on criminal action succeeds in capturing
and subjecting to forceful indoctrination a captive who would otherwise not
have joined in criminal ventures, the victim may attempt to interpose his
abusive treatment ... as a defense to subsequent criminal
prosecution.... [and accordingly this] new defense should be considered.
Id. at 33. Professor Dressler replies, inter alia, that such a defense would radically
change the law. Joshua Dressler, Professor Delgado's 'Brainwashing" Defense:
Courting a Determinist Legal System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 335, 360 (1979).
494 See infra notes 523-24.
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unabashedly result oriented, for they express far more concern
about whether a desired acquittal is achieved than with the
integrity of the reasoning that might support such a verdict.
The purpose here is not to catalogue and comprehensively
discuss all of the novel defenses and variants that have arisen in
recent times. Rather, it is to examine and criticize selected
aspects of the more important of these defenses. This is done
both to illustrate how a correct understanding of justification
and excuse has become devalued and confused, and to show how
this ambivalence can seriously undermine the normative
integrity and coherence of the criminal justice system.
A. Social Background Defenses
One group of novel defenses can be referred to as the Social
Background Defenses (SBDs).495 These would exculpate on the
basis of race, "rotten social background," or some other purported
cultural disadvantage. This approach, first seriously urged in
the mid-1970s, has generated a considerable scholarship but not
widespread acceptance. 496 Judge Bazelon was one of the earliest
to advocate the possibility of a defense based on social
background, doing so first in a dissenting opinion and later in
scholarly articles.497 Soon others joined in championing these
495 See generally Richard Delgado,"Rotten Social Background" Should the
Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW &
INEQ. 9 (1985).
496 See V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1691 (2003). Professor Nourse observes:
As one commentator has put it, one of the "central tenets" of liberal philosophy of the
1970s was the "idea that the defendant should get as much individualized (subjective)
justice as possible." Indeed, in part because of the path-breaking work of H.L.A. Hart,
it once seemed as if a large portion of the literature on negligence, self-defense, and
provocation was devoted to the question of how "individualized" the reasonable
person should be. This movement reached its height with proposals for defenses based
on rotten social backgrounds and the transformation of general rules into more
particularized syndromes. By the end of the century, however, the pendulum had
swung the other way. Although individualization remained a central background norm
in theoretical debates, there was growing concern that this approach could lead to
abuse.
Id. at 1727-28 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
497 United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Judge
Bazelon wrote:
Counsel's strategy was to bypass the troublesome term "mental illness,"
and invite the jury to focus directly on the legal definition of that term. He
conceded to the jury that [the defendant] Murdock "did not have a mental
disease in the classic sense," i.e., he did not have a psychosis. But, counsel
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defenses, including most notably Professor Richard Delgado, who
wrote a major article detailing a variety of potential SBDs. 498
Although Professor Delgado ultimately concluded that excuse
provided the only legitimate rationale for these defenses, 499 he
expended considerable effort suggesting that justification might
also be available for this purpose. 50  Professor Delgado
summarized his position as follows:
[U]nremitting, long-term exposure to situations of threat,
stress, and neglect indelibly mark the minds and bodies of
those exposed. In some cases, the resulting propensity for
crime is so strong as to justify the conclusion that the
individual is not responsible. When this occurs, an existing
criminal defense, such as diminished capacity, automatism, or
duress will sometimes be available. When not, we should
consider creating a new defense. 50 1
This same basic reasoning has been more recently urged as
a basis for jury nullification because of race. Professor Paul
Butler has argued:
Imagine a country in which more than half of the young male
citizens are under the supervision of the criminal justice
argued, the expert testimony showed that at the critical moment Murdock
did not have control of his conduct, and the reason for that lack of control
was a deepseated [sic] emotional disorder that was rooted in his "rotten
social background." Accordingly, he asked the trial court to omit the term
"mental disease or defect" from the jury instructions. I think his proposal
was ingenious ...."
Id. at 959 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge Bazelon expanded on
the defense in later articles. David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49
S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976); David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law: A
Rejoinder to Professor Morse, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269 (1976). His views did not
stand unchallenged. See FLETCHER, supra note 16, at § 10.3.1; Stephen J. Morse,
The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
1247 (1976); Stephen Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Final Word, 49
S. CAL. L. REV. 1275 (1976).
498 Delgado, supra note 495.
499 Possible excuses included involuntary rage, isolation from dominant culture,
inability to control conduct, and public policy defenses. Id. at 75-77.
500 He argues that an SBD premised on justification could possibly be made out
based on three distinct self-defense arguments: 1) an understanding whereby
society's failure to respond meaningfully to poverty or remove known obstacles could
be construed as violence against the individual; 2) on self-defense occasioned by
threats to psychological personhood or self-esteem by a racist environment; or 3)
actions intended to protect the individual's right to full participation in society. Id.
at 57-59. However, in the end he hesitantly "conclude[s] that justification is not an
acceptable model for a new defense based on rotten social back-ground." Id. at 78.
501 Id. at 90.
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system, either awaiting trial, in prison, or on probation or
parole. Imagine a country in which two-thirds of the men can
anticipate being arrested before they reach age thirty. Imagine
a country in which there are more young men in prison than in
college. Now give the citizens of the country the key to the
prison. Should they use it?50 2
Professor Butler reasoned that these disparate rates of
incarceration based on race support his position that "[i]n cases
involving violent malum in se crimes like murder, rape, and
assault, jurors should consider the case strictly on the evidence
presented .... [But flor nonviolent malum in se crimes such as
theft or perjury, nullification is an option that the juror should
consider."50 3 Ultimately, his argument rested on the belief that
502 Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 690-91 (1995) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification]. Professor Andrew Leipold strongly
responded to that article in his essay The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification:
A Response to Professor Butler:
[W]hile the instinct is understandable, Professor Butler's proposal is foolish and
dangerous. Foolish, because it is based on false assumptions and deeply flawed logic.
Dangerous, because even if Butler's proposal set forth a coherent plan of action, it
would more likely harm African-American citizens than help them. Part I of this
Response argues that the factual assumptions underlying Professor Butler's plan are
wrong and that he misconstrues the lessons history teaches about jury nullification.
Part I1 shows that even if Butler were correct in his assumptions, his plan would fail
on its own terms. The plan creates a series of behavioral incentives that would affect
how legislators, prosecutors, and defendants act, nearly all of which are contrary to
Professor Butler's goals. The final part of this Response argues that, even if faithfully
followed, the proposal creates a substantial risk of leaving African Americans as a
group worse off. At a minimum, frequent race-based nullification would help solidify
and institutionalize the racism that Butler correctly abhors.
44 UCLA L. REV. 109, 111-12 (1996). Leipold focused much of his critique on
Butler's evidentiary premises, a brief historical analysis of jury nullification, and
potential harmful effects of the plan; Leipold did not, however, address the proposal
in the context of excuse and justification per se. Id. He did mention at one point that
the sort of nullification proposed by Professor Butler could result in a jury system
rife with partisan nullifications, but he did not go so far as to say that it would
likewise violate the essential principles of excuse and justification. Id. at 136-37.
Professor Butler replied to Leipold's criticisms in his article The Evil of American
Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 143 (1996) [hereinafter Butler, Evil of
American Criminal Justice]. Both writers are no doubt deeply concerned about their
cause, and the debate is of great interest, but, given the focus of Professor Leipold's
criticisms, it is not salient to the justification/excuse approach taken here. For more
information on these issues, see generally Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury
Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253 (1996) and Timothy P. O'Neill, Forward, The Role
of Race-Based Jury Nullification in American Criminal Justice, 30 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 907, the latter of which introduces an entire issue devoted to the topic and the
Butler/Leipold debate.
503 See Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification, supra note 502, at 715.
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the government is fundamentally corrupt and the criminal
justice system is rife with racial inequality, and that racially
based jury nullification for some crimes is called for to address
these evils. 50 4
Professor Butler addressed his argument to African-
American jurors, 50 5 who are told that they may vote to nullify
only in cases having African-American defendants. His
arguments are unapologetically utilitarian in character, 5 6 but
the exculpatory principles that support them are muddled and
seem to incorporate suggestions of both justification and excuse.
For example, at one point Professor Butler explained, 'While my
proposal does not 'excuse' all antisocial conduct, it will not
punish such conduct on the premise that the intent to engage in
it is 'evil."' 50 7 Unfortunately, Professor Butler did not elaborate
on what is meant by "evil." If "evil" refers to the quality of the
act itself, and not the actor, then this sounds like a justification
rationale. This interpretation would be consistent with
Professor Butler's assertion that, under a radical critique, the
504 As Professor Butler put it, "[R]acial critics of American criminal justice
locate the problem not so much with the black prisoners as with the state and its
actors and beneficiaries." Id. at 691. According to Butler and other proponents,
racial privileges and disadvantages are so pronounced in contemporary American
culture that they provide the foundation for a racially based excuse defense. In this
sense, the focus is not limited to why underprivileged minorities commit crimes, but
it also includes a cause -and- effect relationship reminiscent of Robin Hood, i.e., that
crime, and the lack of punishment for it, can have an equalizing effect in society.
Professor Bulter's attention to social reform and the dismantling of what he
perceives as an unjust status quo, id. at 694-96, is thus similar to Professor
Delgado's theories regarding social fault. Delgado, supra note 495, at 89-90.
505 Although Professor Butler limited his encouragement of nullification to
prospective African-American jurors, he believed if White jurors were to do likewise
that this would help address the ills of the system. Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification, supra note 502, at 722.
506 Professor Butler reasoned:
First, I am persuaded by racial and other critiques of the unfairness of
punishing people for "negative" reactions to racist, oppressive
conditions....
[Second,] Black people have a community that needs building, and
children who need rescuing, and as long as a person will not hurt anyone,
the community needs him there to help.
Id. at 716. Of course, factors bearing on social utility can cut both ways. For
example, if African-American criminals are routinely acquitted and released back
into society, might this have a damaging effect on public attitudes about race and
resulting public policy? Also, might it be more harmful to African-American
communities if these offenders, who were acquitted solely because of race, are
returned to their midst without stigmatization and punishment?
507 Id.
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criminal law is unjust when applied to some antisocial conduct
by African-Americans, and therefore African-Americans are not
morally bound to obey most criminal laws. 50 8 If "evil" instead
refers to the defendant's intent, then this sounds like an excuse
rationale, which would be consistent with his use of the term
''excuse" in the above-quoted phrase.
Perhaps even more troubling than this misuse and blurring
of justification and excuse is the proposed recognition of group
characteristics, such as race, as a basis for exculpation. In some
limited circumstances a group characteristic may create a
presumptive or4bright-line excuse, but such classifications were
always premised on a principled basis that related to an
individual actor's attributes. 50 9 For example, immaturity based
on failing to attain an arbitrary age may serve to excuse, but this
is so because age acts as a proxy for a genuinely excusing
incapacity, such as insufficient cognition or volition. In contrast,
for an SBD group, a characteristic, such as race, is used as a
proxy for non-individualized factors, such as social background.
Once the actor qualifies as a member of an SBD group, he can be
exculpated without further personalization or specificity.
Accordingly, an African-American is exculpated because he is an
African-American; no showing is required that his racial status
diminished his capacity or volition, or, for that matter, that his
race had any causal connection to his misconduct. Exculpation
is based neither on the actor nor the act, but it is somehow
508 As Professor Butler put it:
Radical critics believe that the criminal law is unjust when applied to some
antisocial conduct by African-Americans: The law uses punishment to treat
social problems that are the result of racism and that should be addressed
by other means such as medical care or the redistribution of
wealth.... African-Americans should obey most criminal law: It protects
them. I concede, however, that this limitation is not morally required if one
accepts the radical critique, which applies to all criminal law.
Id. at 709 (footnote omitted). Professor Butler did make clear, however, that his
principle has limits, most explicitly the nonviolent/violent distinction, and he went
so far as to reprove black jurors who "excuse some conduct-like murder-that they
should not excuse." Id. at 723.
509 In other circumstances, a group characteristic may be relevant to a
justification defense, e.g., an actor's status as a police officer in order for him to be
justified by law enforcement authority. But in these cases, status provides only
eligibility for the justification defense; the officer's particular actions are evaluated
individually to determine if they are consistent with a law enforcement purpose.
Moreover, it is likely that in most such cases, persons who do not have the required
official status may still operate under the auspices of the defense in an unofficial
capacity, e.g., citizen's arrest.
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tethered to a third entity-the social structure. An actor is thus
exculpated because society is at fault, irrespective of whether the
actor was responsible or his actions were bad. This would
constitute an unprecedented expansion of the reasons for
exculpation, and do so in a way that is completely unprincipled
and destructive to society.
Brief consideration of some of the consequences of
recognizing SBDs should suffice to make the point. First,
because the social disadvantages of an SBD concern only
criminal culpability, a member of a qualifying group would
presumably remain responsible for his conduct in all other
venues. For example, an SBD member could be made to suffer
civil penalties, but not criminal punishment, for breach of
contract or failing to pay taxes. Moreover, while some SBD
proponents argue that the defense should apply to only certain
misconduct, they do not distinguish among crimes based on
criteria that are in any way related to SBD membership. This is
also troubling because there is no principled reason why race
should exculpate perjury or embezzlement but not murder and
rape. These and other arbitrary consequences of SBDs would
contribute, with good reason, to the perception that the law is
fundamentally capricious, incoherent and unprincipled.
Second, the prospect of criminal punishment would not deter
SBD group members, at least for certain crimes. This raises
obvious issues about how to achieve effective deterrence as to
those persons. But beyond this, those outside of the SBD group
are likely to respond to this lawlessness by developing
discriminatory attitudes toward and adopting discriminatory
policies directed at SBD group members. Ironically, this
resulting prejudice based on group identification is one of the
evils that SBDs were intended to address.
Third, an SBD group member might feel encouraged, or even
obligated, to commit crimes. If society owes a SBD member
exculpation because it has failed him, this suggests that society
deserves the crimes he commits as a consequence of this failure.
In this way, SBDs might be seen as justifying the choice to
commit a crime. This is further supported by the argument,
made by some SBD proponents, that widespread acquittals on
the basis of SBD membership, such as race, are a desirable
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means of encouraging social change. 510 If exculpating crime is a
permitted mechanism for bettering society, then it becomes
almost obligatory for SBD group members to change the culture
by engaging in criminal misconduct.
B. Battered Woman Syndrome
Perhaps the best known and most favorably received of the
non-traditional exculpatory defenses is Battered Woman
Syndrome (BWS).511 The very existence of the proposed defense,
like many other non-traditional defenses, is in part a reflection
of society's failure to address important cultural problems. 512 In
the case of BWS, it might also be seen as a reaction to society's
changing perceptions about women in general, and criminal
activity by women in particular. 513
510 See id. at 722.
511 Sometimes, without apparent reason for the difference, the theory is termed
Battered Women's Syndrome. It will be referred to as BWS here.
512 While it is generally accepted that marital violence presents a serious
problem in American society, it is difficult to gauge with confidence the actual
magnitude of it. The estimated number of incidents of marital violence in the
United States reaches as high as 60 million or 27 million victims per year. The
higher number was given by talk show host Pat Stevens on CNN's "Crossfire," and
the lower number is taken from the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence.
Richard L. Davis, Battered Women and Battered Statistics (2001), at
http://www.dvmen.org/dv-31.htm. Other estimates put the number of battered
women per year to as low as 876,340 for 1998. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH
WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (2000),
available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf. Another DOJ publication stated
that "approximately 1.3 million women and 834,732 men were physically assaulted
by an intimate partner .... PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
10 (2000), available at http://ncjrs.org/pdffilesinij/181867.pdf. Meanwhile, the
publication states that there are an "estimated 4.8 million intimate partner rapes
and physical assaults perpetrated against women annually," but that only "2 million
will result in an injury to the victim, and 552,192 will result in some type of medical
treatment to the victim." Id. at v. Part of this disparity, no doubt, stems from the
use of the different means for collecting data and even varying definitions of what
constitutes "marital violence." Reaching a consensus regarding the extent of marital
violence, based on solid empirical research, would contribute to successfully
addressing the problem.
513 Attempts to comprehend the apparent rising criminal activity of women
have taken divergent courses. Some feminists have lauded the increases, connecting
crime and criminal acts with a corresponding narrowing of the social gap between
men and women. See, e.g., FREDA ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW
FEMALE CRIMINAL 30 (1975). Others have found this view unacceptable, and have
attributed the rise in crime by women to oppression, poverty, and physical and
sexual abuse. See, e.g., ANN LLOYD, DOUBLY DEVIANT, DOUBLY DAMNED (1995).
Myriad theories fall in the enormous gulf between these two extremes. For a
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The first 514 of the "feminist theorists" 515 to propose BWS was
Dr. Lenore Walker, in her seminal work The Battered Woman.51 6
The basic premise of BWS, to which most of its proponents
adhere, is that some women 51 7 in abusive relationships have
been rendered incapable of leaving their batterer.518  This
commentary on the reaction of feminists to the belief in women's increased violence
and crime, see Monica Pa, Towards a Feminist Theory of Violence, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 45 (2002).
514 The word "first" is used advisedly, as it assumes a distinction between BWS
and the antediluvian doctrine of marital coercion. See notes 328-30, 353 and
accompanying text. At least one commentator has connected the two theories: "The
marital coercion defense was available only to married women, and it had all but
disappeared in this country by the mid-1970s, when, as is my thesis, it reemerged in
the guise of the battered woman syndrome defense." Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing
Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (1994).
515 The term "feminine theorist" is also used advisedly. This label has been so
widely applied that one almost begins to suspect it is more inclusive than exclusive
in what it denotes. It is used here to avoid nuanced distinctions and complexities
that are beyond the scope of this article. It nonetheless appears to have retained a
basic and generally understood meaning with respect to a point of view regarding
so-called women's issues and related topics. It is within this wide-ranging and non-
specific sense that BWS proponents most assuredly seem to fall.
516 LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979). Dr. Walker, who gained
her greatest fame-or infamy-for her statements concerning battered women and
Super Bowl Sunday, has been called the primary authority in the field of BWS. See
Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wyo. 1981). She is not, however, without
competition in this regard. See, e.g., PATRICIA GAGNE, BATTERED WOMEN'S JUSTICE
(1998); Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill
Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1985); Loraine Patricia Eber, Note,
The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To be Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1981);
Marilyn Hall Mitchell, Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. REV.
1705 (1978). Having said this, it would be inaccurate to characterize BWS as being
Professor Walker's theory, or for that matter as belonging to any one person in
particular, as the abundant scholarship in this area reflects a considerable variation
and disagreement, even among proponents of BWS.
517 Most BWS proponents would seemingly apply the defense exclusively to
women, although some apparently would also allow men to benefit from it. Typical
of the passing reference to men in the BWS literature are the comments by
Professor Walker, who mentions that BWS may apply to defendants who are
battered children, battered men (usually involving homosexual relationships),
battered lesbians, and even battered roommates. Lenore Walker, Battered Women
Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY, 321, 322
(1992). By comparison, the actual push to develop and use a theory of Battered Men
Syndrome (BMS)-or whatever it might be called-is marginal to nonexistent. For
one of the few articles that contemplates this in an, detail, see Hope Toffel, Note,
Crazy Women, Unharmed Men, and Evil Children: Confronting the Myths About
Battered People Who Kill Their Abusers, and the Argument for Extending Battering
Self-Defenses to All Victims of Domestic Violence, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 337 (1996).
518 There is much disagreement about the degree of incapacitation, but the
general idea is that women in abusive relationships are more or less disabled from
leaving. Professor Walker proposes that the following three questions be asked by a
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argument hinges upon the belief that repeated and severe
psychological and/or physical domestic abuse occurs in cycles, 519
thereby creating a "learned helplessness"' 20 in a battered woman
that disables her from leaving her abuser.521 The courts have
had widely varying responses to assertions of BWS. 522 Legal
commentators have likewise had a mixed reaction; although
many support BWS, others have criticized the defense as
"troubling"523  and a "recapitulat[ion of] ... misogynist
assumptions about women's helplessness."524
BWS claims are usually raised in one of two situations. The
first is where a woman kills her batterer. This quasi-self-defense
theory of BWS was the first to be urged and continues to be the
most often claimed. The second situation is where a batterer
psychiatrist to determine whether BWS has incapacitated a woman such that she
may claim the defense: (1) is the woman a battered woman?, and if yes; (2) has the
abuse caused the development of BWS?, and if yes; (3) how has this impacted on the
woman's state of mind at the time of the action for which she is charged? Walker,
supra note 517, at 323.
519 For Walker, the "Cycle of Violence" is key to exculpating women who kill
their batterer when he is not presenting an immediate threat, such as when he is
sleeping. This is because these "women are hypervigilant [sic] to cues of impending
danger and accurately perceive the seriousness of the situation before another
person who had [sic] not been repeatedly abused might recognize the danger." Id. at
324. Thus, "[t]he cycle theory forms the conceptual bridge that spans the time gap
between the batterer's threat of death or serious bodily harm and the defendant's
act." David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age
of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 72 (1997) (footnote omitted).
520 The theory of "learned helplessness" is used to explain why these women do
not exercise non-violent alternatives to abuse. This argument seemingly has been
made more necessary by the recent proliferation of mandatory arrest policies in
police departments, "no-drop" prosecution directives, and mandatory reporting by
medical personnel. For a discussion of these recent trends, see Linda G. Mills,
Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 550 (1999).
621 See Walker, supra note 517, at 323-24.
522 Some courts have accepted or at least expressed receptivity to modifying
traditional self-defense theories consistent with BWS. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 277
S.E.2d 678, 680-83 (Ga. 1981); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369-73 (N.J. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 782-85 (Pa. 1989); State v. Janes, 850
P.2d 495, 501-06 (Wash. 1993); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Wash. 1984).
Others that have rejected it or criticized it. E.g., Hill v. State, 507 So. 2d 554, 555
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987); People v. White, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980);
Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1376-78. (Wyo. 1981). This is only a representative
sample of judicial reaction to BWS.
523 E.g., David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-
Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 621 (1986).
524 Coughlin, supra note 514, at 8.
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coerces an abused woman to commit a criminal act.525 Although
the latter circumstances can present a potential excuse defense
within the traditional auspices of duress, the theoretical
underpinnings for self-defense are far more problematic. 526
When addressing the first situation, many BWS proponents
try to have it both ways-they urge acceptance of BWS as merely
an expression of settled self-defense theory,527 but then they seek
to apply BWS to situations that would fail under traditional self-
defense requirements for imminence and necessity. 528 They
struggle to wrap BWS in the mantle of traditional self-defense
because it is likely that this would more easily facilitate
acceptance of it by the otherwise disinclined. But by resting on
self-defense theory, these proponents must necessarily contend
that BWS is based on justification rather than excuse. For
example, Dr. Walker wrote on the opening page of Battered
525 See Faigman & Wright, supra note 519, at 91-95.
526 Some proponents of BWS self-defense are unconcerned about theoretical
underpinnings as long as abused woman are set free. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, On
Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371
(1993). Professor Rosen describes the question of whether BWS self-defense is an
excuse or justification as having "much ado about very little .... Neither jurors nor
putative defendants are aware of the subtle distinctions between a justification and
excuse, and from my experiences it is clear that few judges could explain the
difference." Id. at 408. Rosen then goes on to describe his understanding of
justification theory of criminal exculpation:
Thus, one can reasonably say that an action is justified if it is an action
that the law does not choose to punish. In order to be justified, the choice
the actor makes need not be the best of all possible choices, or even the one
choice that society prefers. It merely must be one that society believes
should not be punished under the circumstances of the case.
Id. at 409 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It is not surprising that such a
confused understanding of justification and excuse could cause one to conclude that
the distinction between the two is "much ado about very little." See Kit Kinports,
Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 460 (1998)
("[T]he distinction between justification and excuse may have some academic or
theoretical importance, it makes no practical difference to the defendant whether
the jury determines that her use of defensive force was justified or excused. In
either case, she is acquitted and goes free.") (footnote omitted).
527 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 132 (discussing traditional self-defense
theory).
528 For example, in the case of homicide, BWS based on a quasi-self-defense
theory could arise in two ways. First, when a woman kills her abuser while he is
battering or attempting to batter her. Second, when a woman kills her abuser at
some other time, such as when he is sleeping. The first situation could likely be
justified consistent with traditional self-defense theory, provided the woman
reasonably believed that the physical abuse or impending physical abuse-
psychological abuse does not qualify-was life threatening. The second could not.
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Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, "[D]omestic violence has
such a major impact on a woman's state of mind that it could
make an act of homicide justifiable."529  Other proponents are
even more explicit in their characterization of BWS as a
justification defense.
To implement this strategy, 5301 the feminist theory starts with
the premise that battered women's acts of self-defense are
justifiable rather than merely excusable. Although both
excusable and justifiable self-defense fully pardon the
defendant from criminal liability, an important ideological
distinction separates the two. Society holds an excusable act to
be wrong, but tolerates it because of the actor's state of
mind.... Society perceives a justified act of self-defense as
correct and even laudable behavior. Unlike excuse, justification
posits the act as right, and therefore not condemnable; the
substance of the deed rather than the person's state of mind is
at issue.531
The above quotation seems to appreciate-and even
elucidate-the basic difference between excuse and justification.
But when BWS self-defense claims are examined in light of this
distinction, certain problems and inconsistencies invariably
arise. First and foremost, the entire focus of the BWS argument,
which is upon the actor and not the act, is fundamentally
inapposite to a justification defense.5 32 As the quoted passage
recognizes, justification defenses propose that an actor should
avoid conviction for otherwise criminal misconduct because,
under the circumstances, his actions are laudable and benefit
society. In contrast, BWS theory does not base its argument
upon the premise that what is being done-the killing or
harming of the battering male-is a good that benefits society.
529 Walker, supra note 517, at 321 (emphasis added).
530 Crocker, supra note 516, at 130. The "strategy" to which Professor Crocker
refered is described in the preceding paragraph of her article:
The goal is to make the jury see that the woman's actions are reasonable
rather than hysterical, inappropriate, or insane, and that the differences
between men's and women's perceptions are a legitimate basis for
differentiation. A battered woman would no longer have to be judged under
a standard that did not include her experience.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
531 Id. at 130-31 (footnotes omitted).
532 Even the term "Battered Women Syndrome" seems at odds with a
justification theory for the defense. If justification was the actual basis, we might
expect that BWS would have instead been dubbed the "Batterer Homicide
Justification" or something similar.
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Rather, it is solely concerned with the debilitating effects of
cyclical abuse that can cause women to engage in otherwise
criminal conduct. 33
If the batterer's death is a laudable goal, then BWS
proponents should urge society to declare open season on all men
who batter, instead of arguing for the acquittal or lenient
punishment of women who kill their batterers. What is more, if
the killing of a batterer was intrinsically praiseworthy, a third
party could justifiably perform this act. Yet, there is
understandably little advocacy-and even less judicial
acceptance-for applying BWS to third parties who are hired or
persuaded by abused women to kill their abusive partners.534 In
fact, if killing men who batter benefits society, then this ought to
be justified even when done by a third party over the objection of
the battered woman.
Second, BWS proponents would limit the defense to a
discrete group who commit crimes-battered women. 535  But if
the defense were truly based on justification, it would
presumably apply to all situations having the same pertinent
characteristics, regardless of the actor's gender. Thus, unless
there is something uniquely justifying about a woman who is
battered, we should expect the defense to be applied to similarly
situated men who are battered by other men or women, or
women who are battered by women, and so on.
533 Of course, it is a good thing for the woman as a person, and for society in
general, that she be freed from an abusive situation. A woman interposing BWS
would not, however, be tried for liberating herself from her abuser; rather, she
would be tried for killing or harming her abuser.
634 For a discussion of the lack of exculpation for third parties who intervene on
behalf of a battered woman, and the implications of this with respect to justification
and self-defense theory, see Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and
Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV.
211, 297-99 (2002). Professor Burke observed:
Generally, an actor can use force to defend a third party, if the third party
herself would be justified in using self-defense. Nevertheless, when a
batterer is killed not by his victim, but by an intervening actor, the
battered woman syndrome theory has not helped the intervenors' claims
that they were defending a third party.
Id. at 297-98 (footnotes omitted). This observation is telling, because third-party
intervention ought to be allowed if BWS fit seamlessly into self-defense theory.
Justification defenses, such as self-defense, allow for third-party intervention
because, unlike excuse defenses, they are concerned with the quality of the act and
not the peculiarities of the actor.
635 But see supra note 517.
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BWS theory ought to apply even more broadly this. Take
the case of a small-time drug dealer who works for a kingpin.
The boss repeatedly tells the dealer that he will kill him if he
stops selling drugs. The dealer, in a state of despair and
helplessness, kills his sleeping boss. Compared to the BWS
paradigm, the kingpin's threat to the dealer might be just as
certain, potent and restrictive as that posed by a battering
husband who says to his wife, "I'll kill you if you ever leave
me."536  In both cases, legal alternatives are objectively
available. 53 7 In both cases, the threatening party poses a future
rather than an immediate threat. Consistent with defensive
theories of exculpation, the only meaningful basis for
distinguishing between a battered wife and an intimidated drug
dealer is the degree of volition, and perhaps cognition, exercised
by the two particular actors, criteria that are traditionally
associated with excuse rather than justification.
A principled and coherent BWS justification defense would,
therefore, require significant modification of self-defense theory
in general. At a minimum, it would involve redefining
"imminence" and "necessity," as they are commonly understood,
in order to justify a battered woman who kills her abuser while
he sleeps. 538 It would result in BWS becoming more widely
available, perhaps under a different moniker, to a less restricted
group of potential defendants, which probably includes the
previously mentioned drug dealer. It would expand related
536 This is not to suggest that the moral position of a battered woman is
equivalent to that of a drug dealer. The woman is far more likely than the drug
dealer to have come to her position without fault. For purposes of traditional self-
defense principles, however, this difference is irrelevant, unless one subscribes to
the position that justification ought to be disallowed if an actor is culpable in
causing the justifying circumstances. See supra Part III.D.3. But assuming this
caveat is accepted, BWS proponents would themselves be in the position of having
to distinguish between battered women upon a basis that most would categorically
reject.
537 Indeed, one might suspect that drug dealers, as a group, would be less
inclined to seek out the aid of law enforcement than battered women, and they
might be much less likely to receive help if they did.
538 See Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony,
and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 67-
69 (1994). The authors argued that battered women who kill in nonconfrontational
situations can be justified, but that this must be done through a revision of self-
defense theory so that it focuses on the lethal force used being "immediately
necessary," rather than in response to an "imminent" threat. Id. at 64-66; see also
Burke, supra note 534, at 274-86.
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justification theories-such as defense of another, accident, and
even necessity-far beyond the limits that society would seem
prepared to accept. It would even condone contract killings and
violent third-party intervention. In short, reconciling BWS with
justification theory would necessitate a major re-
conceptualization of justification theory itself.Y8 9 Faced with
these daunting prospects, most BWS proponents urge the
adoption of the defense at the expense of principle and
coherence, and presumably accept the damage this would do to
the law and society's respect for it as an unfortunate but
necessary by-product of useful social change.5 40
539 There seems to be no limit to the ingenuity of BWS proponents, in their
attempt to reconcile BWS with justification theory. E.g., CHARLES PATRICK EWING,
BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION 77-85 (1987); Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman's Syndrome
Does Not Go Far Enough: The Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER &
L. 141, 144-46 (1995) (examining arguments from retributive to social contract
theory in search of a justification for the vigilante killing of the batterer, arguing
that "[gender] bias inherent in the law" and self-defense law paradigms support
allowing vigilantism in those cases where BWS cannot be used to absolve battered
women). Professor Ewing proposes the recognition of a defense of self-defense of
psychological well-being. Cf. Delgado, supra note 495, at 63-68 (reflecting a similar
argument by Delgado concerning psychological or self-esteem based harm as a
justification of self-defense). This would be problematic in several respects,
including the subjectivity and imprecision of "well-being." Issues concerning
objectivity and subjectivity, as relating to justification and excuse in general, are
discussed in greater detail in Part V.
540 Some proponents leave the impression that BWS is a conclusion in search of
a supporting rationale. For instance, Ayyildiz began her article by noting the
difficulty in estimating the magnitude of abuse, but nonetheless favorably cites to
statistics indicating that as many as 27 million women annually in the United
States have been battered, with 18 million of these battered women being abused
more than once a year and 188,000 seeking medical attention. Ayyildiz, supra note
539, at 141-42. However, this considerable problem having been declared, near the
end of the same article the author remarks, "[Ilt is important to note that fewer
than one percent of women.., claimed to have been beaten up... by their
partners," and so large numbers of women will not 'get off if killing a battering man
is justified. Id. at 166. In the same work, near the middle of the article, the author
contends that under the social contract theories of Locke and Hobbes a legal system
is established "as a desirable alternative to private justice," but that according to
these theorists women should have no part in the formation of the legal system
because they are a "disruptive influence." Id. at 151-52. The argument continues
that because women were not involved in the establishing of social contracts, they
ought to be allowed to act outside the law-although no argument is given as to why
this should be limited to cases of killing battering men. Id. at 152. In other words,
the author argues in one breath that women can act outside the law but bases this
on the beliefs of social contract theorists who characterize women as being
"incapable of a sense of justice." Id. While it might be plausibly argued that women
are entitled to operate outside the bounds of a system in which they do not
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Given all of the problems with treating BWS as a
justification defense, aligning it under excuse seems more
reasonable. Indeed, BWS is essentially premised upon an
understanding of battered women as disabled actors, which
sounds remarkably like an excuse theory for exculpation. Most
BWS proponents, however, reject this path. The resistance
seems largely attributable to the feminist criticisms of actor-
centered arguments, and what these arguments imply about
women generally. As Professor Anne Coughlin explains:
By securing leniency on the ground that we are predisposed to
losing our power of rational choice, the battered woman
syndrome excuse relinquishes to men, acting either individually
as husbands or officially as representatives of the state, the
authority to make, or, at least, superintend, our choices for us.
The excuse thereby withholds from women the basic life
satisfactions that the capacity for responsibility is said to
secure. If our misconduct incurs not blame for our evil choices,
but pity for our psychological infirmity, then our good works
will be characterized, not as the product of our own
achievements and willings, but as the successful work of the
expert therapists whose 'cognitive restructuring procedures'
overcame the effects of our mental disabilities.541
The fears of Professor Coughlin and others are clear-any
excuse available only to women, because they are women,
enfeebles women, and thus in her words "institutionalizes
negative stereotypes of women."542 It is irrelevant to many BWS
proponents whether the excuse theory fits-it is bad social
policy, albeit for a good social cause, and thus is unacceptable.
This leaves many BWS supporters face-to-face with
imponderable dissonance. On the one hand, they want to argue
that the devastating effects of domestic abuse cause women to
participate and have no representation, the question remains unanswered how a
legal theory that purports to represent women's interests could be based on the
same premises. Moreover, the social contract argument could easily apply to
children, illegal immigrants, and historically oppressed racial, ethic, and religious
minorities, among others. If so, does this mean that battering men who fall in these
groups are also exempt from the constraints of the social contract-and criminal
prosecution? The BWS literature is replete with similar examples of makeshift
empiricism and theory.
541 Coughlin, supra note 514, at 62-63 (quoting WALKER, supra note 516, at
127).
542 Id. at 1. As noted, elsewhere Coughlin compares BWS to the ancient
doctrine of marital coercion. Id. at 51-58.
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acquire the "learned helplessness ' 543 of BWS, which supports
holding them to a different, lesser, standard of conduct. On the
other hand, they wish to assert that battered women are
justified in killing their batterers and do not suffer any mental
impairment or disability. 544  However, the first proposition
argues against the second, and vice versa, leaving BWS theorists
with the choice of either modifying their theory or endorsing a
paradoxical hybrid of excuse and justification.
Some BWS proponents are nonetheless comfortable with
placing the defense within the traditional auspices of excuse,
regardless of the social implications. This seems most readily
achievable by relating BWS to settled notions of duress.
Kimberly Kuhn, for example, proposes
allowing a defendant to use the battered woman syndrome as a
defense for specific intent crimes .... [which] expands the use
of the battered woman syndrome to include cases in which a
defendant uses the testimony as a defense to a crime against a
third party, as opposed to its traditional use in a claim of self-
defense .... 545
Other commentators have made similar arguments. 546 Although
BWS fits better under excuse than it does justification, some
543 Mills, supra note 520, at 595.
544 E.g., Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the
Representation of Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 227, 229
('Thus, while three of the four psychological changes which may occur in battered
women suggest impairment, this last characteristic reflects an enhanced capacity,
an affirmation of the reasonableness of the need to act."); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert
Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 214-15 (1986) ("[T]he danger
of the battered woman syndrome approach is that it revives concepts of excuse.");
Lenore E. Walker, A Response to Elizabeth M. Schneider's Describing and Changing:
Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 223, 223 (1986) ("The data from our research program do not
support the idea that women who are abused develop a personality disorder.").
545 Kimberly B. Kuhn, Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony: Dune v. Roberts,
Justice is Done by the Expansion of the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 U. TOL. L.
REV. 1039, 1040-41 (1995). "In Dunn v. Roberts, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the battered woman syndrome defense could be used to rebut an inference
of intent when a defendant was charged with aiding and abetting her batterer in
the commission of crimes." Id. at 1039 (footnotes omitted).
546 E.g., Laurie Kratky Dor6, Downward Adjustment and the Slippery Slope:
The Use of Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 749-53
(1995). Although Professor Dor6 is more reserved about allowing BWS to fully
exculpate a battered woman based on a duress theory, she does seem to believe that
BWS can be relevant to the question of an appropriate punishment.
[T]he battered woman defense, as employed in practice today, cannot fit
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adjustment to the traditional understanding of duress is still
necessary before the defense can conform completely to excuse
theory.547
But there is a larger point to this criticism than the
particulars of BWS, SBDs, or any other novel defense. Even
assuming that the proposed defense seeks to advance a
beneficial social policy, it ought not to be adopted as a criminal
defense unless it is wholly compatible with the objective norms
that legitimize the criminal law generally. If a proposed defense
is incompatible with these norms, then its socially desirable
results must be sought through other mechanisms. To seek
desirable ends by such illegitimate means would be incalculably
damaging to the law and culture. This harm, and ways to
mitigate it, are the subject of the next and final section of this
article.
V. JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE AS CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD
The thesis of this article is that contemporary American
criminal law systems ought to adopt and systematically apply
defensive theories of justification and excuse that are principled,
distinct, and naturally understood. This thesis has three
predicate assumptions. The first is that there are indeed
intuitive and immutable theories of justification and excuse that
are truly discrete and capable of systematic application. This is
not to say, of course, that culture and society are irrelevant to
criminal defenses predicated on justification and excuse. Rather,
it presupposes that these defensive theories embody objective
content that can be effectively and coherently expressed
regardless of context. This assumption has been explored at
some length in Section II, through the exegesis of the origins and
understanding of justification and excuse in the Western legal
tradition. The specific theories themselves will be described in
greater detail later in this Section.
within the narrow confines of duress as an exception to the general rule of
culpability for crimes knowingly and voluntarily committed. Instead, the
subjective coercion presently embodied in the battered woman defense
seems most appropriately accounted for through increased sentencing
discretion.
Id. at 673.
547 See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.07.
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The second assumption is that contemporary American law
is capable of prescribing and applying naturally understood and
consistent defensive theories of justification and excuse. This
has been addressed to some extent in Section II, which describes
the evolution and general acceptance of a system of criminal
defenses that had largely accomplished this. It is of course true
that justification and excuse have, and invariably will, present
difficult issues regarding substance and application, regardless
of how they are defined or applied. But these questions do not
present insurmountable obstacles to achieving a consistent and
principled recognition of these defense theories. Indeed, much of
the contemporary confusion and incoherence surrounding
justification and excuse-as reflected in portions of the Model
Penal Code and by certain novel defense theories-only arise
when utilitarian, deterministic, and other "Enlightenment"
notions of these defenses hold sway. Even granting that
naturally understood conceptions of justification and excuse
would occasionally present problems at the margins, it is
demonstrably clear that these defensive theories are amenable to
principled construction and systematic use.
The third assumption is that the naturally understood
defensive theories of justification and excuse no longer enjoy
general acceptance, but rather have been disparaged and often
displaced by competing approaches and philosophies. This
cannot be seriously debated. As demonstrated in Sections III
and IV, during the past century these intuitive and once widely
acknowledged theories of exculpation were questioned, doubted
and ultimately discounted by a critical mass of lawmakers and
theorists. This trend has led to the absurdity of radical
exculpatory theories that further confuse, blur, and reject even
many of the post-codification understandings of justification and
excuse.
Assuming these predicate assumptions have been
sufficiently established, the question becomes whether
contemporary American criminal law ought to be reformed, as
necessary, so as to reflect and consistently apply justification
and excuse theory as it is naturally understood. In addressing
this question, it is necessary to venture beyond the axiomatic
descriptions of justification and excuse theory, which oftentimes
obscure basic disagreements about their normative
underpinnings and contentious issues regarding their practical
[Vol.78:725
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application. It is also necessary, as promised, first to describe in
greater detail the content and philosophical underpinnings of the
naturally understood theories of justification and excuse.
A. Justification Theory
The particular justification defenses found in modern
American jurisdictions reflect the influence of several competing
and sometimes contradictory moral theories. 48 These theories
have, over time, gained varying degrees of acceptance in the
Western legal tradition. As has been shown, the early common
law and precursor legal systems often reflected in a so-called
"public benefit" rationale for justification. 549 Under the "public
benefit" theory, homicides 550 and other putative crimes could
most readily be justified on the basis that they benefited society
generally, as opposed to the actor himself.551 Thus, justifying
circumstances were generally limited to cases involving certain
public officials-such as police officers, wardens, or private
persons acting in their stead-when they engaged in otherwise
criminal conduct to advance a valid public purpose. 552 This
restrictive conception of justification was fundamentally
misguided, however, because it failed to recognize that certain
individual rights and interests, such as the right to life or
dignity, are as worthy of protection as such, without regard to
whether the actor has a public status or his actions have a
predominately public benefit. Indeed, the common good can be
protected and enhanced, and thus the "public benefited," only
548 See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.02[A]. In this section, Professor Dressler
provides a concise and useful summary of some of the various theories that underlie
contemporary justification defenses. This summary has been has been most helpful
in structuring this discussion of justification theory.
549 See id. § 17.02[B], wherein Professor Dressler uses this name for the theory.
See generally supra notes 331-40 and accompanying text (discussing the "public
benefit" theory of justification at common law).
550 As the discussion in Section II reflects, the early common law focused its
attention on justification theories largely in the context of homicides as opposed to
lesser crimes.
551 See generally 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 265, at *177-88.
552 This does not mean that a private person could not kill to prevent a heinous
felony; it merely requires that for such a killing to be justified, it must provide a
tangible and significant benefit to society, such as preventing a dangerous criminal
from engaging in later crimes. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.02[B] (discussing 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 265, at *177-88). "Private necessity" provided an excuse,
rather than a justification.
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insofar as important and legitimate individual interests are
protected and enhanced. 553
A second conception of justification held that conduct is
justified provided it "does not result in a socially undesirable
outcome."554  This approach includes the so-called "moral
forfeiture" theory, which "is based on the view that people
possess certain moral rights or interests that society recognizes
through its criminal laws, e.g., the right to life, but which may be
forfeited by the holder of the right" through his misconduct. 555
Consistent with this understanding of justification, an aggressor
or fleeing felon may be justifiably killed because the offender, by
his misconduct, has lost his claim to be respected as a human
being, which includes his right to life.556 This conception of self-
defense in particular, and justification in general, is also
fundamentally flawed for at least two reasons. First, a criminal
does not forfeit his humanity because of misconduct, no matter
how egregious it may be. He may deserve severe punishment,
perhaps even death, but any legitimate exercise of the state's
authority to punish an offender must be accomplished in accord
with his humanity. 557 Second, not even self-defense, as properly
understood, justifies intentionally killing a deadly aggressor,
including a rationale that the aggressor is evil or forfeited his
humanity. Rather, a defensive killing is justified, if at all, only if
the defender acted with the intent of preserving his own life or
defending against some other serious harm, and the death of the
553 The end of society is the good of the community, of the social body. But
if the good of the social body is not understood to be a common good of
human persons, just as the social body itself is a whole of human
persons, this conception also would lead to other errors of the
totalitarian type.... [I]t implies and requires recognition of the
fundamental rights of persons and those of the domestic society in
which the persons are more primitively engaged than in the political
society.... It presupposes the persons and flows back upon them, and,
in this sense, is achieved in them.
JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 40-41 (John J.
Fitzgerald trans., 1947).
554 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.02[C].
555 Id.
556 Id. at § 17.02[C] n.13 ('[The wrongdoer] no longer merits our consideration,
any more than an insect or a stone does."' (quoting Hugo Bedau, The Right to Life,
52 MONIST 550, 570 (1968))).
557 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). Indeed,
some would even argue that a criminal has a right to be justly punished. See
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 485-86 (1968).
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aggressor was an unintended-even if foreseeable-consequence
of using defensive force for this legitimate purpose.558
A third theory, sometimes referred to as the "moral rights"
theory, holds that a person is justified if he acts to "protect a
particular moral interest[, thus] provid[ing] the actor with an
affirmative right to [self-protection]." 559  The theory is correct
insofar as it recognizes that an actor can be justified in
vindicating certain interests without regard to whether doing so
primarily benefits society ("public benefit" theory), and without
recourse to dehumanizing the offender ("moral forfeiture"
theory). But an untempered interpretation of this theory goes
too far, as it suggests that an actor can do anything that is
necessary to protect his legitimate interests from being
compromised by a wrongdoer, i.e., right justifies might.560 The
"moral rights" theory, in its unlimited form,5 61 thus exalts
individual rights at the expense of the common good, by granting
a victim license to defend and avenge his private rights or
interests vis-A-vis an offender, without regard to the offender's
legitimate interests or the best interests of society in general.
558 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of Double
Effect, 90 ETHICS 527 (1980) (discussing of the principle of double effect); William
Marshner, Aquinas on the Evaluation of Human Actions, 59 THOMIST 347 (1995).
The only exception to the principle that a person may not intentionally kill another
is when an individual acts as a representative of the state's legitimate authority,
e.g., during time of war and when inflicting capital punishment.
Since the care of the commonwealth is committed to those in authority
they are the ones to watch over the public affairs of the city, kingdom or
province in their jurisdiction. And just as they use the sword in lawful
defense against domestic disturbance when they punish criminals, as Paul
says, "He beareth not the sword in vain for He is God's minister, an avenger
to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, so they lawfully use the sword of a
war to protect the commonweal from foreign attacks.
35 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 19, at 83 (2a2ae. 40,1).
559 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.02[D].
560 See id. (citing George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic
Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL L. REv. 367, 381
(1973)).
561 See id. n.16 ("[No 'man shall [ever] give way to a thief, etc., neither shall he
forfeit anything"') (quoting COKE, supra note 268, at *55). Coke's statement, taken
in context, concerns the duty to retreat from an offered "robbery or murder"; in
these cases, unlike common assaults, one has no duty to retreat but may stand his
ground and use deadly force to prevent the attack. COKE, supra note 268, at *55.
The quoted language does not necessarily signify that Coke believed the use of
deadly force was justified to prevent any theft, even misdemeanor larceny. Robbery,
like other serious crimes, was "a felony without benefit of clergy," and thus it was
normally subject to the death penalty. Id. at *67-69.
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The theory ultimately collapses under its own weight, as
unbridled vindication of one person's "rights" inevitably
impinges upon the legitimate rights and interests of others,
including those who bear no fault for the precipitating
infringement. Everyone's right to life is less secure and the
common good is damaged, if every victim can justly kill a
pickpocket or hunt down a trespasser. A proper understanding
of justification assumes that actions and reactions are
proportional, and a "moral rights" theory unconstrained by the
common good and notions of commensurability fails to fully
account for this.
The correct understanding of justification is reflected in the
"superior interest" or "lesser harm" theory of the defense. 562 This
theory weighs the benefits and harm to the common good and
the actor's legitimate interests caused by his putatively criminal
conduct, against the benefits and harm that would have been
occasioned if the actor had not acted. The theory thus
comparatively measures action versus inaction using both
qualitative and quantitative criteria. Accordingly, property may
be justly appropriated to save innocent life, because the sanctity
of life is qualitatively superior to property rights. Likewise, one
house might be justifiably destroyed to save a city, because the
property value of one house, however that is to be appropriately
calibrated, is quantitatively insignificant when measured
against that of a city. These examples are not intended to over-
simplify the complexity of drawing such distinctions in the real
world. Nor are they intended to imply that the law must
recognize as justified any act that passes muster using this
method of evaluating competing interests, as extraneous
prudential considerations may counsel otherwise. Rather, these
examples simply illustrate that any principled justification
defense must be premised on the comparative evaluation of the
quality and quantity of benefit/harm that is caused against that
which is avoided.
The "superior interest" or "lesser harm" theory should not,
however, be misconstrued as constituting a purely utilitarian
expression of justification. The theory can certainly be
reconciled with utilitarian principles, but only inasmuch as it is
consistent with the goal of maximizing benefit and minimizing
562 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.02[E].
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harm. "Superior interest" theory, as properly understood,
accomplishes cost-benefit balancing in a way that fully
incorporates objective truth and transcendent norms, in that it
recognizes that some interests are always morally superior to
others. Accordingly, this theory would reject the Model Penal
Code's conclusion that a few innocent lives can be deliberately
sacrificed to save the lives of many,56 3 because such a calculation
fails to recognize that each innocent human life is of
unquantifiable value and deserving of protection.56 4 The theory
563 See supra note 464.
564 John Finnis discusses goods--of which he includes human life-in
connection to consequentialist or utilitarian calculations as follows:
In short, no determinate meaning can be found for the term 'good' that
would allow any commensurating and calculus of good to be made in order
to settle those basic questions of practical reason which we call 'moral'
questions. Hence, as I said, the consequentialist methodological injunction
to maximize net good is senseless, in the way that it is senseless to try to
sum up the quantity of the size of this page, the quantity of the number
six, and the quantity of the mass of this book. Each of these quantities is a
quantity and thus has in common with the others the feature that, of it,
one can sensibly ask 'How much?' Similarly, each of the basic aspects of
human good is a good and thus has in common with the others the feature
that, of it, one can sensibly ask 'Is this something I should rather be
getting/doingbeing?' But the different forms of goods, like the different
kinds of quantities, are objectively incommensurable. One can adopt a
system of weights and measures that will bring the three kinds of quantity
into a relation with each other (there might be six times as many square
inches to this page as there are ounces of weight in this book, or 600 times
as many square millimeters as kilograms, or... [etc.]). But adopting a
system of weights and measures is nothing like carrying out a computation
in terms of the system. Similarly, one can adopt a set of commitments that
will bring the basic values into a relation with each other sufficient to
enable one to choose projects and, in some cases, to undertake a cost-
benefit analysis.., with some prospect of determinate 'best solution.' But
the adoption of a set of commitments, by an individual or a society, is
nothing like carrying out a calculus of commensurable goods, though it
should be controlled by all the rational requirements which we are
discussing in this chapter, and so is far from being blind, arbitrary,
directionless, or indiscriminate.
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 115 (1980). Thus, in the same
way that one cannot correctly say a yard-long stick is more a quantity than a three-
pound brick-both are accurately called quantities-or that uranium is more an
element than calcium-both are equally worthy of the title element-goods, such as
human lives, are also incommensurable and one cannot say one good is more a good
than another-both are simply goods.
Moreover, the cost-benefit calibration of human lives would lead to
conclusions that even most utilitarians would find objectionable. If one innocent life
can be justly sacrificed to save 30,000 people, then presumably 29,999 innocent lives
can be sacrificed to do the same. Likewise, a healthy person could be justly killed so
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does assume, however, that the legitimate law-making
authorities can express differing value judgments consistent
with objective norms. Thus, moral societies may disagree
whether the sparing of an uninhabited museum justifies the
destruction of an uninhabited ballpark to create a firebreak.
B. Excuse Theory
A proper understanding of excuse theory, as with
justification theory, begins with recognizing that the criminal
law ought to stigmatize and punish a person only if he deserves
it. From this it follows that the law may excuse a person from
the consequences of an objectively illegal act only if the person
does not deserve to be stigmatized and punished for performing
it. Punishment in the absence of moral blame is morally
objectionable. 565
This begs the question of what are the appropriate criteria
for assessing moral blame, and thus for excusing misconduct
that is objectively criminal. A review of the three traditional
categories of excuse-involuntariness, lack of sufficient
cognition, and lack of sufficient volition-show that they are all
predicated on the existence of some complete or partial
that his organs could be harvested for transplants to save the lives of several people.
Beyond this, the quantification of human life would almost certainly led to the
necessity of drawing distinctions between persons based on certain preferences-
healthy versus terminally ill, gifted versus retarded, useful versus unproductive,
etc. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, innocent human life is not amenable
to cost-benefit balancing in the same way as other goods.
565 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.03[A] n.17 (quoting Sanford Kadish, Excusing
Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 264 (1987)). This syllogism relating criminal
punishment to moral blame is irreconcilable with the notion that punishment and
excuse from punishment turn primarily on deterrence. The deterrent argument,
proposed by Jeremy Bentham and others, is that punishment in the absence of a
deterrent benefit constitutes a needless infliction pain that must be avoided. See
DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.03[B] & n,21 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 160-62 (J. Burns
and H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970)). It follows that if an illegal act cannot be deterred
through punishment, it must therefore be excused. The deterrent theory of excuse,
taken to its logical extreme, would on the one hand allow the punishment of those
who were insane or acted involuntarily, as this might deter those who would
otherwise commit crime and fake these incapacitations. See DRESSLER, supra note
2, § 17.03[B]. Some have also suggested that it might even argue for the abolition of
all excuse defenses. See FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 813-17; HERBERT L. PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 109-111 (1968). On the other hand, it
would, as noted, absolutely prohibit the punishment of grave and deliberate
misconduct if no punishment would deter the misconduct under the circumstances.
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incapacitation of an actor's informed free will. In other words,
all of the venerable bases for excuse are premised on the truism
that moral blame can be legitimately ascribed to an actor only if
he "had the capacity and fair opportunity to function in a
uniquely human way, i.e., freely to choose whether to violate the
moral/legal norms of society."56 6  A person who lacks the
minimally adequate capacity to exercise informed free will does
not deserve to be stigmatized and punished, in the same way
that a misbehaving dog or a malfunctioning machine are
undeserving of moral condemnation. In this sense punishment
is an affirmation of personhood, and the distinguishing
characteristic of personhood is the capacity of an individual as a
rational actor to exercise an informed free will.
The other major conceptions of excuse theory err in either
discounting the criticality of free choice, or in denying the reality
that even good people can inexcusably choose to do evil. For
example, some theorists view excuse through the prism of
determinism, urging that an actor ought to be excused if his
misconduct was caused by factors beyond his control.567
Causation is of course relevant to excuse, inasmuch as every act,
excusable or not, is traceable in some manner to certain causes
or set of causes. But external variables and forces that burden
free will are not invariably excusing, as these factors are
sometimes of an insufficient magnitude to undermine an
informed free will. Put another way, causation is a necessary
but insufficient basis for excuse. Insanity or duress may cause a
man to steal, and this would be excusing. Anger or
inconvenience may cause a man to steal, but this would not be
excusing. The "causation theory" confuses excuse with
explanation, and it could result in explaining away evil conduct
that is freely chosen.
Other excuse theorists focus on the quality of the person
himself, reasoning that punishment is merited for misconduct
only if it is a product of an actor's bad character. 568 As a
corollary, if a person of good character is constrained to perform
a bad act-that is, to act "out of character"-then he is
566 Joshua Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New
Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 701 (1988).
567 See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.03[C] (citing Michael S. Moore, Causation
and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1101-12 (1985)).
568 See FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 800-01.
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undeserving of punishment. From this it follows that "excuses
should be recognized in the law in those circumstances in which
bad character cannot be inferred from the offender's wrongful
conduct."569 The theory is predicated in part on the presumption,
which is correct as far as it goes, that the quality of a person's
character generally may be inferred from the nature of his
actions. Accordingly, the moral character theorists argue that
the availability of an excuse defense ought to turn upon whether
an adequate reason can be found for concluding, with sufficient
confidence, that the person acted contrary to his inner self, i.e.,
that even a person of good character, in the same circumstances,
would have performed the same bad act.
A character-based rationale for excuse raises a threshold
issue of whether courts are willing or even capable of
determining a person's character with sufficient precision to
make the required determinations. But even leaving this aside,
the "character theory" is fundamentally flawed in the manner in
which it equates character and conduct. A reality of the human
condition is that good people do bad things for reasons that are
not excusing. Life experience tells us that most people of good
character do, from time to time, violate minor laws and
ordinances, e.g., speeding, gambling, etc. On occasion, people of
generally good character have moral lapses and commit serious
crimes, i.e., they may murder because of revenge or jealousy,
steal because of avarice or sloth, and so on. Sometimes the
motivating forces are more benign and even understandable, but
are not excusing, as when a person communicates a threat or
strikes out at another in a moment of despair or frustration.
Although people of generally good character who commit bad
acts might be entitled to excuse, they are not automatically
entitled to excuse because they are of good character.57 0
Otherwise virtuous people sometimes do inexcusably evil deeds,
and when they do they deserve to be punished.
A proponent of character-based excuse theory might respond
that the preceding criticism is off target because it
miscomprehends the meaning of "good character." This
proponent might argue that the character theory does account
for the fact that people of generally good character can have
569 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.03[D].
570 Conversely, sometimes people of bad character ought to be excused, such as
when a career thief shoplifts in order to save the life of his child.
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character flaws or lapses, and any act attributable to a character
defect is not to be excused merely because the person committing
the act is usually virtuous. Such a retort would undermine the
basic premise of the character theory, however, because treating
character as such an indeterminate and fluid concept renders
the notion of good character practically meaningless as a basis
for excuse. In other words, if general good character includes
specific manifestations of bad character, then good character
becomes essentially irrelevant as a basis for distinguishing
between excusable and inexcusable conduct. The focus for
excuse must then necessarily shift to other factors, such as the
cause of the misconduct and the relationship between that cause
and the actor's free will.
Some theorists propose a more deterministic variant of the
character theory, 571 which is ultimately misguided for the same
basic reasons as "causation theory." These theorists argue that a
person is not necessarily responsible for aspects of his character
that causes him to do evil because character can be greatly
influenced by environmental and other forces beyond a person's
control. They continue that when a person acts in conformity
with a malformed character derived from such forces,
punishment is not deserved even if the actions were freely
chosen. This view assumes a sort of inevitability of action that
underestimates the capacity and significance of free will. It first
discounts that a person may have freely chosen to expose himself
to harmful external forces. More importantly, it ignores that a
person can retain the capacity to exercise free will and choose
not to do evil, even when this might be contrary to his
enculturation. People from disadvantaged environments can
and do choose to obey the law, and people from privileged
environments can and do choose to commit crimes. Environment
may shape character and help explain evil conduct, and it can
even mitigate or extenuate it, but environment alone is
insufficient to compel the conclusion that misconduct ought to be
excused, except in those extraordinary situations where
571 See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the
Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511,
1524-25 (1992); Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance
of Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 59 (1990).
See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 17.03[C] (discussing the Arenella articles
and the deterministic variant of the character theory of excuse).
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environmental influences are so profound that they actually
incapacitate free will.
As the above discussion suggests, excuse is intrinsically
more subjective, imprecise and variable than justification.
Excuse is necessarily more subjective because it always focuses
on the particular actor, whereas justification generally does not.
With only a few caveats,572 an intentional act is either justified
or unjustified irrespective of the actor's motives, character or
capacity. Because these actor-specific considerations are largely
irrelevant to justification, a judgment can be rendered consistent
with justification theory without the need for a case-specific
resolution of the philosophical and practical problems associated
with determining whether a person's will was sufficiently
informed and freely exercised. Excuse, in contrast, implicates a
wide range of variables relating to the actor, which must be
addressed and resolved in order to render a judgment on
whether he ought to be exculpated on this basis.
Excuse is also far more imprecise than is justification
because free will, the sine qua non of excuse, is not susceptible to
empirical measurement and, in some sense, can never be
determined with the same type of objective confidence as can
justification. Direct evidence of free will may of course be
presented, for example, through the testimony of the defendant,
but this is pertinent to excuse only insofar as the testimony is
judged to be credible and reliable. Determinations as to witness
credibility are inherently imprecise judgments based as much on
intuition, inference, demeanor, and a multitude of other
unquantifiable factors, as they are upon ascertainable and
objective facts. Free will also can be inferred from
circumstantial evidence or addressed by expert testimony, but,
depending on the particulars of the case, this would at most
merely influence a fact-finder's level of confidence concerning an
inherently imprecise judgment. The practical difficulties
associated with determining excuse are further compounded by
the reasonable doubt requirement, which essentially requires the
finder of fact to determine an abstraction by an abstract
standard. 573 This is not to suggest that free will is so innately
572 These include whether the actor was culpable in causing the justifying
circumstances, and whether his motive or intent was evil. The caveats are discussed
infra in Section V.D.
573 See generally 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 5 (discussing the proving and
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elusive as to preclude rendering a sustainable verdict with
regard to excuse. The point here is that a judgment about
whether an actor ought to be excused, which in turn must be
based on a determination of whether the actor had a sufficient
capacity to exercise free will, is different in kind than a judgment
concerning whether an actor ought to be justified.
Justification, on the other hand, can be evaluated more
concretely than can excuse. Although the fact-finder making a
justification determination is likewise required to apply the
reasonable doubt standard, the subject matter upon which it will
base its determination is far more tangible than in the case of
excuse, i.e., did society realize a net benefit or avoid a net harm
by the defendant's otherwise criminal conduct? Such a
determination can undeniably be confounding in its complexity;
e.g., which would be judged as being more valuable in a lesser-
evils calculation: a modest home that provides shelter to dozens
of orphans, or a mansion inhabited by a single millionaire? This
potentially complicated judgment, however, is susceptible to
some degree of empirical ascertainment consistent with
immutable principles and culture-based values, and would not be
made more abstruse by the intangibles inherent in rendering a
judgment about free will as it pertains to excuse.
Justification can also be determined with greater precision
than excuse because it can be more readily evaluated using
quantitatively objective criteria. For instance, innocent life is
always superior to property interests, and so one can never be
justified in killing an innocent person in order to protect a car or
painting. Similarly, the value of innocent life is unquantifiable
and incommensurable, and so the deliberate killing of one
innocent person can never be justified on the basis that it was
done to save many lives. In contrast, the fundamental criterion
for excuse-free will-cannot be evaluated using standards that
incorporate categorical rules having similar clarity.
Moreover, while justification can be determined using an
absolute standard-i.e., an act either benefits society or it does
not 574-- the central focus of an excuse determination-free will-
disproving of criminal law defenses with respect to burdens of persuasion).
574 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 3.02(1)(a). Of course, a
jurisdiction may modify the absolute standard, such as by requiring that the
otherwise criminal act results in a substantially greater benefit or avoids a
substantially greater harm. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-702(1) (West 2003)
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is often measured in shades of gray. Of course, cognition and
volition can sometimes be so disabled as to be nonexistent, such
as when an insane person attacks another believing he is slicing
an apple or sinking a battleship, or violently thrashes about
because of a chemical imbalance or brain defect. But it is far
more likely that the circumstances implicating excuse are not so
stark and instead involve a will that is in some sense free but is
not completely unhindered. Human will, after all, is not
exercised in a vacuum, and forces are almost always at play that
burden free will to greater and lesser degrees. These forces,
however, will be deemed excusing only when they so seriously
encumber an actor's will, typically as measured by an
intermediate threshold established by law, that it is no longer
sufficiently free or informed to merit blame. Thus, the law may
provide that mental illness can excuse misconduct when it
substantially impairs cognition or volition. Similarly, although
people choose to steal for a variety of reasons, typically duress
excuses larceny and greed does not because only the former
involves forces that have such a profound and acceptable effect
on freedom of an actor's will that it becomes, as a matter of law,
insufficiently free to be blameworthy.
The determination and application of intermediate
thresholds for excuse introduces yet another variable into the
excuse equation that does not apply to justification.5 75 Beyond
this, intermediate excusing thresholds are neither normatively
derived nor objectively specified, but they can vary as between
and within jurisdictions. In other words, there is no absolute
minimum amount of incapacitation of free will needed for
excuse. This is not to say, however, that lawmakers may
quixotically lower the bar, as any intermediate exculpatory
threshold must embody a sufficiently grave incapacitation of
cognition or volition to be actually excusing, lest it confuse
("[A]ccording to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and
urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the
injury sought to be prevented by the statue defining the offense in issue."). Although
such a variant of justification can be legitimately required by the law, it is not
required in principle by justification theory.
575 Of course, lawmakers could decide to limit excuse to circumstances where an
actor's cognition or volition was completely incapacitated. Although this might be
prudentially supportable in some times and places, it would seem in the abstract to
be too restrictive a definition of excuse, as it would result in stigmatizing and
punishing some actors who ought to be judged unblameworthy.
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excuse theory with mercy or license. Legitimate authorities in
different jurisdictions may nonetheless establish a variety of
reasonable standards of cognition and volition for a host of
prudential reasons. Different thresholds can even be established
within a single jurisdiction, based on criteria such as the
seriousness or nature of the alleged offense. The only
transcendent moral requirement is that conduct must be excused
if it is performed in the complete absence of free will.
Finally, excuse is more variable than justification in that it
is intertwined with the particulars of a culture in ways that are
irrelevant and even illegitimate with respect to the objective
underpinnings of justification. The protection of human life is
inviolably superior to the protection of property interests, and
thus the deliberate killing of an innocent to safeguard property
would never be justified, regardless of time or place. This is not
to say that justification determinations must completely
disregard the surrounding culture. Appropriating privately
owned water to prevent the destruction of food stores threatened
by fire may be justified in a case of a rainforest society but not
among desert nomads. But this example merely illustrates that,
with regard to justification, the application of transcendent
norms can vary with the circumstances. Objective truth remains
unchanged, for if it changed with the times and circumstances it
would be neither objective nor true.
Although the centrality of free will to excuse theory is
likewise a transcendent norm, its expression and measurement
can be far more culturally dependent. For example, suppose a
vigilante tells a good citizen that unless he kills a notorious drug
dealer, he, the vigilante, will destroy a work of priceless art.
Killing the drug dealer would never be justified in these
circumstances, as innocent life is always superior to property
interests. 576 But if the citizen chooses to kill the drug dealer,
576 The drug dealer would be considered an "innocent" life, for purposes of this
hypothetical, because the killing of him by the good citizen would be unrelated to
any legitimate defensive theory. The drug dealer might not be innocent for purposes
of justification if, for example, he immediately threatened the life of the good citizen
with an involuntary injection of heroin, or the life of the citizen's child by the
distribution of a dangerous drug to him. In these circumstances, self-defense could
conceivably justify the killing of the drug dealer, who would then be acting as
dangerous aggressor, in order to protect the life of an innocent person, where the
killing was unintended if foreseeable consequence of exercising proportional and
necessary defensive force.
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whether he ought to be excused could conceivably turn on a
variety of variables specific to the culture. If the citizen lived in
a society where human life was devalued, drug proliferation was
rampant and destructive, and artistic expression was honored,
then the citizen's free will may have become so misinformed as to
excuse the killing because he actually and understandably did
not know the moral right and wrong under the circumstances. If
the society had instead done a better job of inculcating norms
relating to the value of life, or if illegal drugs were a less serious
concern, then excuse might not be legitimately available. There
is a danger, of course, in drawing such a distinction-by excusing
the killing in the case of an immoral culture, this might reinforce
and even seem to legitimize that society's basic
misunderstanding about the value of human life. But the issue
of whether to allow excuse in this type of case is a prudential
decision committed to lawmakers, as the availability of an
excuse defense is neither morally compelled nor prohibited in
circumstances such as these.
For all of these reasons, excuse and justification are discrete
but complementary defensive theories. Excuse acts as a
normative safety valve, which allows for exculpation based on
just deserts while preserving the integrity of objective and
transcendent truth reflected in justification. Excuse permits the
community to express its judgment through its laws about the
culturally appropriate standards for blameworthiness in a way
that is wholly consistent with transcendent principles. The
outer boundaries of justification, on the other hand, are
definitively circumscribed by certain moral absolutes, which do
not allow contrary expression regardless of popular sentiment or
the pragmatism of the moment. Acting together, these theories
safeguard the normative underpinnings of the law and allow for
its consistent and coherent application in accord with just
deserts. Immutable truth is defended and advanced by the
practical application of truth-affirming procedures.
C. The Importance of Adopting and Applying Principled
Defensive Theories Based on Justification and Excuse
As traditionally and correctly understood, all legitimate
laws, including criminal laws, are derived from and consistent
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with transcendent moral principles and norms.577 This is not to
suggest that the criminal law's proper purpose is to codify
morality, i.e., to describe comprehensively moral behavior and
punish all departures from it. Much of what is deemed immoral
is left unregulated because of countervailing interests involving
individual liberty and freedom, because the conduct is not
sufficiently harmful to society to warrant regulation or
punishment, or because of other prudential reasons. For
example, although lying is immoral, the criminal law stigmatizes
only certain lies that are especially harmful, such as perjury and
false official statements. This traditional understanding of law
and morality also recognizes that some laws, such as traffic
regulations, lack an obvious moral content, 578 and that the body
of law must regulate the mundane as well as the profound.
There is no doubt, however, that a traditional understanding of
the inter-relationship between law and morality recognizes that
the former's very legitimacy depends upon its adherence to and
consistency with transcendent moral norms. The positive law, in
other words, was always properly understood as being a
derivative and selective extension and expression of the moral
law that undergirds it. 579
As has been demonstrated, justification and excuse are
important objective moral concepts with a rich jurisprudential
pedigree. Unlike stop signs and jaywalking ordinances, their
purpose is far more profound than the orderly regulation of
577 According to St. Thomas, laws are just if they are ordered to the common
good, do not exceed the authority of their maker, and equitably distribute the
burdens of the law. 28 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 19, at 131 (Ia2ae. 96,4). If
laws fail to satisfy any of these three prerequisites, they "are outrages rather than
laws," and are to be obeyed in order to avoid greater evil but are not in themselves
binding on the conscience. Id. St. Thomas instructs further that a law commanding
an action contrary to the "divine law" must never be obeyed, and must be refused
even onto death. Id.
578 This is not to suggest that any valid laws, even traffic laws, are devoid of
moral content. For example, although the choice of what side of the road to drive on
is not itself a decision involving moral content, the failure of lawmakers to specify
the authorized sides of the road, just as the failure of drivers to comply with this
determination once it was legitimately made, could be immoral. This is because
declining to institute or failing to obey such regulations could unjustifiably and
inexcusably endanger the lives and safety of drivers and passengers. See id. at 103-
07.
579 See Dressler, supra note 401, at 1169 ("Criminal statutes and rules of
criminal responsibility express, or at least intend to express, the basic moral values
of the community.").
2004]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
human activities. Rather, justification and excuse embody
precepts that are universal and integral to determining criminal
culpability and responsibility. And, as noted above, they are
fundamentally distinct. 580 Although it is possible that an actor
could simultaneously be both justified and excused, 58' he cannot
be legitimately exculpated by combining inadequate justification
and inadequate excuse to create a single and sufficient hybrid
defense.
The distinction between justification and excuse thus
assumes an important prescriptive quality and effect. When the
law says that certain conduct is justified, it grants its
imprimatur and encourages like conduct. It tells all who are
similarly situated that they ought to engage in the same
behavior, as doing so is objectively beneficial. Justified conduct
is not only the legally permitted thing to do; it is the moral and
socially responsible thing to do. On the other hand, when the
law says that certain conduct is excused, it announces that the
conduct harms society and others ought to not freely choose to do
the same. The law communicates that the conduct is wrong,
legally and morally. It also expresses a concomitant judgment
that it would be unjust to hold this particular actor criminally
liable for engaging in the harmful conduct, for reasons that are
unique to the actor and his circumstances. This assertion is a
basic philosophical distinction between justification and excuse
that the law should be compelled to draw, and the moral
implications that flow from this are profound.
Take for example the case of a prisoner, who escapes from
confinement because of objectively intolerable and illegitimate
conditions he is compelled to suffer. If the prisoner is later
charged with unlawful escape, society must decide whether his
conduct is justified, excused, or neither. 58 2 This question would
580 Even many of those who argue against drawing systemic distinctions
between justification and excuse acknowledge that they embody essentially
different rationales at their core. See generally Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1898-
1900 (recognizing the distinction between justification and excuse in the paradigm
or classic circumstances, while arguing against seeking to draw this distinction in
cases at the margin).
58, Such as when an actor builds a firebreak to save a town, pursuant to the
command of another who threatens the actor's child with death unless he does so.
582 See George P. Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a
Justification or an Excuse for Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1355, 1355 (1979); Martin
R. Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape from Prison-A Step
Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 110, 112-13
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be answered most authoritatively through the criminal law, and
this answer can, of course, have great practical and immediate
significance to others who are similarly situated. In the words of
Professor Fletcher, "When the principles of justification are
rendered concrete in particular cases, the result is a precedent
that other people may properly rely upon in similar cases. 58 3
Although the availability of an excuse defense to this escaped
prisoner would be decided more idiosyncratically, this
determination can likewise be instructive and influential for
others in confinement who might contemplate escaping.
Beyond this, the law's expression of justification and excuse
conveys fundamental moral judgments, which apply more
generally than just to the actors themselves and those who are
similarly situated. How the law responds to prisoners who
escape inhuman conditions is a reflection of society's values and
norms regarding the dignity of the human person, the legitimate
reasons for punishing and of specific types of punishment, the
authority of state vis-A-vis the individual, and other issues of
similar weight and magnitude. Because the law should serve as
a moral compass, what it says, or fails to say, about the legality
of this and other disputed conduct conveys normative authority.
This applies to the traditional affirmative defenses, such as self-
defense, defense of others, law enforcement authority, and
duress. It also applies novel and non-traditional bases for
exculpation, such as those discussed in Section IV.
Because justification and excuse embody transcendent and
distinct moral principles and norms that define a culture
through its laws, it is imperative that the positive criminal law
derived from these sources should do likewise. As always, doing
this would contribute to the legitimacy of the positive law and
provide important moral guidance to society. But these benefits
take on added, even critical importance in contemporary
America, where morality is often viewed as being relative and
situational, rather than transcendent and universal.58 4 Indeed,
(1975).
583 FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 810. But see Dressier, supra note 3, at 95-98;
Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1915-16.
584 Judge Posner has expressed the conception of morality as being relative and
situational as follows:
Every society, every subculture within a society, past or present, has had
a moral code, but a code shaped by the exigencies of life in that society or
that subculture rather than by a glimpse of some overarching source of
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given the diversity and dynamism of contemporary American
society and culture, there is little, if anything, that seemingly
commands overwhelming popular acceptance as being an
immutable moral truth. Certain abstractions about freedom,
equality, representation and the like are widely trumpeted as
being genuine American first principles, but even these appear
to lack objective content and substance when they are extracted
from the laws and court decisions designed to define and protect
them. Without an authoritative legal imprimatur, any tangible
expression of moral principle is seen as being merely one of
many competing philosophical or political views, which is
objectively entitled to no more or less respect than the next. One
person's conception of freedom is another's denial of equality,
and so on.
In the normative vacuum of contemporary American culture,
the positive law and public morality have become increasingly
synonymous. The criminal law ought to be popularly understood
as expressing prudential judgments about what is to be
prohibited and, to a lesser extent required, consistent with
underlying truth. It is instead now popularly seen as actually
constituting the underlying truth. Put another way, the law is
not understood as prohibiting behavior because it is wrong; the
behavior is seen as wrong because the law prohibits it.
Perhaps this juxtaposition of law and morality is traceable,
at least in part, to the proliferation of malum prohibitum
offenses. Under such a regime, for example, obscure violations of
environmental and health and safety codes are punished as
quintessential common law felony offenses. 58 5  The failure to
moral obligations. To the extent it is adaptive to those exigencies, the
[moral] code cannot be criticized convincingly by outsiders.
... [W]e would not be entitled to say that we are morally better than
Americans in 1860. .. because we all know that slavery is evil .... [W]e
would [only] be describing our own moral feelings rather than appealing to
an objective order of morality ....
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 19-23
(1999).
585 For example, the potential criminal penalties under 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2000),
for improper disposal of hazardous waste, include up to five-years imprisonment.
See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
the crime to be a strict liability offense, for which ignorance of the nature of the
waste or the need for a permit is not a valid defense). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1540
(2000) (providing for a $25,000 fine and up to six months imprisonment for violating
the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000)); United States v. St. Onge,
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park one's vehicle between the lines in an unoccupied lot can
expose an offender to a less severe but similar punishment to
that meted out for malum in se misdemeanors. 58 6 Alcohol and
cigarettes can be consumed lawfully-beginning at different
ages, in some locations but not others-while marijuana
generally remains illegal. Some animals may be exterminated or
slaughtered, others may be hunted only with a license, and
others are scrupulously protected. Some animals that are raised
for slaughter may not be transported in a "vehicle or vessel for
more than 28 consecutive hours without unloading the animals
for feeding, water, and rest. ' 5 7  These examples are not
cataloged to suggest that malum prohibitum offenses in general,
or any of the offenses cataloged here, are intrinsically
unprincipled or unwarranted. Quite to the contrary, modern
times need modern crimes, and these types of offenses have
become increasingly necessary as American society has grown
more complex, technological, interdependent, and in some ways,
more dangerous. No doubt many-perhaps most or even all-of
these regulatory offenses can be individually supported as being
consistent with genuine normative principles. They nonetheless
collectively contribute to the popular perception that the
criminal law is no more than a piecemeal amalgamation of ad
hoc policy choices, which may be discretely pragmatic but are
systemically incoherent.
Moreover, the process for determining American criminal
law is no longer tethered to transcendent norms. The process is,
as it has always been, animated by a variety of abrasive
influences-self-interest, efficiency, public opinion, and so on.
The problem is that in contemporary America, these forces are
no longer informed by a correct or shared understanding of
676 F.Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988) (holding that defendant need only be shown
to have intentionally discharged a firearm for a conviction; there is no requirement
to show that he intended to shoot a grizzly bear). For a discussion of malum
prohibitum offenses generally, and their effect on the social stigma attached to
criminal violations, see Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a
Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46
EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997).
586 Malum in se offenses prohibit conduct or results that are inherently
immoral. See generally PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 15, at 880.
587 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2000); see also 16 U.S.C. § 742j-1(2000) (criminalizing
airborne hunting). A listing of federal statutes concerning the treatment of animals
can be found in Henry Cohen, Federal Animal Protection Statutes, 1 ANIMAL L. 143
(1995).
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objective truth. Thus, when ideology actually is an animating
force, the resulting laws can appear even more incoherent,
discordant, and Kafkaesque. For example, the law can
constitutionally prohibit the possession of composite
pornographic images of children that are created by cutting and
pasting actual photographs obtained from innocent sources, but
a similar artificial image, if wholly generated by a computer,
enjoys a protected status.588 Even the most basic of criminal
laws, such as those relating to homicide, have repeatedly been
contorted beyond any semblance of coherence by the friction of
moral, philosophical and ideological differences. In California,
for example, murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought," unless the
mother, but not the father, consents to killing of her "fetus" or it
is the product of a lawful abortion.58 9 There are, of course,
several caveats to this, including that a fetus cannot be the
victim of a lesser-included manslaughter, although a "human
being," as defined by California law, can be.590 Perhaps even
more bizarre is the law of South Carolina, which simultaneously
provides that a woman can be convicted of unintentionally
killing her unborn child by using cocaine, although the same
woman could have lawfully obtained an abortion and thereby
intentionally accomplish the same end. 591 Similar examples are
profligate. 592
588 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2000) (providing that illegal child
pornography includes a "visual depiction [that] has been created, adapted, or
modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit
conduct"), with Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002) (holding
unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), which defines "child pornography" as
including a "computer-generated image" that "appears to be of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct").
589 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (Deering 1985). The fundamental incoherence of the
California murder statute has recently received national attention in connection
with the murder investigation involving Scott Peterson. Mr. Peterson is accused of
murdering his wife, Laci Peterson, who was then eight months pregnant with their
unborn child, "Conner Peterson." See Ty Phillips, Double Homicide Charge Likely,
MODESTO BEE, March 23, 2003, available at http://www.modbee.comreports/laci
story/6434593p7379268c.html. Mr. Peterson is eligible for a capital sentence
because the murder of his wife and the fetus made the alleged crime a double
homicide under California law. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3). The
killing of Conner would not be illegal, however, if Mrs. Peterson had "solicited,
aided, abetted, or consented to [it]." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b)(3).
590 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (stating murder includes the killing of a
fetus), with id. § 192 (stating manslaughter does not include the killing of a fetus).
591 Compare State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171, 179 (S.C. 2003) (upholding
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The cumulative effect on the culture is insidious. The
criminal law's actual and apparent incoherence reinforces
unprincipled relativism and opportunism. It legitimizes moral
loopholes. It eats away at the very fabric of America and its
the conviction of a pregnant defendant for the statutory crime of homicide by child
abuse for causing the death of her unborn child by using cocaine), with Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a qualified constitutional right to an abortion). A
similar example is presented by TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (2003), which
provides in one breath that the terms 'another,' 'individual,' 'individuals,' and
'another person' include a viable fetus" for purposes of acts prohibited by the state's
criminal code, and in another that "[i]t is the legislative intent that this section
shall in no way affect abortion which is legal in Tennessee." See UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-201 (2003) (providing that the state criminal homicide statute includes unborn
children within the definition of human beings, while excluding abortions).
592 One example involves the right of minors to consent to profoundly grave
matters without parental permission or even parental notification, while requiring
parental permission for certain mundane activities. Compare, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (stating a minor may obtain an
abortion "[i]f neither a parent nor a guardian provides consent, [provided] a court
authorize[s] the performance of an abortion upon a determination that the young
woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent"), and Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1977) (holding that minors have a
constitutional right to contraception without parental consent), with, e.g., CAL. FAM.
CODE §§ 6910, 6911, 6922 (Deering 2004) (providing that minors are incapable of
informed consent to medical and dental procedures), CAL. FAM. CODE § 6925(b)(1)
(Deering 2004) (stating minors are unable to consent to voluntary sterilization), and
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22706(b)(3)-(4) (Deering 2004) (stating minors are not
allowed to use a tanning booth without parental consent). Another example involves
an individual's right to be free from discrimination based on race, while in some
circumstances allowing racial discrimination for racially motivated purposes.
Compare, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)
(quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978))
[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor
subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.
.. "[I]t is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications
based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon
personal rights .... "
with, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2342 (2003) (quoting Bakke, 438
U.S. at 323) ("The ... goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority
students does not transform its program into a quota .... [s]ome attention to
numbers,' without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a
rigid quota."). Finally, consider that some non-traditional sexual activities between
consenting adults enjoy constitutional protection, while others do not. Compare, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2488 (2003) (holding laws prohibiting
homosexual conduct unconstitutional; "[a] law branding one class of persons as
criminal solely based on the State's moral disapproval of that class and the conduct
associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the
Equal Protection Clause"), with, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165
(1878) (holding freedom of religion is no defense to polygamy charge). This does not
purport to be an exhaustive list.
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legal system, rendering one law disconnected from another and
making the body of positive law disembodied from anything
greater than itself.
While all of this argues that the criminal law should be
reformed, it does not suggest that the law actually can be
reformed. The status quo presents two formidable obstacles to
meaningful change. First, the very same reasons that have
caused the proliferation of malum prohibitum offenses make it
unwise if not impossible to eliminate or curtail them, and
thereby constrain criminal codes to crimes that prohibit conduct
that is intrinsically evil. To reiterate, modern society needs
modern crimes, and behavior that is not inherently evil
sometimes needs to be regulated, and misbehavior stigmatized
and punished. Given the attributes of contemporary American
society discussed above, today's lawmakers would fail in their
obligation to protect individuals and foster the common good
were they to categorically reject all malum prohibitum crimes.
But the recognition and proliferation of malum prohibitum
offenses does not support the idea of creating corollary malum
prohibitum criminal defenses based on ad hoc and result-
oriented theories of exculpation. To the contrary, defensive
theories premised on justification, and to a lesser extent excuse,
are not expressions of cultural relativism and case-specific
pragmatism. These defenses are, at their core, universal and
transcendent. They are, like malum in se crimes, such as
murder, rape, and robbery, naturally understood regardless of
time and place. Although history has shown that these defenses
have not always been uniformly defined and applied, this does
not make them any less universal. The multiformity can be
explained in part by an evolving and richer understanding and
application of the underlying theory and doctrine. It can also be
attributed, in part, to culture-specific tailoring that is often
pragmatically motivated but may nonetheless be fully consonant
with principle. Consistent with the Western legal tradition,
however, there is no reason for believing that the vicissitudes of
time have rendered contemporary American jurisprudence
incapable of recognizing and applying the normatively based and
naturally understood conceptions of justification and excuse,
albeit tailored to the prudential needs of contemporary American
culture, as allowable and necessary.
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The second obstacle relates to the lawmaking process itself.
It presents a dilemma that may be summarized thusly: the law
needs to be reformed so that it coherently reflects transcendent
and immutable norms, but the same contemporary belief
systems and processes that have created this need seem
singularly unsuited for and even hostile to implementing such
reforms. There is much truth in this. For example, those on the
opposite sides of issues such as virtual child pornography593 and
the right to abortion 594 are unable to coalesce around a particular
set of laws or legal theories precisely because their
disagreements are important, and because they extend beyond
the tangible to the abstract. In other words, the scope of the
debate in Ashcroft and Roe v. Wade is not limited to ends, i.e.,
whether certain images can be disseminated or abortions can
occur, or even to the means to those ends. It also encompasses
the morality, philosophy, and ideology that undergird the
positive law that produces desired ends and specifies certain
means.
But the same fundamental antipathy does not exist, at least
not as intensely, with respect to disagreements about
justification and excuse theory. Indeed, much of the recent
commentary about these types of criminal defenses, stripped to
the basics, seems far more concerned about results than reasons.
In fact, to the extent that debate is utilitarian in nature, the
results and the reasons are essentially the same. This suggests
that reforming contemporary positive law with respect to
criminal defenses, so that it reflects a correct understanding of
justification and excuse, is not nearly as formidable as this might
at first seem. With regard to ends, a principled application of
excuse could achieve much of what is desired by those who
advocate incorrect conceptions of justification. In other cases,
the positive law can be rewritten so that a correct application of
failure of proof or offense modification defenses can be used to
achieve the same results as a flawed application of justification
or excuse. To the extent that justification and excuse are
misused to incorporate irrelevant extenuation and mitigation,
this end can be satisfied by modifying maximum and minimum
punishments or sentencing guideline regimes. Other practical
593 See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 239.
594 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
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solutions are available to address practical, result-oriented
concerns.
It follows, therefore, that a tipping point might be reached in
support of reforming the criminal law to reflect principled and
coherent defensive theories of justification and excuse as urged
in this article, provided that most lawmakers can be satisfied
with the tangible results produced by these reforms, which
should be the case. Of course, such practical considerations do
not provide the strongest reasons in support of such reforms-
they ought to be adopted because they are objectively correct and
would benefit society generally. Nor is the argument here
intended to suggest that basic ideological differences concerning
justification and excuse would thereby evaporate if the
recommended reforms were broadly accepted; legal theorists will
continue to debate and disagree about these theories, based on
genuinely and passionately held beliefs, regardless of what
lawmakers actually do. Rather, this proposal merely recognizes
that the lawmaking process might be susceptible to engagement
for the purpose of implementing objectively correct and
practically beneficial theories of justification and excuse, because
most of those involved in process might be persuaded that these
reforms would benefit the law and society generally, while
usually achieving the desired results in individual cases.
D. Some Problematic Applications of Justification and Excuse
Theory
Even assuming contemporary American criminal law can be
reformed consistent with conceptions of justification and excuse
as criminal defense theories that are principled, distinct, and
universal, questions will nonetheless arise concerning the
precise parameters of such defenses, and how they are to be
applied to certain problematic situations. Some of these are
discussed next.
1. Objectivity and Subjectivity With Respect to Justification
Assume an actor is strolling down a city street when he
comes upon a confrontation between two persons. The actor sees
a petite young woman resisting a hulking man's attempt to pin
her to the ground. Everything that the actor observes and all of
his life experience cause him to believe-honestly and
reasonably-that unless he immediately comes to the woman's
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aid and restrains her attacker, she will be violently assaulted
and mugged, or worse. Our heroic actor intervenes by striking
and grabbing the assailant, thereby allowing the woman to
escape to safety. Unbeknownst to the actor, the apparent
assailant is an undercover police officer who was trying to
subdue an armed and dangerous criminal. Can this well-
meaning actor successfully defend against a later charge of
assault upon a police officer, on the basis that his conduct was
justified by his subjectively reasonable attempt to protect the life
of an innocent person?
The answer depends on whether the jurisdiction recognizes
an objective or subjective form of the justification defense of
"defense of another." The "prevailing rule,"595 and the approach
used by the Model Penal Code,596 holds that the actor would be
justified in his use of force to protect this apparent mugging
victim, provided his mistake was reasonable and the force he
used was proportional and necessary. The majority rule reflects
a subjective approach to justification, at least insofar as the
actor's reasonable beliefs, rather than objective reality, are
determinative of whether his use of force was proper. The
minority rule-sometimes referred to as the "alter ego" rule-
provides that an actor's right to defend a third-party is
coextensive with the third-party's right to defend himself.597 The
minority rule embodies an objective approach to justification, as
it measures the propriety of an act against objective reality. The
question of whether to evaluate the actor's conduct objectively or
subjectively extends beyond the defense of another and
implicates the justification theory generally.
The above example illustrates one circumstance where the
actor's conduct is subjectively warranted but not objectively
justified. The opposite situation can also arise. Suppose that the
same actor, seeing what he sees and reasonably believing what
he believes, instead reacts by tackling the woman as she breaks
free from the undercover policeman because the actor wants to
help rob the woman and share in the proceeds. Here, the actor's
conduct is objectively justified, as measured by the actual
circumstances, because he used the minimal force necessary to
assist a police officer in preventing the escape of a dangerous
595 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 375, § 10.5.
596 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 3.05(1).
597 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 375, § 10.5(b).
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criminal. But if the actor's conduct is instead evaluated by
reference to his subjective purpose or motive, the result is the
opposite and he would not be justified. The legal authority
pertaining to these types of situations are "rare and about
equally divided."598
The simplicity of these paradigm hypotheticals belies the
scope and breadth of the issues implicated when distinguishing
between objective and subjective justification.599 Obscured by
these hypotheticals are the situations near the margin, such as
when an actor performs a morally permissible act that is not the
best possible choice from among the available alternatives. 600
The hypotheticals likewise fail to address other ambiguities
concerning objectivity, such as where an actor's intent may be
objectively justified, e.g., tackling an escaping criminal, but his
subjective motive is considered reprehensible, e.g., because he
hated the criminal's race or religion.
Returning to the original hypothetical, the Model Penal
Code and the majority rule-a rule that treats justification as a
subjective concept, to be measured by the circumstances as they
appear to a reasonable person-is incorrect for at least two
reasons. First, it is contrary to the proper understanding of
justification, which focuses on the act and not the actor. In order
for the would-be rescuer to be justified, the act itself, when
viewed objectively, must result in a greater aggregate benefit or
less aggregate harm. This is not true in the case of our would-be
rescuer, and thus to call him justified confuses his laudable
motives and subjectively reasonable behavior with the objective
circumstances as they pertain to his motivation and behavior.
Second, treating the would-be rescuer as being justified
presents the irresolvable paradox of two persons both being
justified, who are acting in conflict with each other. Certainly
the undercover policeman in this hypothetical would seem
justified in using reasonable force to defend himself against the
would-be rescuer. But how could he be objectively justified in
resisting, if the very purpose for this resistance was to foil the
objectively justifiable actions of another? Logic dictates that no
598 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 13-14.
599 See generally Greenawalt, supra note 12 (analyzing and rejecting several
rationales for systematically distinguishing between justification and excuse,
illustrating the complexity and problems with trying to draw such distinctions).
600 See id. at 1904.
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more than one of several contradictory actors can ever be
justified, provided their actions are truly in conflict with each
other.601 This is true because, by definition, only one of several
contradictory acts can objectively be the most beneficial or least
harmful. 602
Should the would-be rescuer be excused? Assuming his
actions were subjectively reasonable under the circumstances, he
might be excused based on cognitive impairment, i.e., his actions
were objectively mistaken, but his mistake is premised on his
non-culpable failure to know certain facts. But the would-be
rescuer is not morally entitled to be excused. Lawmakers,
depending on the circumstances, may prudentially adopt the
"alter ego" rule and decline to recognize a subjective excuse
defense, believing that society is benefited by discouraging
misguided rescue attempts because they will, on balance, cause
more harm than they avoid. The "alter ego" excuse defense
might also have the practical benefit of encouraging would-be
rescuers to be especially certain that their attempted rescue is
objectively justified before commencing action. The point is that
the specific parameters of an excuse defense allowed for these
circumstances are matters committed to the prudential
judgment of lawmakers, who can address this in a variety of
ways that are consistent with principled and coherent expression
of excuse theory.
Distinguishing between justification and excuse on the basis
of objectivity has other tangible consequences, such as in relation
to accomplice liability. Because a justified act is itself proper, all
those who participate in such an act ought to be exculpated,
601 The question of conflicting actors can be complex, and it may be that actors
in apparent, but not actual, conflict can both be justified. For example, suppose a
fire threatens a town. Actor A wants to destroy a waterworks to create a firebreak,
while Actor B wants to appropriate water without paying to extinguish the fire.
Both A and B may be justified with respect to their actions directed against the fire.
Now assume the two actors come into conflict with each other, and assume further
that the firebreak is objectively more beneficial than dousing the fire with water. In
that case, A may be justified in resisting and foiling B, while B may be excused, but
not justified, in resisting and foiling A. This is because B, vis-A-vis A, is acting
reasonably but mistakenly.
602 As noted, objective benefit must be measured in the context of time and
place. Thus it may be more beneficial to preserve water in a desert than in a rain
forest, or preserve the waterworks if the technological capacity to replace the plant
is lacking.
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subject to several caveats not relevant here.60 3 For example,60 4
assume an actor helps a friend kill another person. If this friend
is later acquitted because of legitimate self-defense, the actor
likewise ought to be acquitted. This is because the actor has
assisted in accomplishing a socially beneficial act. On the other
hand, if the friend is acquitted because he lacked mental
responsibility, this provides no corresponding basis for
concluding that the actor ought to be absolved. This is because
the actor has assisted in a socially detrimental act; indeed, he
contributed to it by arming an insane person. The basis for the
friend's acquittal is personal to the friend. If the actor is to be
excused, he must have his own reasons supporting this excuse.
2. Justification and Culpability in Causing the Justifying
Circumstances
Assume a mayor of a woodland town goes camping in a
nearby park. When he leaves his campsite to return home, he
negligently fails to extinguish his campfire. The embers later
ignite a forest fire that threatens to destroy his entire village.
The mayor, consistent with his specified emergency authority,
responds by ordering that several evacuated homes be burned
down in order to create a firebreak, which he correctly
determines to be the least harmful alternative that can spare the
town and avoid the loss of life. Assume also that by creating a
firebreak in this manner he would be guilty of aggravated arson,
unless his conduct was justified by an affirmative defense based
on public authority or necessity. Ultimately, the firebreak
succeeds and the town is saved. Should the mayor be found
guilty of aggravated arson, when he responded in an otherwise
justified manner, solely because he was culpable for causing the
triggering conditions that prompted his response?
Jurisdictions have adopted different approaches for
addressing situations where the actor claiming a justification
defense is in some way responsible for creating the triggering
conditions. 60 5 Some jurisdictions disallow justification if there is
603 These include whether the actor was culpable in causing the justifying
circumstances, and whether his motive or intent was evil. See the discussion infra
Part V.D.2.
604 The examples in this paragraph are taken from DRESSLER, supra note 2, §
17.05[D].
605 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 123 (discussing different approaches to
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any causal connection between the actor's prior conduct and the
triggering circumstances, while others are unconcerned about
such causation. Some approaches, such as that proposed by the
Model Penal Code, distinguish between levels of culpability in
causing the triggering conditions. 60 6 Finally, some jurisdictions
will exculpate the actor for his response to the conditions he
caused-such as aggravated arson for deliberately burning down
homes-while nonetheless holding him responsible for his initial,
triggering misconduct-say, for misdemeanor negligent
maintenance of a campfire, assuming the criminal code has such
an offense.
Each of these approaches raises difficult questions about the
practical application of a given justification defense.607  Of
greater importance to the present discussion, however, is what
the differing conceptions suggest about the basic understanding
of justification within a jurisdiction. In some sense, the concern
about an actor's responsibility for triggering conditions simply
presents a time-framing issue pertaining to the scope of the
operative act and the actor's accompanying state of mind, i.e., is
the actus reus of an arson charge against the mayor restricted to
his justifiable decision to burn down the homes, or does it extend
backward in time to include his earlier negligent failure to
extinguish the campfire? Similar time-framing issues relating to
excuse are discussed later and are illustrated by examples of a
drug addict who continues to use illegal drugs and robs to
support his habit, and an epileptic who drives without
medication and causes an accident during a seizure. If a broad
temporal lens is used to evaluate the mayor's conduct-a lens
that considers his initial culpable act as well as his mitigating
actions that follows-then the mayor has "unclean hands" and so
he is not justified, at least not completely, in destroying property
to create of firebreak. If a narrower frame of reference is
employed, then the mayor should be exculpated for creating a
firebreak because it was justified under the circumstances.
Time framing illuminates the underlying issue of the
foreseeability of the subsequent harm, and thus it may serve as a
principled way for distinguishing between the mayor and the
this issue).
606 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 3.02(2).
607 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 123.
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drug addict with respect to justification.608 When the addict first
uses addictive illegal drugs, it should be reasonably foreseeable
to him that he could become drug dependent and consequently
desire to possess and use illegal drugs in the future. It should
also be reasonably foreseeable to the addict that he might be
tempted to engage in future illegal conduct in order to facilitate
his continued drug use, although the certainty of this causal
connection is more attenuated. Actual or constructive
foreseeability is generally required for culpability, and thus the
addict would not be justified, nor properly excused, for that
matter, for his later drug use or for the crimes he committed to
facilitate his habit. In contrast, it seems less likely that an
objectively reasonable mayor on a camping trip would anticipate
his failure to comply with one law relating to safe camping would
later induce him nominally to break another, more serious law
such as aggravated arson.60 9 This conclusion, of course, depends
on the facts, and thus the question of reasonable foreseeability,
and thus perhaps justification, would be quite different if the
mayor camped in a tinderbox forest on a windy day, or if it was
widely known that negligent campers had recently sparked
destructive fires in the same general area.
Causation and foreseeability are germane to the issue of
justification, regardless of whether the defense is based on
consequentialist or deontological principles. Assume that when
the mayor left his campsite the forest was dangerously dry and
the gale-force winds were blowing toward the town. These
circumstances would certainly be relevant to a utilitarian
application of justification, for a person who failed to extinguish
a campfire carefully in such perilous circumstances probably
possessed a more dangerous mens rea, perhaps recklessness or
even a depraved heart, and thus is in greater need of
rehabilitation, specific deterrence and incapacitation. General
deterrence might also be better served by holding the mayor
criminally responsible for all of the damage caused by the fire,
6o As noted, the more fundamental distinction is that the addict has a better
chance of arguing that he was excused rather than justified. See infra notes 632-39,
and accompanying text.
609 This does present an interesting, if somewhat strained, issue relating to
transferred intent. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 375, § 5.2, at 249-51
(discussing circumstances involving a disparity between the intended and actual
result, suggesting that none would apply in these circumstances).
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including that necessitated by creating a firebreak, and imposing
upon him a suitably harsh punishment.
A deontological understanding of justification would likewise
concern itself with causation and foreseeability. As a predicate
matter, retributive justice would not countenance holding an
actor criminally responsible for harm he did not in fact cause.
But beyond this, if retribution is to be exacted based on the
amount of harm actually caused by an actor's misconduct, then it
is fair to take into account all of the harm resulting from a
crime, limited by notions of proximate cause and attenuation.
Accordingly, the damage inflicted by the mayor in creating a
firebreak, which would not have been necessary but for his
earlier carelessness, or worse, could provide an appropriate basis
for his stigmatization and punishment consistent with
retributive principles of punishment.
The facts, of course, can cut both ways. In the case of the
drug addict, society may sensibly decide that it wants both to
deter people from experimenting with addictive drugs and from
later engaging in acts of misconduct connected to drug use. This
rational desire provides a legitimate deterrent basis for
separately punishing an addict's initial drug use and the
subsequent misconduct it occasions. On the other hand, society
would want both to discourage unsafe camping and encourage
reasonable actions needed to mitigate the potential damage
caused by unsafe camping. Accordingly, although harshly
punishing those who irresponsibly maintain campfires might
deter others from engaging in the same misconduct, a utilitarian
would not seek to achieve this result in a manner that
discourages people from mitigating the fire damage resulting
from irresponsible camping, regardless of who started the fire.
From a retributive standpoint, if just deserts are calibrated with
reference to the net harm caused, then the mayor ought to get
credit rather than blame for taking steps to avoid the more
serious harm, even if those steps caused a lesser harm. If just
deserts are calibrated with reference to actor's evil intent, then
the mayor's culpability ought to be limited to irresponsible
camping and its reasonably foreseeability consequences.
On balance, the more principled and sensible approach is to
exculpate the mayor, based on a theory of justification, for the
destruction of property done for the purpose of creating a
firebreak. Justification looks to the act, not the actor, and the
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act of creating a firebreak is beneficial regardless of the origins
of the fire. Moreover, it might even be reasonably argued that
the mayor had a duty to act-apart from his responsibilities as
mayor-precisely because he was responsible for creating the
risk that later served as the justifying circumstance. 610 Finally,
the law generally ought to encourage beneficial intervention, and
the mayor's intentions for creating the firebreak do not recast his
objectively beneficial intervention, based on his good motives,
into a blameworthy foray.
But what if the mayor's intent and motive were less pure?
Suppose the mayor decided to set a fire in the woods so that he
would have a defensible reason for destroying the home of a
political rival? In this situation, the creation of a firebreak
remains justified in the abstract, but the person deciding to do
the act intentionally created the justifying circumstances with
an evil motive and intent. In some sense this situation re-
presents the issue discussed earlier concerning whether an
objective or subjective conception of justification is favored, and
how those terms ought to be defined and applied when an actor's
intent and motive are discordant. But there is even more
involved here, as making the firebreak was part of a culpable
course of conduct, which was accompanied by a culpable mens
rea. Accordingly, making a firebreak, as to this actor in these
circumstances, would not be justified. The stigmatization and
punishment of this mayor would also be supported by prudential
considerations, such as deterrence, denunciation and
rehabilitation. Exculpating this mayor for this act based on
justification would be akin to exculpating an actor who kidnaps
his sister-in-law because he is lonely, when the source of his
loneliness is the recent death of his brother, whom he had
murdered.
3. Public Authority and Private Balancing With Respect to
Justification
Justification theory raises important questions about the
extent to which private balancing is permitted by public
authority. As noted, every jurisdiction has recognized a discrete
set of enumerated justification defenses, either by common law
610 See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 9.07[A][2][c] [i] (discussing the omissions in
connection with creation of a risk).
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or, more typically, by statute. For these defenses, private
balancing is confined to the specified parameters of the defense
as the legislature or the courts have authoritatively defined
them. Thus, a defendant claiming self-defense must satisfy all of
the particular requirements of his jurisdiction's enumerated
defense of self-defense in order to claim that his conduct was
justified on that basis. Assume the law in a jurisdiction
provides, for example, that a person may not use deadly force
against an aggressor if he "knows that he can avoid the necessity
of using such force with complete safety by retreating."611 A
defendant subject to this law is not at liberty to conclude that
availing oneself of the opportunity of making a safe retreat, as a
general requirement, is unnecessary, unwise or disproportional.
Rather, any claimed justification for exercising self-defense
without retreating must instead be evaluated on the basis of
whether the defendant knew-or perhaps reasonably should
have known, if a subjective approach to justification is used-
that he could have avoided using deadly force because of the
availability of a safe retreat.
The issue of private balancing is more complicated in the
case of a residual justification defense, typically referred to as
the defense of "necessity." As explained earlier, general defenses
are interposed notwithstanding the prosecution's ability to
establish all the elements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It
has been suggested by some that in a positive law system,
lawmakers must enumerate in their criminal code all the
recognized general defenses, just as they are required to
enumerate by statute all criminal offenses. 612 Accordingly, if the
defendant's guilt has been proven and none of the specified
general defenses apply, the argument is that the legislature has
thereby determined that the defendant cannot avoid conviction
on the basis of some unspecified residual defense. In other
words, lawmakers only have a voice through the statutory
language of the positive law, and so anything they say
611 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 3.04(2)(b).
612 E.g., id. § 1.05(1) ("No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or
violation under this Code or another statute of this State."). Several states
nonetheless continue to recognize common-law offenses through the operation of so-
called "reception" statutes. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 3.02[A]. "In effect, such a
statute 'receives' the common-law offenses in place at the time of the statute's
enactment; these crimes become an unwritten part of the state's criminal law, and
are defined as they existed at the time of their reception." Id.
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authoritatively with this voice must be reflected with a high
degree of specificity in the text of the statutes. It follows from
this that conduct based on ad hoc private balancing, which is
contrary to the letter of the law, has been necessarily foreclosed.
In other words, by defining certain conduct as a crime generally
without providing a specific statutory exception based on
justification, the legislatu:e has determined a fortiori that the
conduct is always unjustified. 613
This argument goes too far. It is of course true that in
deciding whether certain conduct is justified, an authoritative
determination by the state, expressed through its criminal
statutes, must trump individual balancing that conflicts with
it.614 In a representative government, this balancing is
performed by the legislature for everyone and not by each
individual for himself. But to acknowledge the state's authority
to make law does not presuppose that the state has anticipated
in its criminal code all the situations a person might potentially
confront that implicate justification theory. Quite to the
contrary, it is highly doubtful that lawmakers, even if they
wanted to, could anticipate and address in a criminal code all of
the exceptional circumstances that could justify violating every
law.6 15
Assume a jurisdiction's law of criminal trespass is written in
broad terms, to proscribe the "wrongful entry of another's real
property that is clearly marked against trespass by signs or
fences." Assume further that an actor decides to ignore
sufficient posting and climb a chain-link fence in order to save a
young child who is in imminent mortal danger. Is the actor's
conduct justified? An unforgivably strict construction of the
trespass statute, prohibiting the actor's conduct notwithstanding
the obviously justifying circumstances that prompted it, would
613 Compare United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483,
490 (2001) ("[lit is an open question whether federal courts ever have authority to
recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute."), with United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412-13 (1980) (accepting, seemingly, that there is a residual
necessity defense in federal law, even in the absence of express statutory
authorization).
614 "In the operation of the proportionality balance, no jurisdiction delegates to
the individual actor the right to rely upon his own assessment of the harm avoided
and the harm inflicted." 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 124(d)(1).
615 2 STEPHEN, supra note 262, at 109-10 ("[I]t is just possible to imagine cases
in which the expediency of breaking the law is so overwhelmingly great that people
may be justified in breaking it, but these cases cannot be defined beforehand.").
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be nonsensical. Any reasonable and moral lawmaker involved in
drafting of the trespass statute would not have intended to
stigmatize and punish this Good Samaritan. Indeed, if
lawmakers knew that the trespass law they were drafting might
be given such a penurious interpretation, they likely would have
included an explicit rescue-exception provision in the statute
itself.
Absent such foreknowledge, a lawmaker might conclude
that, as a matter of draftsmanship, it would be imprudent to try
to anticipate and include a reference to every situation where a
criminal trespass might be justified for at least two reasons.
First, such a statute, not to mention the criminal code in its
entirety, would soon become overly cumbersome and unwieldy.
Second, incorporating a list of justifiable exceptions might
suggest that any omission from the list was deliberate and could
not provide the basis for a justification defense. Although the
lawmakers could include a savings clause in an attempt to
address any unanticipated situations not included in the textual
list, this would merely re-present the original issue of legislative
intent, albeit in a somewhat more constrained form.
There are other reasons, beyond a scribner's predisposition
for drafting elegance, which argue against creating turgid
criminal statutes that incorporate a laundry list of justifying
exceptions. A crime is "an expression of a community's moral
outage, directed at the criminal actor"616 because of his act. To
facilitate this first principle, criminal statutes, to the extent
reasonably possible, ought to embody understandable and
declarative statements of what is prohibited. This preference for
simplicity is supported by the common-law description of the
criminal law as being "definite and knowable."617  The
desirability of having a criminal statute communicate an
unconfused expression of moral outrage continues to the present,
even though modern criminal codes include a proliferation of
malum prohibitum offenses that are not always innately
knowable; indeed, it is for these reasons that minimalist
criminal statutes are even more desirable today than in times
past. Streamlined statutes tend to better serve both utilitarian
purposes, such as general deterrence, and normative goals, such
616 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 1.01[A] [1].
617 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 497 (J. Murray ed., 4th ed.
1879).
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as retribution. These benefits are potentially compromised every
time another pinpoint justifying exception is added to the text of
a criminal statute.
But there is a trade-off associated with simple and
straightforward criminal statutes. The more generalized the
description of what is prohibited, the more often this will be
subject to after-the-fact qualification and exceptions. 618 It is a
truism that no criminal code can accurately prescribe the correct
conduct in all situations; it can only provide an approximation of
society's intuitive judgments.619 Allowing a residual justification
defense, especially when none has been provided for expressly in
the criminal code, constitutes nothing more than an affirmation
of this truism.
An alternative approach is to assign substantive meaning to
the statutory term "wrongfully," and then to use this definition
to identify those putative criminal trespasses that ought to be
justified. Unfortunately, this tact would seem to be of little aid
in discerning the legislature's intent with respect to our Good
Samaritan. "Wrongfully," when used as a word of general
criminality in a statute, simply signifies that the conduct
addressed by the statute is contrary to the law. 620 General words
of criminality are thus useful when the conduct addressed by the
statute is not intrinsically evil, such as when a statute proscribes
the "wrongful" appropriation of property 621 or the "unlawful[f'
removing of oneself from official detention. 622 Absent such words
of criminality, statutes such as these would seem to address
facially innocent conduct that is not invariably deserving of
sanction. In these circumstances, general words of criminality
can effectively express the lawmakers' intent that the conduct
specified by the statutory elements can result in a conviction
when it is engaged in without justification or excuse. In the case
of our Good Samaritan, this simply restates and begs the
question just asked.
The preferable approach is for the legislature to enact a
residual defense that expressly establishes the general
618 See Robinson, supra note 401, at 271.
619 See id.
620 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1606 (7th ed. 1999).
621 E.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 921(a) (2000) (emphasis
added).
622 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 242.6 (emphasis added).
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parameters for justification. Lawmakers can thereby specify
with greater clarity the recognized triggering conditions for a
residual justification defense, and assign meaning and content to
the terms "necessary" and "proportional." This approach has
several practical benefits. It recognizes the general availability
of a residual justification defense while confining it to its
intended limits. It provides notice of the authoritative balancing
criteria to be applied by individual actors when they make their
justification calculations. It allows prosecutors to refer to these
criteria when exercising their discretion, and factfinders to apply
these same criteria when deciding guilt. These advantages were
a motivating force behind the inclusion of a choice of evils
defense in the Model Penal Code,623 even if the defense itself is
substantively flawed. About one-half of the states have enacted
their own version of a residual justification defense. 624 But this
leaves about two-dozen state jurisdictions without such a
defense, and thus with less precise guidance for evaluating
whether individual balancing was justified.
Even in the absence of a residual justification defense, the
criminal justice system will still need to evaluate justification
claims made on the basis of individual balancing. This is
because, regardless of the rationale that animates and informs a
particular jurisdiction's idea of what is justified, some putative
criminal behavior inevitably will occur that its citizens-and
presumably its lawmakers, had they decided to specifically
address the matter-would agree is proper under the
circumstances. Any defensible concept of the term "justification"
must have at least enough play in the joints to exculpate a
person who chooses to disobey a no trespassing sign in order to
rescue a baby in imminent mortal danger. Although this
example implicates questions of morality and philosophy, the
conclusion that the baby rescuer was justified in trespassing in
these circumstances need not rest on any particular
philosophical construct or moral theory. Reference to
constitutional rights and limitations, as well as ubiquitous
statutory provisions pertaining to human life and property, can
provide a generic positive-law basis for this conclusion. 625
623 See id. § 3.02, and accompanying commentary.
624 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 24(a).
625 For example, laws criminalizing certain forms of homicide, child abuse, and
neglect, in addition to laws pertaining to abortion and euthanasia, among others,
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Moreover, the common law has been used from time to time to
fill gaps in a criminal code, 626 and "necessity seems clearly to
have standing as a common law defense."627
On other occasions, the positive law will speak explicitly and
declare that certain individual balancing is out of bounds and
can never be justified. For example, lawmakers have decided
that an individual's belief that smuggling laetrile is justified
cannot be squared with the government's explicit banning of its
distribution and use;628 that a citizen's sincere conclusion that a
national defense policy is immoral cannot justify civil
disobedience that unlawfully interferes with the execution of
that policy;629 and that a sailor's fear of the routine dangers of
radiation exposure associated with working in a nuclear
submarine cannot justify his failure to perform duties there.630
In each of these cases, lawmakers have evaluated the relevant
competing interests and reached a prudential conclusion that
legally binds all persons confronting the same circumstances.
An individual actor may sincerely and even rationally disagree
with what the lawmakers have decided, but this disagreement
cannot provide a legally justifiable basis for conduct that is
premised on this balancing but is contrary to the law.
The practical difficulty arises in cases that fall somewhere
between the trespassing baby rescuer and the trespassing war
protestor, where the legislative intent is not so clear. What
about a person who chooses to trespass to search for a missing
baby, whom he reasonably believes might be on the property, or
to help a slightly injured adult? What about a person who
trespasses to recover an inanimate object that is priceless, or of
considerable value, or merely of a nominal but sentimental
reflect society's attitudes toward human life generally and the protection of children
in particular. Constitutionally recognized rights pertaining to privacy, the takings
clause, and search and seizure, as well as statutory limitations on property rights,
such as environmental legislation, reflect society's attitudes toward property in
general.
626 See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 18 F.3d 1166, 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding the common-law "year and a day rule" applied to a federal murder statute,
which is silent about the rule).
627 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 3.02 cmt., at 10.
628 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1978).
629 See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 702-04 (8th Cir. 1972).
630 Milhizer, supra note 454, at 105-06 (discussing United States v. Talty, 17
M.J. 1127 (N.M.C.M.R.), pet. denied, 19 M.J. 237 (C.M.A. 1984)).
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value? What if the property that is trespassed upon has greater
indicia of privacy, such as an office, or the curtilage around a
home, or the home itself? The list of hypotheticals is infinite. In
jurisdictions that do not recognize a residual justification
defense, the resolution of a given case may turn in large part on
the expansiveness of one's approach for discerning the
legislature's intent with respect to criminal statutes. But in any
case, the operative moral and philosophical underpinnings for
justification generally will be crucial to understanding how a
criminal defense based on justification should be applied to any
given circumstances.
4. Excuse and Involuntary Acts
Voluntariness, even in this narrow sense of the term, can
present difficult line-drawing issues in the context of excuse
theory. Many of these involve time framing. Take the example
of a driver who loses control of his car and crashes into a tree
while having an epileptic seizure, and is subsequently charged
with reckless driving. At the moment of the accident, the actor's
faulty operation of the vehicle was clearly involuntary. Viewed
through these narrow temporal lenses, the actor ought to be
excused because his harmful actions were involuntary and,
therefore, not reckless.631 But suppose the actor also knew he
was likely to suffer a seizure unless he was properly medicated,
but that he drove anyway without taking his medication. If the
relevant time frame is broadened to include the decision-making
period immediately before the actor started driving, then his
misconduct is a voluntary product of an informed free will. The
actor's epileptic seizure and resulting bodily movements remain
involuntary, but his choice to operate a vehicle when he knew he
might suffer a seizure probably constitutes criminal
recklessness.
Time framing becomes more complicated in the case of
addiction, and other putative excuses that are premised on
psychological forces, or some combination of psychological and
physiological forces. 632 These forces can render an actor's ability
to resist anywhere from somewhat more difficult to virtually
impossible. Whether conduct resulting from addiction ought to
631 Most jurisdictions define "recklessness" as substantial and unjustifiable risk
taking that is advertent. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994).
632 See generally KADISH, supra note 418, at 104-06.
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be excused as being involuntary can thus be answered, in the
first instance, by the degree to which the actor is capable of
resisting. If an addiction makes resistance to a criminal impulse
merely difficult, rather than impossible, then an addict's failure
to resist ought to not be termed involuntary. Temptation toward
evil is part of the human condition, and most people who do not
suffer from an addiction nonetheless, from time to time, wrestle
with sometimes-powerful urges to violate the law. Indeed, the
deterrent rationale for criminal punishment is based on the
premise that "the greater the temptation to commit a particular
crime and the smaller the chance of detection, the more severe
the [punishment] should be."633
But what if the addiction is so extreme that resistance has
become virtually impossible, or at least so debilitating that a
"person of reasonable firmness... would [be] unable to
resist"?634 First, it is doubtful that an addiction could be so
overwhelming that it produced involuntary, rather than
impaired conduct. 635 If a person of heroic firmness could resist
doing an act, then the act is voluntary even if a person of
reasonable firmness could not resist doing it. Whenever
resistance is possible but deliberately rejected, for whatever
reason and regardless of difficulty, the act of succumbing, i.e.,
failing to resist, is an exercise of free will that is a "product of the
actor's effort or determination." 636  It is, in other words,
voluntary conduct.
Assuming an addict's conduct is actually involuntary, then
another and more complex time-framing issue is presented. In
virtually every imaginable situation, an addict will have
voluntarily consumed narcotics over a period of time before
becoming addicted.637 If the relevant time frame is expanded to
include this period, then the actor's addiction-and indirectly his
behavior that is caused by his addiction-is invariably voluntary.
Just like the epileptic driver, the addict's "problem is almost
always in some sense of his own making. However powerful the
pressures once the person becomes addicted, they were not
633 See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1340 (Sanford H. Kadish, ed. 1983).
634 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 2.09(1).
635 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 455.
636 Id.
637 KADISH, supra note 418, at 105.
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present in the steps along the way."638 Thus, if an appropriately
expansive and retrospective time frame is used for assessing
voluntariness, an addict will rarely if ever be excused on the
basis that his conduct was involuntary. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that he would be unable to claim
excuse based on a sufficient incapacitation of his cognition or
volition, which are discussed next.
5. Excuse and Cognitive Impairment
Excusing cognitive deficiencies are often traceable to some
disabling physical cause or condition. For example, the insanity
defense, as defined by the M'Naghten Test, 639 is concerned with
cognitive deficiency caused by a mental disease or defect. The
excusing condition can be permanent in character, such as
congenital sub-normality, or transitory in nature, such as
immaturity or a concussive injury. In either situation, the
disability must be of a sufficient magnitude so that it impairs an
actor's capacity, to the degree specified by the law, to exercise
informed free will. Although an insane actor can violate the law
and thereby unreasonably harm society, he might be excused
because he suffered from a disability that so severely impaired
his cognition that he should not be blamed.
On other occasions, an actor can behave in a subjectively
reasonable manner and nonetheless violate the law because of a
cognitive deficiency, which is unrelated to any physical
impairment or mental infirmity. In some of these cases an
excuse defense has been disallowed, even though the actor's
conduct is traceable to his failure to know what was, within
reason, unknowable to him.6 40 In other words, an actor may
seemingly behave as any reasonable person would under the
circumstances, and yet he will not be excused. This constitutes
an apparent gap between moral blame and legal fault, which
almost always arises in the context of either strict liability
offenses and mistake of law situations.
Strict liability offenses can impose criminal liability despite
an actor's failure to be aware of circumstances that make his
conduct illegal. Liability is strictly imposed even though a
reasonable person in the actor's situation would be unaware of
638 Id.
639 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 721 (H.L. 1843).
640 KADISH, supra note 418, at 105.
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those circumstances. For example, jurisdictions commonly
provide by statute that a defendant could be convicted of
"statutory rape"-sometimes referred to as carnal knowledge or
by some other name-if he had consensual intercourse with an
underage woman not his wife, even if someone in the defendant's
position would have honestly and reasonably believed that the
woman had attained the age of consent. 641 In such a case, the
defendant would be precluded from arguing that he ought to be
excused because of a cognitive deficiency even if his lack of
knowledge was subjectively reasonable, and his conduct,
presupposing the accuracy of the of circumstances as the
defendant reasonably understood them to be, would have been
legal.
In other situations, an actor may engage in conduct without
knowing that it had been prohibited by the law. It is axiomatic
that ignorance of the law is no excuse, 642 and the rule is applied
with vigor except for a few narrowly drawn circumstances. 643
While the mistake of law is not exculpating in the case of
behavior that it intrinsically evil-such as murder, rape, and
larceny-a defendant's situation seems more sympathetic in
cases involving malum prohibitum or regulatory offenses. 644
This is especially true in contemporary times, where criminal
codes have expanded several-fold to proscribe a vast array of
intuitively innocent conduct in response to the needs of an
641 See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 375, § 17.4(c), at 873-76
(discussing the history of statutory rape in general, and the issue of mistake of fact
as to the female's age in particular).
642 See United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971).
But see Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957) (overturning defendant's
conviction for violating an ordinance requiring convicted felons to register their
presence with police when residing in a city, where the defendant was unaware of
the ordinance). Lambert has been described as a fair-notice case, but the
requirement for fair notice seems contrary to axiom that people are presumed to
know and understand the criminal laws that apply to them. See 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 265, at *27. For a discussion of the potentially narrow application of
Lambert, see DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 13.02[C].
643 These exceptions are usually limited to situations where either the
defendant reasonably relies on an official interpretation of the law that later proves
to be incorrect, see DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 13.02[B][2], or knowledge of the law is
itself an element of the crime, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201-02
(1991). The latter exception functions as a kind of failure of proof defense, and not
as an affirmative excuse defense per se.
644 See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 375, § 1.6(b); PERKINS & BOYCE,
supra note 15, at 1029-30.
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increasingly complex, technologically advanced, and inter-
dependent society.
The arguments in favor of strict liability offenses, and
against recognizing a mistake of law defense for malum
prohibitum offenses, are principally utilitarian and pragmatic.
In the case of strict liability offenses, proponents may well
concede that punishment without mens rea is unmerited, but
they reason that this individual injustice is merely a cost to be
evaluated when calibrating the overall utility of a strict liability
offense. These utilitarians conclude that in some circumstances,
especially when the punishment is light,6 45 this cost of being
unfair to some persons is outweighed by the countervailing
benefit to all of enhanced deterrence. 646
The utilitarian arguments for strict liability, however, are
irreconcilable with the basic principle that persons ought to be
stigmatized and punished only if they deserve it. The law is
debased when it is used as a means for chastising the blameless
to advance extraneous ends. In most cases, the pragmatic
645 Strict liability attaches most often in the case of "public-welfare offenses,"
which include "minor violations of the liquor laws, the pure food laws, the anti-
narcotics laws, motor vehicle and traffic regulations, sanitary, building and factory
laws and the like." Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
78 (1933).
646 Many have argued that strict liability offenses serve no deterrent purpose.
They contend that criminal liability without mens rea
is inefficacious because conduct unaccompanied by an awareness of the
factors making it criminal does not mark the actor as one who needs to be
subjected to punishment in order to deter him or others from behaving
similarly in the future, nor does it single him out as a socially dangerous
individual who needs to be incapacitated or reformed.
Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109
(1962). Proponents respond that strict liability offenses can enhance deterrence:
[I]t might be the case that a person engaged in a certain kind of activity
would be more careful precisely because he knew that this kind of activity
was governed by a strict liability statute. It is at least plausible to suppose
that the knowledge that certain criminal sanctions will be imposed if
certain consequences ensue might induce a person to engage in that
activity with much greater caution than would be the case if some lesser
standard prevailed.
In the second place ... it seems reasonable to believe that the presence of
strict liability offenses might have the added effect of keeping a relatively
large class of persons from engaging is certain kinds of activity. A person
who did not regard himself as capable of conducting an enterprise in such
a way so as not to produce the deleterious consequences proscribed by the
statute might well refuse to engage in that activity at all.
Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731,
736-37 (1960) (footnote omitted).
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interests that strict liability offenses seek to advance can be
accomplished through alternative mechanisms, such as by
increasing the punishment for negligent misconduct, or by
retaining strict liability but allowing for an affirmative defense
predicated on a lack of culpability. But even granting that in
some circumstances these alternatives would prove to be
ineffective, the fact remains that the state would misuse its
authority if it created and enforced criminal laws that were
designed to punish the blameless in order to promote some
desired policy. Quite to the contrary, the state is morally obliged
to inform society about the standards of conduct reflected in the
criminal law, so that misconduct can be avoided and the truly
blameworthy can be punished.
At first blush, the general refusal to recognize a mistake of
law defense, at least where the law is seemingly not reasonably
knowable, likewise appears to be "frankly pragmatic and
utilitarian."647 As Chief Justice Holmes characterized it:
The true explanation of the rule [that ignorance of the law is no
excuse] is the same as that which accounts for the law's
indifference to a man's particular temperament, faculties, and
so forth. Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general
good.... It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which
the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the
law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage
ignorance .... and justice to the individual is rightly
outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the
scales. 648
Assuming Holmes' utilitarian argument is correct, an
undeniable paradox seems obvious. Some irrational actors, who
engage in seemingly unreasonable and objectively unlawful
conduct because of a cognitive deficiency, will be excused. Other
rational actors, who engage in seemingly reasonable but
647 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 13.01[B] [4], at 167 (quoting People v. Marrero, 69
N.Y.2d 382, 393, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1074, 515 N.Y.S.2d 212, 218 (1987)).
648 HOLMES, supra note 476, at 48. A related and pragmatic justification for the
rule is that a broadly applied mistake of law defense would encourage frauds upon
the court by defendants who assert false and unverifiable (and thus perhaps
irrefutable) claims of mistake. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 13.01[B][3], at 167.
Professor Kadish has described the response to these arguments as being "well
known and well taken." KADISH, supra note 418, at 91. These include shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant, imposing criminal liability based upon negligence
for failing to be aware of the law or the danger, and imposing only civil sanctions.
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objectively unlawful conduct traceable to a cognitive deficiency,
will not be excused.
In the case of mistake of law, the gap between punishment
and blame is more imagined than real. First, there is no gap
with respect to malum in se offenses. Murderers, rapists and
thieves are blameworthy regardless of whether they honestly
believed that their misconduct was legal. Second, many so-called
malum prohibitum offenses involve conduct that is intuitively
infirm, morally or civically, such as opportunistic pricing/price-
gauging and aggressive money lending/usury. In these cases, an
actor cannot avoid moral blame on the basis that he was
unaware that his questionable actions crossed a line established
by the state. There is a certain assumption of risk involved
here-one may be held blameworthy for his miscalculations
about the law when he operates at margins of morality.
But the most sweeping response to Holmes' contention is
based on the mutual obligations of the state and the individual,
which is in some sense derived from a social contract and
operates in conformity with the common good. The criminal law
is public matter, and the legitimate lawmaking authority is
obligated to publish law so that it is made known. Indeed,
failing to make the law known would undermine the utilitarian
goal of general deterrence. Individuals have a reciprocal
obligation to know the law made public, and to conform their
conduct to it. Thereby, an individual who does not know a public
law, in some sense, fails in his responsibilities as a member of
society. He can be held blameworthy for this failure, and for any
misconduct that is attributable to this failure. As a practical
matter, of course, public law is not always reasonably knowable.
This is especially true as society has become more complex and
malum prohibitum laws have proliferated. But a presumption
based on this norm of mutual responsibility between the state
and the individual is not immoral. In circumstances where the
application of the norm seems unjust, alternative mechanisms-
e.g., recognition of a specific mistake of law defense by statute,
prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification, executive pardon,
etc.-are available to ameliorate this injustice.
6. Excuse, Volitional Impairment and Objectivity
The third group of excusing conditions involves impairments
or deficiencies in volition, which concern an actor's ability to
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make unencumbered choices or to meaningfully control his
behavior. Duress is a defense premised on a lack or impairment
of volition caused by external forces, and thus it is one of the few
excuse defenses that have an objective aspect. One of the
venerable limitations of duress, as noted previously, is that an
actor cannot claim the defense for murder even if his misconduct
was consistent with that expected of a reasonable person under
the circumstances. 649 As also noted earlier, the rule can be
criticized on both retributive and utilitarian bases.650
Despite these criticisms, the rule can be defended as a
reasonable bright-line expression of an underlying normative
principle. Recall the earlier discussion of how nonexculpatory
defenses reflect the balancing of competing legitimate interests
expressed via bright-line rules.651 The same might be said for
the categorical rule that duress is no defense to the killing of an
innocent person, and other seemingly arbitrary limitations of
this basis for excuse. 652 The state may have determined that, in
the vast majority of such cases, an actor's capacity to resist
killing would not be so completely overwhelmed as to require,
consistent with the imperative of free will, that he be deemed
morally blameless, especially when the consequences of case-by-
case determinations are balanced against the costs of doing this.
This judgment implicates the distinction between an
encumbered free will and the absence of free will. It would be
immoral for the state to punish an actor who is completely
disabled from exercising free will, i.e., one who acts
involuntarily. But the state can legitimately establish a high or
presumptive threshold for an excusing encumbrance for volition
as this pertains to free will, and it may do so in various ways for
different crimes. Accordingly, while a principled theory of excuse
could permit duress in the case of premeditated murder, it does
not require that the defense be allowed unless the actor's free
will was so overborne that his conduct can be called involuntary.
649 See supra note 481.
650 See supra notes 483-85, and accompanying text.
651 See supra Part III.D.2.
652 See J.W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 748 (1959); 2 ROBINSON, supra
note 13, § 177(g)(1), at 368-69. For example, a common requirement for duress is
that the threat must be imminent and of a certain gravity, yet one can imagine
situations in which a reasonable person would yield to a threat that is more remote
or less severe and engage in a minor infraction. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, §
177(e)(2), (3), at 357-60.
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For the reasons already discussed, such a circumstance is
practically nonexistent.
This leads to a final issue concerning subjectivity and excuse
deserving brief comment. An actor's entitlement to most excuse
defenses is measured using a wholly subjective standard. It is a
nonsequitur to speak in terms of a reasonable but insane person,
for example, because a reasonable person is necessarily sane.
Conversely, an insane actor is an unreasonable person, and in
applying excuse to insanity the law is unconcerned with whether
an otherwise reasonable person would have also been rendered
insane if he suffered from the same disease or defect as this
actor.
But the reasonable person standard does have relevance
with respect to two excuse defenses-duress and mistake.
Objective reasonableness is required for these defenses because
in both cases the actor is a normal person, one who cannot be
distinguished by either a physical or mental defect. Both kinds
of actors must therefore demonstrate that special
circumstances, for which they are not responsible, caused their
conduct and would have induced the same conduct by the
reasonable person.653
This explanation begs the question of how to define the
reasonable person in relation to duress and mistake. A well-
respected definition of a "reasonable person," which is borrowed
from tort law but applies with equal force to the criminal law,
explains that the term
connotes a person whose notions and standards of behaviour
and responsibility correspond with those generally obtained
among ordinary people in our society at the present time, who
seldom allows his emotions to overbear his reason and whose
habits are moderate and whose disposition is equable. He is
not necessarily the same as the average man-a term which
implies an amalgamation of counter-balancing extremes. 654
Accordingly, the reasonable person is an abstraction
grounded in practical reality. He or she is an ordinary person
653 2 ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 177(c)(3), at 354.
654 ROBERT FRANCIS VERE HEUSTON & R.A. BUCKLEY, SALMOND AND HEUSTON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 56 (Sweet & Maxwell, 17th ed. 1977). Although the above-
quoted definition is that of a "reasonable man" rather than a "reasonable person,"
this is of no import as the terms are interchangeable. The term "reasonable man" is
also gender-neutral, in the same way that a woman's basketball team can try to
defend against their opponent by playing a "man-to-man" defense.
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living in contemporary times, who is virtuous but not heroically
so. The reasonable person cannot be divined by statistical
calculation. His or her measure of fortitude, for example, cannot
be derived by quantifying the amount of fortitude possessed by
each person in a jurisdiction, adding this up, and then dividing
by the number of persons.
Although the reasonable person is an objective abstraction,
he or she is not a wholly undifferentiated abstraction. The
reasonable person standard legitimately imports some of the
peculiar characteristics of the particular actor whose conduct is
being evaluated for purposes of excuse. 655 Age and gender have
long been considered in assessing whether an actor behaved as a
reasonable person in a given situation, 656 so that the law may
differentiate between what is reasonable for a woman of thirty
years as compared to a boy of thirteen. The law also sometimes
takes account of other tangible physical characteristics-such as
the actor's size, strength, and health-in making exculpatory
judgments based on excuse. 657  In every case where the
reasonable person standard is relevant, some nexus must be
demonstrated between the subjective characteristic at issue and
the purported excusing condition in order for that characteristic
to be incorporated into that standard.658
On the other hand, the reasonable person standard cannot
be so receptive that it incorporates every subjective
characteristic of an actor, lest it cease to express objective
reasonableness and instead become uniquely biographical. But
where is the line to be drawn? Some subjective characteristics,
655 It is legitimate to consider the subjective characteristics of a reasonable
person in the context of excuse, as defenses based on this theory focus on the actor.
It would be a nonsequitur to do so in the case of justification, however, as an act is
objectively justified, or not, irrespective of the actor's gender, age, or other
characteristics.
-6 See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin, 2 ALL E.R. 168, 175 (H.L.
1978) (finding age and gender relevant in a homicide case when assessing whether a
reasonable person would have been provoked under the circumstances). It is not
always clear, however, whether gender is considered because men and women are
innately different, or because gender acts as a proxy for other characteristics, such
as size and strength.
657 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 2.09 cmt., at 375.
658 For example, the size and strength of an actor, relative to the person making
the threat, could be relevant in assessing whether the actor ought to be excused
because of duress. On the other hand, the actor's size and strength would be of no
relevance in assessing whether he ought to be excused because of insanity or
immaturity. See id.
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such as an actor's voluntary intoxication, are easily excluded
from the reasonable person standard when assessing blame. 65 9
This is because "the voluntary act of impairing one's mental
faculties with intoxicants is a morally blameworthy course of
conduct that renders the actor culpable for the ensuing harm."660
As was noted earlier, if the actor's conduct is time framed to
include the period in which he decides to drink, then he will be
deemed responsible not only for his drunken condition, but also
derivatively for how his intoxication might impair his cognition
or volition with respect to subsequent acts. The reasonable
person does not choose to become intoxicated, and, thus, this
choice cannot excuse the drunken misconduct that follows as a
consequence of intoxication.
But how does the law of excuse deal with subjective
attributes relating to temperament and demeanor, which are
more innate and indelible in character? For example, an actor's
trait for exceptional cowardice may play a determinative role in
explaining the amount of fortitude he demonstrates, or fails to
demonstrate, when faced with a threat.661 If this actor later
claims duress to excuse the misconduct he commits because of
the threat, should his blameworthiness be evaluated on the basis
of a person having reasonable fortitude, or instead with
reference to a reasonable but cowardly person?
The Model Penal Code reaffirms the general rule that
subjective factors relating to temperament are not to be
incorporated into the reasonable person standard. 662 The rule
cannot be based on the premise that the actor is to blame for the
disability, at least not in the same fashion as he is held to be
responsible for his intoxication or addiction. A person does not
choose to be cowardly in quite the same way as he chooses to
drink excessively or first use drugs. Perhaps the line is drawn
between disabilities that impair cognition and disabilities that
impair volition.663 This distinction recognizes that although an
actor can only know what he is capable of knowing, he can be
659 The Model Penal Code, for example, requires that the reasonable person be
sober. Id. at 350-53.
660 DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 24.03[B] [2], at 324.
661 Other character traits are less sympathetic-such as being short-tempered,
intolerant, or brutal--especially when urged as the basis for an excuse defense in a
homicide or assault case.
662 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, § 2.09 cmt., at 375.
663 See KADISH, supra note 418, at 97.
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called upon to exercise a degree of fortitude that most people can
do with reasonable forbearance but he can achieve only with
greater difficulty. This is the difference between explaining
conduct and excusing conduct. When one moves further along
the continuum, past volitional impairment toward complete
volitional deficiency, then the insanity defense may apply. But
the potential availability of an insanity defense to such an actor
probably requires both that the jurisdiction's form of the defense
has a volitional prong, and that the actor's extreme cowardice is
traceable to a mental disease or defect.
So why would society decline to excuse any actor who breaks
the law because of overwhelming fear that he is incapable of
resisting, on the basis that a reasonable person in the actor's
circumstances could resist? The explanation may be as simple
as the belief that a coward deserves to be punished for his
cowardly acts. It may also be a question of practicality and
proof. Assume an actor asserts that he possesses an innate
character trait of cowardice that is so debilitating that he could
not, despite his best efforts, resist a threat that most people
could brush aside. Upon what basis could the fact finder decide,
with any degree of acceptable confidence, that this actor is to be
distinguished from others who, faced with the same situation,
could have resisted but were too afraid to do so? The American
Psychiatric Association has observed, "The line between an
irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no
sharper than between twilight and dusk. ' 64  In most
jurisdictions, the law is apparently unwilling to entrust to
factfinders the task of making this esoteric judgment to a precise
standard of proof, when experts in the field confess that they are
incapable of confidently making the same assessment using a
less rigorous standard of certainty.
7. Justification, Excuse and Lifeboats
So how should justification and excuse theory apply to a
lifeboat case such as Regina v. Dudley and Stephens? First, a
proper application of these principles would draw clear and
principled distinctions between the two defensive theories, being
664 Am. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, POSITION STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 5
(1982), cited in DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 25.04[C] [2] [a], at 349.
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sure to avoid the blending of justification and excuse that
unfortunately is reflected in the Dudley opinion.
Second, it is clear that justification theory cannot be used to
exculpate survival killing and cannibalism. The deliberate
killing of an innocent person, even if done in order to save many
lives, is an objective evil that can never be justified. Each
innocent human life is of unquantifiable and incommensurable
value, and is deserving of protection by the criminal law. It is a
superior interest that is not susceptible to utilitarian
calculations of lives saved versus lives lost. Further, there is no
reasonable application of the doctrine of double effect that would
justify the killing of an innocent person as being an unintended
consequence of seeking sustenance.
Third, an excuse defense that exculpates survival killing and
cannibalism could be morally permitted but is not morally
required. Whether a killing motivated for such reasons ought to
be excused is entrusted to the prudential judgment of the
lawmaking authority, exercised consistent with the principles of
excuse discussed earlier. Consistent with this authority,
lawmakers could decide to allow an excuse defense that focused
on the actor's particular capacities and attributes, measured
either by rational group-based bright lines or idiosyncratically.
Likewise, the availability of an excuse defense may depend on
the circumstances, and the actor's subjective, or perhaps
subjectively reasonable, perception of them.
The sine qua non for excuse, as discussed earlier, is the
incapacitation of an informed free will. Accordingly, if an actor's
capacity to choose to kill is so severely undermined as to be
completely negated, then he is morally entitled to be excused
because he is not blameworthy for his consequential actions.
But even short of a complete abolition of an actor's free will, the
law may legitimately deem a partial incapacitation of the will to
be of a sufficient magnitude for exculpation based on excuse.
This intermediate threshold can be measured with respect to
either cognition or volition.
It is of course possible that the extreme hardships of a
shipwreck and prolonged exposure at sea could completely
destroy an actor's ability to understand his circumstances or
actions. For instance, a shipwrecked sailor could kill a cabin boy
and consume his blood believing that he was butchering and
eating a seal. In such a case, the deranged actor must be
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excused because of his complete inability to exercise free will
based on cognitive incapacitation.
But what if the actor knew exactly what he was doing when
he killed a cabin boy, and he did it consistent with an informal
custom of the sea that permitted killings for these purposes?
Such a custom, or even a positive law legalizing the custom,
could never morally justify the deliberate killing of an innocent
person. Such an act would always violate an objective norm that
transcends law and culture. The existence of a permissive
custom might, however, help provide an excuse for a person who
acts in conformity with it.665 This is because the custom and its
underlying values may have so misinformed an actor as to
objective norms or the positive law that he had an actual and
subjectively reasonable, albeit distorted, belief that actions were
moral and lawful. In other words, an actor's understanding of
right and wrong, and legal and illegal, may become so malformed
or confused by the culture that he should not be blamed and
stigmatized for criminal and immoral conduct that is
attributable to these conventionally accepted but perverse
beliefs.
Volitional incapacitation may also provide an excuse. As
with cognition, an actor's ability to control himself may be
completely undermined, as when one kills in response to a truly
irresistible impulse. In such a case, the actor ought to be
excused because his volitional incapacitation would negate his
ability to exercise free will.
What seems more likely, however, is that a shipwreck
survivor's volition would be increasingly and even
extraordinarily burdened but not completely negated by the
circumstances, i.e., as a survivor grows nearer and nearer to
death by dehydration and exposure, his corresponding ability to
resist killing another in order to survive would invariably, or at
least predictably, become more and more diminished.
Lawmakers can address this reality by establishing an
intermediate, excusing threshold for fortitude short of a complete
absence of volition. The particulars of such line drawing would
6 As just noted, it is possible that a society could enact a law that treated such
killings as lawful. Anything is possible with respect to the positive law. Such a law
would be an immoral law, however, as it would affirmatively permit that which is
objectively evil. In such an extreme situation, the actor would have no need to seek
an exculpatory defense because his conduct would be legal.
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be a function of the law-e.g., statutory language requiring
"substantial" or "extreme" volitional impairment-and the facts,
both with respect to the actor-e.g., his age, physical strength
and emotional stability-and his circumstances-e.g., how long
he has been adrift, how likely it is that he might be rescued.
But just because exculpation can be based on a partial
incapacitation of cognition and volition does not mean that the
state must excuse based on any particular degree of impairment
of these faculties. Quite to the contrary, a society may
legitimately choose through its laws to require more or less
demanding thresholds of awareness and fortitude for excuse, or
even to reject excusing an actor in such circumstances based on
anything other than complete negation of cognition or volition.
This variance can be an expression of fairness, as when an
excuse is allowed consistent with an immoral but pervasive
custom. More generally, it may reflect an incorporation of the
basic purposes for punishment itself, including retribution,
deterrence and denunciation. In any case, lawmakers are
entrusted with the prudential task of determining which
objective wrongs are to be made illegal, and they can draw these
distinctions both through the laws that define crimes and the
defenses that excuse them.
CONCLUSION
Finally, it is useful to consider the future of criminal
defenses if the approach urged in this article is rejected. We can
expect that modern criminal law systems will continue the trend
of abandoning a systematic application of defensive theories
expressing justification and excuse, which are normatively
derived and represent the culmination of a venerable legal
tradition, in favor of ad hoc strategies that achieve desired
results in particular circumstances regardless of overarching
principles. In other words, the law pertaining to exculpatory
defenses will likely continue to drift on the currents and eddies
of competing beliefs and quasi-philosophies, until they crash
upon result-oriented shoals and are churned into jurisprudential
flotsam. The operative question will become whether the
proposed defensive claim supports preferred policy, with such
policy judgments being made on the basis of case-specific costs
and benefits, however these variables might be defined.
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To the extent that these modern criminal defenses are
treated as matters of policy rather than jurisprudence, they are,
like all matters of policy, essentially relative and ephemeral. For
example, whether someone can be justly killed because he
unreasonably threatens the life of another, or because he is in a
persistent vegetative state, or because he is a member of a
particular race, depends on situational variables. It might
depend on whether we want to encourage or discourage private
self-defense. It might depend on whether the seriously ill are
believed to be an unacceptable drain on society's resources. Or,
it might depend on whether members of a particular racial group
are judged to be deserving of favored or disfavored treatment,
because of their race or for any other reason. If anything is a
potentially relevant consideration for policy makers, then
nothing is binding upon them.
Indeed, if exculpatory defenses are viewed as being strictly a
facilitator of public policy, then the same should also be true for
all of the criminal law more generally. Murder and rape, for
example, ought to not be punished because they are innately
evil; rather, if this conduct is to be punished at all, it is only
because it promotes good policy to do so. Likewise, if the only
reason for punishing larceny is that it supports a desired policy
result, then theoretically lawmakers could instead decide that
the failure to steal in certain circumstances could be punished if
this would be pragmatically beneficial. Anything can be
prohibited or allowed if a sufficiently convincing argument can
be made for it.
Most people would, of course, find the portrait just painted
to be both unrealistic and unacceptable. They would believe that
in order to fetter the discretion of policy makers, certain lines,
perhaps even normatively derived lines, would have to be drawn
and respected. But upon what bases should these lines be
specified and applied? With respect to exculpatory defenses,
ought they to be determined by venerable and naturally
understood conceptions of justification and excuse, or instead by
alternative philosophical principles or hybrid amalgamations of
ideology? Ought they be applied systematically and coherently,
or instead on a piecemeal or case-by-case basis? The answers
seem so obvious that one might wonder why the questions even
have to be asked, except that the obvious answers do not
describe the status quo. Quite to the contrary, the contemporary
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jurisprudence of exculpatory defenses has grown increasingly ad
hoc and incoherent, and all of the indicators seem to point in the
same undesirable direction.
So now is the time to make a stand for the systematic
application of rightly principled justification and excuse
defenses. The critical mass of lawmakers and practitioners has
not yet become so ideologically fractured or misguided as to
reject a correct conception of these defensive theories on
philosophical grounds. Further, the pragmatic trial results that
reasonable people seek have not become so exotic as to compel
the use of illegitimate means to reach those ends. The clear,
consistent, and principled approach urged in this article can still
be adopted.
And we should commit to begin now. All who participate in
the criminal justice system must understand and respect our
jurisprudential inheritance and its essential philosophical bases.
Lawmakers should seek to achieve good policy by prudentially
expressing immutable conceptions of justification and excuse in
their criminal codes. Judges ought to interpret exculpatory
defenses consistent with this over-arching legislative intent.
Prosecutors should exercise their discretion, and defense counsel
should provide their advice and representation, with reference to
these normatively based defensive theories. And jurors,
notwithstanding an occasional need to nullify, ought to decide
whether to convict or acquit using these same common sense
criteria.
The potential benefits of this approach would extend beyond
the limits of exculpatory defenses and inform all aspects of the
criminal law and laws of every kind. This approach would
actually and perceptibly help tether the law to transcendent
normative principles, and thereby elevate society's moral
conscience and enhance its respect for the law. It would serve to
dignify the individual, legitimize the positive law, and promote
the common good.
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